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
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THE INDIAN MUTINY
IN PERSPECTIVE

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
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THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW

Most of the figures are portraits

THE INDIAN MUTINY IN PERSPECTIVE

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR GEORGE MACMUNN

K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
COLONEL COMMANDANT, THE ROYAL ARTILLERY

LONDON
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INTRODUCTION

My nurse in my early childhood was the widow of a sergeant in the 32nd Foot and had been through the Defence of the Residency. Never did I tire of her stories, while the fact that my father and many relatives had been in the Mutiny, and all those with whom I was brought up at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, had been in many Indian campaigns, has made the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, the most romantic and fascinating of subjects to me. From my first going to India till my coming away, I have studied every accessible scene, I have talked to every veteran I could find, British and Indian, to those who have been to the 'Baillie Guard' and to those who were mutineers within the walls of doomed Delhi. Eurasian tramps who declared they were 'with Neill at Cawnpore,' and Europeans from 'Jim Turnbull's throop your Honour' have all added to the charm.

It has also been my business when on the General Staff in India to study the problem of internal defence and security lest history repeat itself, and therefore to ponder the real military aspects of the uprising and how to do better if the Devil's Wind rose again. In doing this I have been struck with the inadequacy in certain military aspects of the histories of the Mutiny, and how certain commanding facts have not received attention. I have also been struck in taking friends over the Mutiny scenes at Delhi itself, to note how little the full aspect of the happening was understood, how keen the young people and visitors of to-day are to follow the story, and yet how difficult it is for them to get a succinct account that they would be bothered to read.

The bibliography of the period is immense especially in records of personal and local experience. It has been my

INTRODUCTION

pleasure to read every book and gazetteer dealing with the subject I could find. The most attractive of all the stories is Sir John Kaye's *Sepoy War* which only ran to two volumes, but which was finished by Colonel Malleson. This with Malleson's completed History and a later *History of the Indian Mutiny* by T. Rice Holmes are the basic books, Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes, V.C., R.E., who took part in the defence of the Residency wrote thirty odd years ago an admirable brief record, *The Sepoy Revolt*, while Lord Roberts' *Forty-one Years in India* is another authoritative work. The lives of most of the leaders, of Hodson, John Nicholson, Colin Campbell, John and Henry Lawrence are all invaluable. Sir George Forest's later history but produces in easier sequence, what Kaye and Malleson have written, and gives no new facets.

Among the fascinating, if inaccurate accounts, is *The Red Pamphlet* a contemporary production by one who was then the young Malleson, a scarce work sought after by the Indian seditionists some twenty years ago. They – it was said Vinayak Savarkar – produced a work *The Indian War of Independence of 1857* which appeared till confiscated (it was printed in Paris) on the Indian bookstalls, wrapped in a cover labelled *Random Papers of the Pickwick Club*. This work was a clever but upside down production, in which statements by British writers removed from their context were cleverly inserted, but in which such incongruous phrases as 'The Heroic Nicholson' and the 'Sainted Rani of Jhansi' appeared side by side.

In 1926 appeared a little booklet by E. J. Thompson entitled *The Other Side of the Medal* which does present by quoting a series of extracts from writers who are often somewhat irresponsible, the horrors of the suppression of the Mutiny. He also appears to write as if the Mutiny was a great bar to any rapprochement between British and Indian. That is a view that few will admit except the modern Indian writer who wants to make bad blood and has raked among the histories to find

material. That deplorable and ill controlled executions and reprisals took place is alas too true. But the gravamen of such things must lie with *Messieurs les assassins* who commence. The scenes of outrage and murder of rebels were not as Mr. Thompson states confined to a few places but were universal. The scenes similar to those described at Sitapur unhappily were innumerable, and the corpses of Europeans, men women and children, lay on many a dunghill calling for vengeance. It was that that produced the deplorable instinct of reprisals. I should not place full reliance on all Mr. Thompson's extracts. Anyone used to censoring soldiers' and young officers' letters, will know something of the tendency to exaggeration designed to make the readers blood 'creep,' and I have known the rank and file depict themselves as the heroes of atrocities on an enemy, when they had not been within a hundred miles of him. Again let it be said that blame must rest with those who loose spirits they cannot control. The danger of a book like *The Other Side of the Medal* is that it gives a set of tragic extracts devoid of much context and explanation ready to the hand of the inflammable mind seeking for just such material. The tragedy of the beloved Sepoy being led into such a mass movement of mutiny and murder, which was so foreign to him, and the penalties that he incurred, has haunted many an Army officer both then and since. But one fact must never be forgotten. The Indian Mutiny even where it grew to rebellion, was not a war between British and Indian. Tens of thousands of Indian soldiers from all parts of India took part eagerly in its repression and glory to this day in the tradition, while hundreds of thousands of non-combatants equally eagerly aided in its repression. The behaviour of the Indian servants was in itself the very best evidence of the position of the British in India in 1857, and the bulk of evidence is overwhelming that it was much appreciated. That there were other instances is no doubt true, and we know that 'one fly in the pot maketh the ointment to stink.'

Perhaps the most attractive and informing work for those to whom the great upheaval is a study, is *A Postscript to the Records of the Indian Mutiny* by Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. D. Gimlette, late I.M.S., published of recent years, which tells the story and eventual fate of every unit regular and irregular of the Bengal Army.

The History of the Royal and Indian Artillery in the Mutiny by Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn is a very remarkable narrative, containing better tables and orders of battle, than any other book published. It is as interesting for its general as it is for its artillery record.

NOTE—The system of spelling followed is that adopted by the Royal Geographical Society's Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, which for Indian names follows the Survey of India and the Imperial Gazetteer.

CHAPTER I

THE RISING OF THE WIND

The Devil's Wind (of 1857) – The Mutiny historians – The British in India – The régime of Lord Dalhousie – The evolution of the Sepoy Army – The Army in 1857

The Devil's Wind (of 1857)

It is now over seventy years since there swept through the northern portion of India that catastrophe spoken of by Indians of a generation ago as the 'Devil's Wind,' *Shaitan ka harva*, more generally known as the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, and more exactly as the mutiny of the Bengal Army. It is important to realize that it was only one army, that of Bengal, that was engulfed, and not the sister but quite separate formations, the armies of Madras and Bombay. The Bengal Army was, however, the largest of the three, and stretched in its cantonments from Calcutta to Peshawar, along the great waterways of the Ganges and Jumna, and covered the whole of Northern India.

What began as a military mutiny soon became an uprising of a very few of the princes and chiefs and of some of the peoples, accompanied in every district where troops had mutinied unpunished, by a general and joyous uprooting of every sign of authority, at the hands of the wilder and less responsible spirits.

The enduring of the first uprisings and the suppression of the whole, form one of the most pathetic and adventurous stories of our race in the histories of both Great Britain and India, but still lie unhappily as a great bend sinister across the evolution of the 'Raj.' The gallantry and suffering of our people make an epic never to be forgotten, while the military side of the story, furnishes a store of exciting venturous and

chivalrous doings, that must endure wherever the British exist. Equally chivalrous and remarkable are the many instances of loyal friendship and assistance that the British received from India itself, even from many of the soldiery of those classes that generally mutinied.

In 1930 when India is once again showing signs of hysterical and unnecessary unrest, it is well to study this story of the Devil's Wind, both for its venture and for an understanding of the permanent bonds in which it entwines our destiny and that of Hindustan. The statue of John Nicholson outside the Moree Gate of Delhi, the Well of Remembrance at Cawnpore, the flag over the Residency ruins at Lucknow, which save for renewals, has never been hauled down since the site was recaptured by Sir Colin Campbell in 1858, are all holdfasts which sentiment has driven deep into our system. The story which shows us our mistakes and our glories, will give us some medium in which to study the present, and above all in these somewhat self-sufficient days should remind us of what our fathers did in their prime, before they joined 'the grizzled drafts of years gone by.' It may also show us the pathos that lay on the Indian side of the rebellion.

It may also be remarked as a reason for a new book on the Mutiny, that the last history of merit appeared over thirty years ago, and that it is the habit of the age to read eagerly stories of the past if written from a modern angle, so long as those stories are placed easily before us by our libraries. Most of us are too busy to hunt up old books, though willing to read new books on old subjects. This subject of the Mutiny is one that still attracts the younger generations, who eagerly visit the sites; and in addition to the many who *would* know, there are a great many who distinctly *should* know, and who should have the information put comfortably before them. It is also to be remarked that the existing histories have often failed to bring out certain military essentials which are needed if the past is to have lessons for the future.

The Mutiny Historians

The story of this Devil's Wind, this Mutiny of a famous army, and its accompanying uprisings, has a vast literature of its own, official, historical and personal, and yet in many ways the story has been inadequately told, and the essential factors but feebly brought out, while certain commanding features receive little prominence. That is probably due to the fact that no instructed soldiers of experience produced them, and to the rather unctuous Victorian outlook towards hard truth that pervades the more definite histories. The only history by a soldier of standing is the outline by Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes, already referred to. It is concise and succinct, and tells the story as it should be told, and is free of the tragic details of the happenings in countless stations, which naturally clog the fuller narratives, and in which interest is past. Some of the opinions given so freely by Kaye and Malleson are contradicted by the two great soldiers who, in their early days, took part, viz., Field-Marshal Lord Roberts and Sir Henry Norman, regarding matters in which the latter were better acquainted with the facts than any one else.

As an instance of the incompleteness of the narratives, it may be cited that from reading them no one would realize that Bengal and the Punjab were divided into divisional commands very much as now, with a general officer in command and the usual staff. Even if the former were often past mark of mouth, their staff were not, and it is to be presumed that they were seriously engaged in studying and commanding their divisions and in devising expedients to meet the crisis. We are told of John Lawrence ordering junior officers to carry out wonderful feats, when in reality those orders came from the proper military authority however much Lawrence may have been the stimulant at the council chamber. Indeed the neglect to mention the military machine almost seems a riposte for the contumely heaped on the Political Department for the disasters in Afghanistan.

Perhaps the most important fact connected with the Mutiny

was the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, General the Hon. George Anson, the Adjutant-General and the whole Headquarters Staff in Simla when the Government were in Calcutta. Thus the Governor-General was not only deprived of all his advisers but had no military executive to hand to control the army south of the Delhi-Meerut conflagration, or prepare for the vast reinforcements devoid of all Indian military equipment, which were to be hurried to the scene. It was the dominating condition of the period, and one from which most of the disasters, including the loss of Cawnpore, and the leaguer of Lucknow emanated. To-day every subaltern knows that the Viceroy will never let the Commander-in-Chief and staff be far from his side, even in the quietest times, and yet the astounding separation of 1857 is hardly commented on.

The important arsenals were almost all situated far up country, one of the largest with an inexhaustible store of cannon, unprotected by Europeans, being lost. Added to the initial disability inherent in the absence of Army Headquarters from the seat of government and its isolation, the death of the Commander-in-Chief of cholera on his way to recapture Delhi still further disarranged the military machine as it then existed. Nevertheless, the significance of this further disaster is never insisted on, nor the fact that it left the whole army machine camped at Delhi without a head, and only connected by telegraph through Karachi with Calcutta.

Neglecting to emphasize these points the historians prefer to emphasize what was little more than bazaar gossip concerning the discussions between the Chief and Sir John Lawrence as to the course to be followed regarding the recovery of rebel Delhi.

Another commanding occurrence and disaster, that of the mishandling of the troops at Chinhat, and the heavy loss in British lives there sustained by Sir Henry Lawrence, which alone brought on the close investment of the Residency area, are little emphasized. Again may be instanced the recognized fact that the episode of the blowing up of the expense magazine in the Delhi arsenal, thrice gallant though it was, did not affect the real ammunition supply which Sir Charles Napier had had

removed to a fortified building, three miles above the city on the river a few years earlier.¹ No writer mentions this and all prefer to assume that the ammunition was destroyed, yet withal no one pauses to wonder whence the mutineers got the inexhaustible supply of ammunition with which they bombarded the Ridge during its memorable and prolonged occupation by the avenging British. Again no history mentions the existence of two companies of native artillery among the mutinous Cawnpore troops.

Clearly therefore, from a soldier's point of view there is more to be said.

The British in India

The story of the British in India, has been enshrined for us in the allegory of *The Galley-Slave* by Rudyard Kipling, who has also called the country, 'the grim stepmother of our kind' in tribute to the hard centuries that the British have spent in India picking up the myriad pieces into which the Mogul Empire broke, and jig-sawing them into one prosperous whole. It is to be remembered by all who would lightly regard our future there, or who would depreciate what India owes to the British, that from North to South and from East to West, there are innumerable Christian cemeteries, in which almost without exception, the graves are those of British soldiers or civil servants, their children and their wives who have died *before their time* in the said service of reconstruction that has brought India to its present state of development. It has been said that India is the paradise of the British middle class, which is only an ungraceful way of saying that the country gentry and the intelligentsia have sent their sons to serve where service must earn its own promotion. That class has found the personnel of the Indian services, and it has well been said that India by taking some of the very best of Britain's young men has done the rest of the Empire no service, since the colonies, the dominions and the home country would have been the better for their labours.

¹ Used to this day as the kennels of the Delhi hounds. See p. 50.

The astounding story of the British in India, is too well known to need rehearsing save in so far as is necessary to see the uprising of the Devil's Wind, but there are one or two aspects that are not always realized. The first English settlers came to India when a Tartar throne ruled in India as in China, and had that throne at Delhi been able to maintain itself as did the Manchu, Bombay Madras and Calcutta would have been little more than wealthy treaty ports something as Shanghai is to this day. But the Mogul throne of Delhi was rotten by its own weight and the English, the *Angrez*, by that strange wafting which is the most romantic episode in the world's history, arose undesirous in its place. There are two most interesting reflections on this story of India, *first* that since the conquests of Mahmud of Ghazni, and the settling of his successors, the dynasties of Lahore and Delhi have been Turkish and Tartar, which we should write 'Tatar' and pronounce like a postman's knock, with but one very short Afghan exception. The *second* is that four great Turkish or Tartar dynasties have quartered Asia from the Bosphorus to the Pacific, Mogul in India, Manchu in Peking, Ottoman at Constantinople and Khajiar in Teheran, and that all save the Mogul or Chagatai, to give it its true name, lasted till the world war. A third reflection arising from the foregoing, is that the English have ruled India as Aryan over Aryan, people of the same ethnology, and therefore far more suitable governors than any of the strange inhuman Tartar strain. Further the Indian Army, at any rate of 1857, was but composed of Eastern Aryans officered by Western Aryans as were the large number of local levies which accompanied Alexander in his march to the Punjab. These are interesting reflections, not without importance these days, and if properly understood may offer some key to the troubles of the twentieth century.

The great Tartar rulers of the Mogul dynasty, often known by sonorous titles, which are not their names, Baber, Humayūn, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, Aurungzebe, singing themselves as they go, faded into futility in the days of Queen Anne. As they faded the rising star of England took their place, till in 1857 an aged pensioner in the ring fence of the rose-red walls of Shah

Jahan's citadel was all that was left on the site of the peacock throne that Nadir Shah took forfeit.

Between the capture of Delhi from the Marathas who held it, the rescue of the blinded Mogul Emperor from a Maratha prison house in 1803, and the Mutiny of the Bengal Army much water had rolled down the Jumna and the Ganges. Bhurtpur the arrogant, had been stormed, and the rightful heir to that throne installed, Lord Auckland had failed in his far flung policy of extending British trade and influence to the Oxus, through his neglect to implement his visions, and British prestige had suffered its greatest shock. Then after the period of murder and horror in Lahore, unparalleled since the later days of Rome, the army of the Sikhs hurled itself against the British and was destroyed. After an attempt to restore a Sikh dynasty to the throne of Ranjit Singh, the Punjab once more rose and put the issue to the sword, only to lose again and be annexed. In the interim, too, the great Maratha state of Gwalior, unmindful of the treaties under which since 1803 her status had been assured, had been toying with the unstable Sikh Durbar, and during a minority of the crown had let loose the remnant of the old Maratha Army. This had been dealt with by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Hugh Gough in 1843, and thus the year 1850 had dawned with every cloud wiped away, and the English paramount in an Empire larger even than that of Aurungzebe, the last of the Moguls to be great. Progress, peace, prosperity, were now the object of the day, and there had come to the viceregal throne one of those great constructive characters, so necessary when a page in the book of time has to be turned over. Lord Dalhousie was just such another as Lord Curzon, and his tenure of the throne occurred at just such a juncture in the affairs of India as coincided with Lord Curzon's appointment. Perhaps John Bull has a flair that enables him unconsciously to select such men on occasion. Steam, the electric telegraph, the application of science to the arts and crafts of daily life, were in 1848 waiting to be brought to India and with such an arrival, a hundred different issues emerged also from Pandora's box. Wars were apparently over; business,

trade, education, progress, and that faster than the ways of the East indicated, were required. Yet the East India Company, had by design and by instinct realized how difficult it would be to graft Western progress on Eastern stalk, and how many dangers might accrue therefrom. His Lordship did not.

The Régime of Lord Dalhousie

From 1848 Lord Dalhousie was to direct the affairs of India for the unusually long period of eight years. Like his equally illustrious successor of recent years, he was a man of delicate health geared by an iron will, but when he left the seat of the mighty he left it but to die, at an age when most men are in their prime. His acts and his works, great as they were, induced so many of the conditions that finally resulted in the Mutiny, that it is impossible to listen to the soughing of the Devil's Wind without also looking into the house of winds, that place where the East is stirred and prodded to think again and leave her ancient ways. Lord Dalhousie arrived in Calcutta in January 1848 to find the whole of India quiet enough and in the opinion of the outgoing Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, free to enter on a period of prosperity and development, with the experiment of maintaining a Sikh kingdom, under a regency during the minority of the little Dhulip Singh, prospering reasonably. In the summer succeeding his arrival however, broke out the rebellion of Moolraj the Diwan of Multan, followed by the gradual secession from the Durbar into rebellion of all the Sikh Army and of the Sikh chiefs. We need not follow the story here, suffice it to say that after the fierce battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat, in which the Sepoy Army did not cover itself with the glory of its earlier days, Lord Dalhousie annexed the Punjab, a proceeding to which there was no alternative. With the Punjab settled, Lord Dalhousie was able to deal with the many urgent issues which progress demanded. The distribution of the waters of the Ganges and Jumna over the face of land subject to famine, the inception of railways and telegraphs, the modernization of education, tea and coffee

planting, and generally the laying of the foundations of the trade increase between India and Europe which was so remarkable a feature of the last half of the nineteenth century were the Governor-General's task. He came with a fresh and enquiring mind to raise for the East all those great activities of all kinds which were stirring the western world.

The terrible state of affairs revealed to him by the inner story of the Lahore Court, when the upstart Sikh throne ended with its original founder Runjhit Singh, and the impossible condition of affairs in the great state of Oudh, struck him forcibly. This, added to the success in developing the prosperity of trader and peasant that was now so patent in the British districts, convinced his Lordship that British India was far happier than India under the native rulers, few of whom outside Rajputana, but were descended from comparatively recent soldiers of fortune. He therefore, adopted a policy, undoubtedly the right of the paramount power, of asserting the 'Right of Lapse' to states in which there was no heir. Under this policy, Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi came to be British territory, the Punjab fell of its own weight into the same fate, and, finally, the fifty year old heritage of the Oudh difficulty had to be settled.

Oudh the home of the great Aryan colonization in the Ganges plain, where Hinduism had grown to its present form, had been a Mogul province and in the decay the Nawab, who had also been the Vizir of the Empire, had founded a dynasty. This dynasty allying itself with the British and always friendly there-to, had earned the right to remain, and Oudh had become a kingdom. Nevertheless, it was a most hopeless dynasty and most evil tradition to stand godfather to. Moslem, and Shiah at that, it ruled what was largely a Hindu province. For fifty years had the British endeavoured to induce reforms and for fifty years the dynasty and its ways had called to high heaven for removal. When Lord Dalhousie came to the throne, the cup of iniquity and misrule was so full that action was unavoidable. Some of the best of the Indian statesmen, such as Colonel Sleeman, had in vain tried to induce reforms. An infamous Eastern crown falls in time by rebellion if left to its own devices, but an

infamous crown backed up by British bayonets, is an evil that cannot adjust itself by natural methods and could no longer be permitted to exist.

Nevertheless, this annexation coming in February 1856, close on the others, and added to an equally insistent annexation following a long overdue punitive war with Burma, did undoubtedly, in the eyes of India, make for uncertainty. In several hundred states varying from half the size of France to that of a nobleman's park, apprehension of our policy was unavoidably aroused. Sir John Kaye who commenced the first history of the Mutiny wrote on the fly-leaf of his first volume, one of the most pertinent of the sayings of Lord Bacon on such matters, and it may well stand as a guiding principle and ever-bright warning :—

‘If there be fuel prepared it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds, much poverty and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates so many votes for troubles. The causes and motives for sedition are innovations in religion, taxes, alterations of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, deaths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate, and what-so-ever in offending people joineth them in a common cause.’

There were, unavoidably and avoidably, many points in the above category that were present in the British rule. In the land settlements now being made in the conquered or resumed territories, mistakes of zeal often occurred, though far less so than in the work of the less experienced settlements of a generation earlier. Settlement it must be explained is the matter of writing a Domesday Book saying to whom land belongs, and, since in the East rent for arable land is the principal crown revenue — of assessing the amount that each property shall bear. Throughout the earlier history of settlement by competent men, there have been two schools of thought at work, those who only thought of the agriculturalist and the trader and shuddered at all that they had suffered in the past, and those who sympathized with the nobility and quality for whom our presence meant

great loss and humiliation. This was the great line of cleavage between Henry and John Lawrence. Henry sympathized with the laird and the captain of free-lances and knew how the coming of the Pax Britannica had taken all hope from their outlook on life, and not only theirs but the thousands who depended on them. He dreamed always of making them a valuable and contented factor in the make-up of the country side, while the more utilitarian mind preferred to get rid of them, as useless cargo in the ship of state.

In our own times the settlement of the Peshawar district by able settlement officers, has been recognized in itself as an absolute model of *ad hoc* justice and detail, but has, it is said, shouldered away the influence of the squires who have managed the tribes within our border for countless ages, and whose diminished influence alone would account for such follies and incongruities as a 'red shirt' movement on our Peshawar border.

Another curious condition obtained in the Moslem state of Oudh with its Hindu population. From time immemorial this population largely of Brahmin and Rajput origin, the former of the agricultural and not the priestly leaven, but bearing the social prestige of their class, the other Rajput, but 'broken' in that they were not tribally grouped, had formed the military class of India, or at any rate of that part properly known as Hindustan. As infantry, the footmen and the spearmen drawn from the Telinga, the soldier classes of Oudh, served the Afghan and Turkish thrones of Delhi and Lahore, and under them penetrated to Central Asia; it has been said that like the cat, they attached themselves more to the house than to the master. In 1857 they furnished the bulk of the rank and file of the Bengal Army, and had spread far afield into the 'contingents' as will be explained later. Because one of the Brahmin clans was Pandé, and many of our soldiers bore this patronymic, the mutineer soon bore for the British soldier the nickname 'Pandy.' *Up Among the Pandies* is actually the title of a story of the Sepoy War, as the Mutiny was also called. Because India is a topsy turvy land, where even the robin has a

red behind instead of a red breast, the annexation of Oudh did not please the soldiery as might have been expected, despite the fact that for simple agriculturalists like themselves, there could be no question as to the blessings that would ensue. No, as British servants, or rather as servants of the East India Company, they held a privileged position vis-à-vis their neighbours, and their little family and land troubles were pushed for them in the local courts with no less a backing than that of the British Resident at the Court of the Nawab Vizier. On annexation they relapsed into the position of being like any one else. Now to be nobody, especially when you have been Mr. Somebody, however small, is anathema to the Eastern mind, and it is on record that on this personal ground alone the Sepoy did not look with satisfaction on the change.

However, the great Indian ship of State under the brilliant leadership of Lord Dalhousie, steered a steady course, and only those whose gaze could penetrate below the surface had any knowledge of the many causes for dissatisfaction existing, some due to the inexorable march of events, some due to British mistakes, not a few to the brilliant man who thought he could hustle the East.

The Evolution of the Sepoy Army

The Sepoy Army of the Honourable East India Company, of which the larger of the three constituents vanished in a column of smoke in this trial of 1857, has a remarkable history, paralleled only by the legions of mighty Rome. When the English factors but lodged in the house of the Moguls, night watchmen and caravan guards sufficed for the protection of their storehouses and moving merchandise. The decay of central authority, the high-handedness of local rulers freed from restraint, the encroaching quarrels of rival princes, compelled the traders to arm their guards. From armed guards there followed automatically companies trained and disciplined, and ere long it was necessary to form battalions and give the battalions some cannon, if the merchants were not to go down



BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY

in the anarchy. Contending claimants soon found the new troops of the Company worthy of consideration and alliance, and so the story of the fortuitous rise to paramountcy went on. The struggle with the French for the paramountcy in Southern India, that was fought out so bitterly in the South during the middle years of the eighteenth century, not only first brought Royal troops to India, but saw the local armies begin to model themselves on the British line. The copying of the British uniforms and equipment that was so much derided in Mutiny days, was the deliberate result of definite policy based on two different factors. The line of battle of troops, whether British or Indian, all dressed in scarlet, white belts and shako-like head-dress, scared their native opponents who never knew when and where the line might be European, and further, all through the eighteenth century the successes of the British Army in the Continent of Europe had made the British Line the model to copy *par excellence*. As the type of adversary grew more serious, when the northern adventurer had to be met and the native armies were trained by French and other European officers, the number of British officers with Indian units was greatly increased. Without them the Indian Sepoy could neither receive the training necessary nor the leading. For the wars with the Mysorean usurpers and their northern mercenaries, large numbers of Royal troops were required, the Indian army was much augmented, and the customs of the British Line were more and more followed. By the earlier years of the nineteenth century, the armies of the three Presidencies had copied the Line in all its ways. Even the extravagances of dress introduced in the days of the Prince Regent found their way to India. The battalions had their rifle companies, both officers and men were dressed in green, their grenadier companies in fur caps and the like. The regular Indian cavalry, were dressed, officers and men, in light cavalry shakos, lancer and dragoon caps, and so forth. In the Sikh state some of the Durbar cavalry were dressed in the helmets and cuirasses of France, so closely did the East now copy the West in matters military. This state of affairs lasted to 1857, and the famous

Bengal Horse Artillery then wore the dress of the dragoons and horse artillery of Waterloo.

In the earlier days of the nineteenth century occurred a phenomenon, written of somewhat bitterly by old officers as the 'Brahminizing of the Indian Army.' This may well be a puzzling matter, that many students have found difficulty in following. In the earlier days the Indian Army, particularly the Coast Army as the Army of Madras was called, recruited low caste men who had no prejudices, or Afghan and Turkish adventurers and their children by Indian women, of whom the countryside was full, and very good fighting stuff both had proved when well led. As the newly acquired districts settled down the civil authorities represented that the army should have a stake in the country by enlisting the yeoman peasantry, and the sons even of the larger land owners, usually men of good Hindu caste, often of Brahmin clans engaged in agriculture who are more numerous than the priestly Brahmins. Thus it came about that long years before the Mutiny the average Sepoy was drawn from the high class yeomanry, almost entirely in Bengal, largely in Madras, and to some extent in Bombay. The Army was no longer 'mercenary,' but had become a national militia concerned in the defence of the national lands. The Bengal Army and all the Contingents that could possibly get men from this source, enlisted the Rajput and Brahmin from Oudh, whose height, active frame and curled beards and whiskers gave them a distinctly attractive martial appearance very different, let us say, from the 'mountain rats' of the Konkani Maratha.

It later became the fashion to say that the high caste Hindu was a poor soldier, although the evidence is to the contrary. Nevertheless it was soon evident that the Sikh and Moslem peasant from the plains of the Punjab was a finer fellow still, and it is perfectly true that in the two hard fought wars with the Sikhs that preceded the Mutiny, the Bengal Sepoy had not always distinguished himself, and the bulk of the fighting had to be done by the Europeans. Lord Hardinge, however, the Governor-General who was present in the self-assumed position

of second-in-command to Lord Gough in the battles of the Sutlej campaign, always said that the Bengal Sepoy was about the same in value to his mind, as the British-led Portuguese in the Peninsula War, and like them and indeed like *Jean Baptiste* had his good and his bad days. Further the Hindu of Oudh had no wish to see the last Hindu Kingdom brought down. Contrary to modern belief, the facts and records all show that he was very much on equal terms with the Afghan during the first Afghan War, when even in his scarlet coatee and his white belts, he would chase him from his native heights. The disasters that befell the Kabul force in the snows of the Kurd Kabul were not of the Sepoy's making. The general failure of the Army in the last few years of its history was more due to the withdrawal of the better officers to man the services of the huge new acquisitions and the centralizing mania which had gradually made the commandant of the native unit less and less of a king on his own little heap.

As the Army increased special races were introduced, such as Gurkhas after 1814. After the Sikh Wars, Sikhs were enlisted both into special units, and to the extent of a hundred into each battalion of the Bengal Army, much to the disgust of the commanding officers who thought the wild looking Sikh destroyed the symmetry of their curled ranks.¹

The Army in 1857

Enough has now been said on this very fascinating subject to show what a vast and imposing force the Bengal Army was, and how it cantoned itself through the length and breadth of Hindustan and the Punjab. The following table shows the strength of the Army, European and Native, of the Honourable East India Company at the outbreak of the Mutiny.

¹ It is to be remembered that the curled looped beard which we connect with the Sikh of to-day was entirely unknown to the latter till they enlisted into the Bengal line when they picked up the curling habit from their Rajput comrades.

			Bengal	Madras	Bombay
Horse Artillery Eur. Bdes.	3 ¹	1 ²	1 ²
Foot Artillery Eur. Battns.	6	4	2
Nat. „	3	1	1
Engineer Corps	1	1	1
Light Cavalry Regts.	10	8	3
Irregular Cavalry Regts.	23 ³	—	10
European Infantry Battns.	3	3	3
Guides Corps, Horse and Foot	1	—	—
Native Infantry Regt. Battns.	74	52	29
Native Irregular Battns.	12 ³	—	—
Local Militia Battns.	18	—	—
Camel Corps	1	—	—

There were also the various Contingents of the Native States.

Hyderabad: 4 Batteries 4 Cavalry Regts. 4 Battns.

Gwalior: 1 Battery 1 Cavalry Regt. 7 Battns.

Nagpur: 1 Battery 1 Cavalry Regt. 3 Battns.

Bhopal

Kotah

Jodhpur

Shekawatti

} Contingents of lesser and varying establishment.


The Contingents enumerated existed for two differing reasons. The first arose in the days when these states furiously in conflict one with another, had sought British support and agreed to maintain a properly organised force to assist in their own defence. The second developed as these times passed, and the Contingents became more and more a contribution of a State towards Indian military resources generally, and against any attempt to upset the great Pax Britannica which had grown up. The Contingents differed from modern 'State' troops in that they were officered by British officers and were often manned by races foreign to the State that maintained them. In modern times we have seen the contingent system remain till the twentieth century in the celebrated Hyderabad Contingent, now merged in the Indian Army. Prior to 1857 the two swagger contingents in which service was much sought by British officers were those of Hyderabad and Gwalior.

The foregoing enumeration includes the Punjab Irregular

¹ Includes three native troops.


² Includes one native troop.

³ Includes the Punjab Irregular Force. Oudh Irregulars not included.



BENGAL INFANTRY

The Sepoy of the Mutiny



OFFICER OF THE
BUNDLECUND LEGION

A typical Contingent

Force, later known as the Punjab Frontier Force, which was raised in 1846 and increased in 1849 from the defeated Sikh troops, but not the short-lived Oudh Irregular Force of three batteries, three cavalry corps and ten battalions, raised in 1856 from the disbanded Oudh forces on the same lines as the former.¹ Before the influence of their British officers could be felt, the force was involved, often with intense bitterness, in the catastrophe which overtook the troops of the regular army.

It should be noticed that in addition to the Company's Europeans, there were 4 regiments of cavalry and 22 battalions of the Royal Army stationed in India, but no Royal Artillery, Engineers, or departmental units. This force was at less than normal strength, for two cavalry corps and three battalions had gone to the Crimea and only one cavalry regiment had been replaced by the Carabiniers, on which fact an important part of the Meerut story rests.

On the eve of the Mutiny the grand total of these forces amounted to the very large figure of 40,000 European and 311,000 Indian ranks,² a proportion of eight to one.

During the long years that had seen the rise of the British to the heirship of the Great Mogul, the services of the Native Army had been remarkable, but perhaps 'faithful to the house rather than the master,' that is to say ready to serve the ruler who gave their long shattered land peace and prosperity. That allegiance had been raised to great content and enthusiasm by the hitherto unknown care for their interests that their British officers evinced, and also by the equally unknown brilliance and devotion of the leadership.

Nevertheless it was hardly to be expected that this long period, well over a century in 1857, could have passed without some occasions of insubordination and mass mutiny. Several had in fact, occurred. Far the most serious had been that at Vellore in 1805 when the garrison of that station despite the presence of a British battalion, had risen, massacred their officers and many of the battalion whose arms they had secured, and were only suppressed by the galloping of Colonel Gillespie

¹ *Vide* p. 93.

² Including Irregulars and Contingents.

and the 19th Light Dragoons from Arcot. Some grievances and the machinations of the deposed Mysorean usurpers lay at the bottom, but the essential fact is that the lesson indicated under conditions so likely to exist elsewhere was not taken to heart. An ill-managed affair had taken place in 1826 when Bengal troops, to avoid their objection to going across the 'Black Water,' were sent to Arracan by land on 'relief scale,' and the order to march evoked considerable resistance. The men had to pay for their own transport, on this scale which should never have been ordered, but the outbreak was put down with great and possibly necessary severity. Various lesser troubles have been recorded all tending to emphasize the three points so wanting in the years previous to 1857, viz., the presence of European troops in sufficient proportion, care to avoid acts and regulations oppressive or liable to misconstruction, and thirdly the need of having adequate authority in the hands of regimental commanders. The most serious trouble undoubtedly occurred in the years succeeding the annexation of Sind and the Punjab. The Indian soldier who is paid very little and expects generous leave to allow him to attend to his land, objects to distant garrisons unless he receives extra allowances to compensate him. It must be remembered that he has almost always a wife and family at home, for marriage and a family is the essential concomitant of Indian adolescence. The series of wars from 1839 to 1849 had greatly embarrassed Indian finances and the financiers were exploring every avenue of retrenchment. Regardless of human conditions they insisted that with the annexation of newly occupied territories, the claim for war time extra allowance¹ must automatically lapse. Many regiments under orders for the new territories were aghast, and a whole clique of corps got together by letter or contact and vowed that they would not move. What was practically open mutiny was overcome with great difficulty, the sepoy winning most of his points, and then he saw the power of combination. Indeed it was this clique of objecting corps that were found to take a leading part in the outbreaks of 1857. Government had had

¹ Termed 'batta.'

many warnings. There appeared some very able pamphlets in the decade that preceded the Mutiny which pointed out the troubles. John Jacob, the distinguished artilleryman on the Sind frontier, frequently wrote forcibly against the Bengal system of promotion by seniority, urging the merits of the Bombay system of promotion by selection, pointing out the effeteness of the Bengal Native Officer in supporting his British Officers compared with the alert young Bombay men.

Herbert Edwardes curiously enough had replied by pointing out the danger of the efficient selected Indian as leader of mutineers. Both were proved to be partly right. Henry Lawrence had repeatedly warned Government of what was coming, and had said that what had occurred at Kabul in 1841 might so easily occur at Delhi.

In the *Calcutta Review* of 1843 Lawrence had written commenting on the habitual carelessness of Government, and how easily a hostile party could seize Delhi, he wrote 'Let this happen on June 2nd, and does any sane man doubt that twenty-four hours would swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands, and in a week every ploughshare in Delhi would be turned into a sword. And when a sufficient force had been mustered, *which could not be effected within a month*, should we not then have a more difficult game to play than Clive at Plassey or Wellington at Assaye.' It is true, however, that in the batta disturbances of 1844 and 1851¹ he saw no great evidence of coming danger so far as the Army was concerned. Lord Dalhousie had grave misgivings, and Sir Charles Napier while most enthusiastic as to Sepoy prowess, wrote clearly enough of the dangers of so vast an army so inadequately balanced by European troops. Warnings however were general rather than specific.

But whoever wrote warnings and whatever effect they may have had, the strain of the Crimean War had postponed any action, and 1857 saw the old system in all its force with a smaller European counter-weight than usual.

An important point to notice with regard to the distribution

¹ See previous page.

of the army in Bengal and the Punjab, and especially its arsenals, which were all established when railways were undreamt of in India, is the great waterways of the Ganges and the Jumna and their large tributaries navigable all or part of the year, and of the Indus and its tributaries. The heavier military stores were almost always carried by water, and a large marine existed on the Ganges and the Indus, the former still in operation to this day, though on the Indus the railways have almost entirely replaced the flotilla. The cantonments lay along the courses of the rivers, and indeed so did many of the great Indian cities. The strategy of the British in India, sometimes by choice, sometimes by necessity, was always largely influenced by this fact. In the Coast provinces of both Bombay and Madras many of the cantonments for similar reasons of accessibility, lay on or near the coast.

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CHAPTER II

THE CONDITIONS OF 1857

The India of 1857 – The military organization and personalities in Bengal in 1857 – The European garrison – The forerunners of the storm – The first outbreak – Meerut and Delhi

The India of 1857

IN these days we are prone to think that the modernizing of India came with the assumption of control by the Crown direct, in replacement of its agent the East India Company, after the Mutiny. Still more is it believed that the change came with the opening of the Canal in the early seventies. That event did, it is true, enormously influence the westernization and the modernization of India,¹ but it did not originate it.

The real opening out of India began with the series of Victorian campaigns and acquisitions that took place during the eight years between the close of the First Afghan war in 1842 and 1850. These resulted in the annexation of the Punjab and the Conquest of Sind and the quickening of the pace which ensued, to which must be added the annexation of Oudh in 1856. For some years the overland route through Egypt to Suez had been in use and despite its manifold discomforts and the many changings involved had so shortened the journey to the East that the period of visitors from Europe had set in. The railway developments had commenced a year or two prior to the Mutiny; from Bombay the line had reached the Tannah Creek and from Calcutta northwards a little over a hundred and forty miles to Raniganj, while

¹ The combined imports and exports have risen from 60 million sterling in 1860 to 430 million sterling in 1929.

earthwork was in progress at many points on the line; indeed, it was the railway works that produced so large a civilian population in the dwindling military station of Cawnpore, at the time of the great tragedy.

The interior administration in India in the fifties was in many ways at its zenith in its suitability. The people still remembered all the chaos and disorder from which they had been rescued by the coming of law and order, or had heard it from their fathers. The complicated modern administration had not set in, which however unavoidable has so divorced the British magistrate from his happy shirt-sleeve touch with the people. Men took far less leave and were not changed frequently, so that their grasp and grip and their friendships with the notables of their districts still held. But even then times had changed from the spacious days of the Malcolms and the Ochterlonys and the like, many of whom held that it was their duty to amalgamate themselves with the people and even adopt some of their ways. Change in this earlier outlook was inevitable under the circumstances, but the personnel of the Indian Civil Service had still the kindly touch with the people which has been so happy a condition of the British *Raj*. It is to be remembered that the British administration but replaced in most cases a lost or ruined native one, and the object of the Company and its Governments was to retain as much as possible of what was good in the ancient ways, and aimed chiefly at making life and trade safe so that they might continue and prosper.

Hostility to the *Raj* came from certain recognized sources, from the Muhammadans in those districts where the tradition of Moslem over-lordship still remained, from groups of the priestly Brahmins who realized that their influence must slowly wane, thirdly from those ruling families whose hostility to us had eventually brought them to ruin, and fourthly from those of the baronial class, who resented the rule that slipped and curbed their over-riding habits and privileges of the past. To the peasant, the industrialist and the trader and all that were desolate and oppressed, the British *Raj* came as a most undreamt-of blessing, despite the fact that some of the early land

revenue enactments were mistaken and pressed unduly on those subjected to them.

In the vast territories of Oudh these troublous elements were bound to be present. After the annexation of that State by Lord Dalhousie, the administration was entrusted to Sir James Outram, than whom no more sympathetic statesman could be found. He was well qualified to minimize the unavoidable hardships following on a putting-an-end to an oriental administration where many ruined prospects and broken hearts had to be eased, and the other side of the shield blazoned. Unfortunately he had to go away for his health, and the man he wanted to hold the fort for him was not available. Then there ensued during the interregnum, a régime of the most unsympathizing bureaucratic efficiency, which little understood, succeeded in alienating most even of those who looked to the eventual good that would accrue from reform. Early in 1857, the worn but enthusiastic Henry Lawrence was brought from Rajputana as Outram was required for the war with Persia.

The Military Organization and Personalities in Bengal in 1857

It has been related how the Commander-in-Chief in the spring of 1857 was on tour in the 'Upper Provinces' en route to summer at Simla, with all the personnel at Army Headquarters, and how there was no one representing the Army with the Government of India other than the bureau of the War Ministry. The Military Member at that time was only nominally a soldier, General Sir Peter Low of the Madras Army, who 20 years earlier had been Resident at Lucknow. He had the reputation for sound common sense, but the Bengal Army, save for his knowledge acquired as Resident in Oudh was a sealed book to him. His ignorance of military matters however, was ordinarily a good and proper thing, as he was the less likely to infringe on the Commander-in-Chief's duties, but in the peculiar crisis that arose it was a grave disadvantage. The

Secretary of Government in the Military Department was a Colonel Birch who had come under the severe displeasure of Sir Charles Napier when Judge Advocate General of the Army. He was by no means fitted to deal with such a crisis, in the absence of the responsible military advisers. The whole position of this department was, it will be remembered, the rock on which the strong reforming partnership of Lord Kitchener and Lord Curzon split in our own time. The military organization in Bengal was very much that of to-day, the great province that stretched from the Bay of Bengal to the Afghan Frontier at Peshawar being divided into seven divisional commands:—

Presidency: Major-General Sir John Bennet Hearsey, K.C.B. (H.E.I.C.S.).

Dinapore: Major-General G. W. A. Lloyd, C.B. (H.E.I.C.S.).

Cawnpore: Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, K.C.B. (H.E.I.C.S.).

Meerut: Major-General S. H. Hewitt, C.B. (H.E.I.C.S.).

Sirhind: Major-General Sir Henry Barnard, K.C.B. (Brit. Service).

Lahore: Major-General G. E. Gowan, C.B. (Ben. Art., H.E.I.C.S.).

Peshawar: Major-General T. Reed, C.B. (Brit. Service).

Under them there were several first and second class brigade areas, commanded by brigadiers. The rank of brigadier-general was conferred and used for special purposes only.

There was a Commander-in-Chief also in Madras and Bombay with separate military departments in the Governments of those Presidencies. Nevertheless the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal was in command of all British troops in the East Indies, and had an over-riding position in all military matters when necessary. Divisional commands in Bombay and Madras also existed as in Bengal. Fortunately each of those armies had its own arsenals which were able to help equip the British reinforcements that were to pour out from Home. Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant of the Bengal Army was Commander-in-Chief in Madras, and Sir Henry Somerset of the British service in Bombay. In the Indian Army, and to a considerable



LIEUT -GENERAL SIR JOHN HEARSEY
in the uniform of 2nd Bengal Irregular Cavalry

extent in the British Service advancement went by seniority, and the occurrence of the Crimean War had prevented any British Service men of marked attainments being in India at the juncture, while even the Commander-in-Chief himself had seen no soldiering since his youth in the Peninsula. The same applied to General Reed at Peshawar. Sir Henry Barnard, however, who had just come to Ambala (Sirhind) had been chief of the staff in the closing years of the Crimea. The Indian Generals were all fairly old, but Sir Hugh Wheeler and Sir John Hearsey men of outstanding reputation and experience, were both advanced in years, the former over and the latter close on seventy years of age. The latter was to save the situation, the former was to lose it. Sir Patrick Grant was the one 'star turn' in the Bengal Army, promoted for service and knowledge, after serving in all Lord Gough's campaigns, but he was not on the spot.

Some of the brigadiers were men of distinction but nearly all beyond the age when physical activity was likely to remain, after the long years on end then spent in the East. The only one who came to fame, most deserved, was Sir Sidney Cotton, late of the 22nd Foot, who commanded the Peshawar Brigade. Brigadier Corbett at Lahore also gained a reputation for decision.

The European Garrison

It has been related how the European Garrison of India consisting of H.M. troops and the Company's Europeans, had been reduced during the Crimean War by 5 Queen's regiments, and had not yet been brought back to normal establishment. In June 1857 the actual strength was 40,160 exclusive of 5,362 British officers of the native units. And so far as Bengal went the grouping, which was the direct result of the annexation of the Punjab and the new task of opposing Afghan invasions and eruptions, had taken most of the Europeans to the Punjab. There was the 53rd Foot at Calcutta, the 10th Foot at Dinapore

400 miles up the Ganges, the newly raised 3rd Battalion of the Bengal Fusiliers at Agra, and the 32nd Foot at Lucknow. Thus but four battalions with a few European batteries were stationed in this tract as big as France and Germany.

It was not till Meerut and Ambala were reached that the strength of Europeans began to be in evidence, while in the Punjab proper British corps were at Peshawar (2), Rawalpindi (2), Lahore, Ferozepore, Jullundur, Ambala (4),¹ and Sialkot (1), with several troops of European horse artillery as well as field batteries. It was, of course, this fact that permitted of the Punjab disarming or overawing its Sepoy army, and then sending the reinforcements that took Delhi. Without this garrison the zeal and energy of the Punjab group of officers could not have borne all the fruit it did. It explains also how comparatively helpless the Supreme Government was for the moment when the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi put down a barrier between the Northern and Southern grouping of reliable troops.

The Forerunners of the Storm

However much the various causes of dissatisfaction both in the Army and in the country-side may have been at work, 1857 opened peacefully enough; the Governor-General and his council were in Calcutta and as was their wont, they would summer in Calcutta. During certain of the years of the First Afghan War and of the Sikh troubles, Lord Auckland, Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie had spent the summer with a camp office in Simla, which had come into fashion as a residence by the end of the thirties, having steadily grown in popularity since its first discovery at the close of the Nepal War. But the absence of the Governor-General from his capital had always been accompanied by great inconvenience, and was by no means normal, for the formal move to Simla of the Government of India had yet to be inaugurated. On the other hand, the Afghan Wars and the annexation of the Punjab had brought so

¹ Includes the troops in the Simla hills and one cavalry regiment.

many troops into Northern India that the Commander-in-Chief was in the habit of touring in the northern provinces each spring and summering in Simla with his staff and heads of departments.

Before he started on his northern tour in the spring of '57, there had occurred the untoward and devil-born incident of the lascar at Dum Dum, and the excitement known as the 'greased cartridges,' concerning which the historians have poured such wrath on all and sundry. The Army was being issued with the Enfield Rifle, and the cartridge included a greased patch at the top, which had to be torn off (as had the top of cartridges previously in use) with the teeth. With the new weapon this greased patch was used to assist in ramming home the bullet into the rifled muzzle-loading barrel. This rifle and these cartridges had been in experimental use for some time without demur, the pattern and the instructions for making up the cartridges having been drawn up by the Ordnance Committee in Great Britain. They had been seen by many people in India, but it had occurred to no one that the biting off the greased patch might offend ceremonial religion. Nor had the idea occurred to those Indian soldiers who had hitherto experimented with the cartridges.¹ The vials of the historians' wrath have been poured on all and sundry for not thinking of the matter, but to those who know the ordinary routine of army administration it would be hard to say whose business it was, in the absence of previous experience, to take ken of such possibilities. In food matters the Commissariat Department could be trusted, but the armament authorities had no such daily reminders of religious inhibition as the food authorities must always have had.

If we turn back to Lord Bacon's wisdom already quoted we see 'If there be fuel prepared it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come.'

The spark came in this way, and in this connection is to be remembered the almost homogeneous composition of the

¹ Save that it is said that Colonel Tucker, Adjutant-General of the Army when the adoption of the new rifle was under discussion, had written an overlooked memorandum, on the importance of the components used for the grease.

Bengal Army of high caste soldiers of ingrained customs from one part of India. At Dum Dum near Calcutta where there was an arsenal, a lascar of humble breed was abused by a high caste sepoy of the 34th Infantry, whereon the former remarked that such as he would not long carry their heads so high, as the use of the cartridges whose tops they must tear with their teeth, smeared with the fat of the sacred cow and the foul pig, would damn their place in heaven for ever, and render them out-caste among all their fellows. The horrified sepoy ran to his lines and the story spread like wildfire, equally disconcerting to Hindu and Moslem. In vain did officers re-assure their men, and generals address them, in vain did the Commander-in-Chief order that the men should grease their own cartridges with their own butter; the excitement spread, and over the whole land regiment corresponded with regiment. The free postage for soldiers' letters only recently discontinued, in itself a grievance, had long taught them to write freely among friends and relatives throughout this great homogeneous service.

The aged King of Delhi with a turn for writing topical verse is credited with a Persian couplet, that describes the chance which enabled the somewhat disgruntled soldiery to combine in one curious hysterical movement, a chance that the many plotters never hoped to find. And this is how it runs.

*Kuchch Chil-i-Rum nahin kya, ya Shah-i-Rus nahin,
Jo Kuchch kya na sare se, so cartouche ne*

to which the free translation has been made:

Not Tsar of Russ not Sultan made the conquest easy
The only weapon was a cartridge greasy.

At Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot in the Bengal Army were rifle depots, where detachments of selected men had been assembled to be trained as instructors in the use of the new weapon, which in itself elicited the admiration of the men for its power and efficiency. At this juncture disturbing ideas if current at the rifle depots, were thus easily transmitted throughout the army.

The Commander-in-Chief marching up country, as related with the intention of inspecting the troops in the Northern provinces and on his way to summer with all his staff at Simla, inspected the rifle depot at Ambala. He was escorted by the 37th Native Infantry, and it is said that when men of that corps at the depot ran out to greet their comrades they were received with taunts as tainted out-caste men who had used the cartridges. The Commandant of the depot realized the gravity of the situation and the Chief through an interpreter addressed the native officers and men, and explained the whole matter, and pledged himself that in future the men should grease their own cartridges. They expressed themselves satisfied, but as they went to their corps they found the mischief done and none to listen to them. The fat was in the fire and no one knew how to get it out. The one man who according to current views could reassure the men, and who held the feelings of the Sepoy in his hands, was the handsome debonair Pat Grant of the Hurriana Light Infantry already referred to, the favourite staff officer of Lord Gough, the man who knew more of the inner side of the Punjab campaigns than any one else. But he was away Commander-in-Chief in Madras and when he did come up it was too late. Henry Lawrence, Hearsey, Wheeler, could all hold the Indian Sepoy for a time but the pressure of events was to set even their efforts at naught.

Nevertheless the Commander-in-Chief's action did undoubtedly put matters straight for awhile in the depots, and the great man passed on.

That the men were disturbed in many cantonments was evident by the obviously incendiary fires that occurred in cantonments, thatched bungalows, often those of officers, bursting into flames at night. Many of the regiments had served in the recent Sonthal campaign, and had learned from the Sonthals the trick of firing lighted arrows into thatch from a safe distance, and many of the fires were thus occasioned.

Then came the curious episode of the chappaties, the small unleavened cakes of wholemeal wheat, that were being mysteriously distributed round the country. They came from

one village watchman to another, with the message 'From the North to the South and from the East to the West,' and every watchman was enjoined to make four more and send them out with the same message. To this day no clue has been arrived at as to whence they came and who started this alarming type of chain letter. Many who knew the country remembered that similar portents had occasionally been noted and the most that could be said was that they were believed to be meant to draw people's attention to something coming. That something might have been the Mutiny, but it might equally have been any other matter religious or local, or it might have even been an advance advertisement.

In this connection it may be remarked that there has never been any evidence that the Mutiny was due to any master-plotting. The many grievances and the number of magnates and barons on whom our policy had impinged were always engaged in some local plotting to improve their condition, to increase their pensions and the like. Brahmins hated the undermining of their influence, the abolition of infanticide and of satti or widow sacrifice, even the suppression of thuggi the mysterious ritual murder and theft, all raised their own peculiar enmities. When the Army broke forth, then each and all of these pesterings tried to link their fortunes to the disintegrated force at their disposal. Some components of the Army, as has been explained, had once come to an understanding one with another regarding proceeding to the frontier and newly acquired provinces without extra batta. With the cartridge scare the old machinery of correspondence and consultation was revived. Each corps had no doubt before long its own element and centre of resistance which now took on some definite form. The bolder spirits, especially those interested in wrestling, which meant also gambling, dancing girls and debt, were usually the ring leaders in organizing the regimental resistance spore. Local master-minds may have appeared, but no trace of a serious centre was ever discovered. Nevertheless, the Moulvi of Fyzabad had, it was known, visited various Muhammadan centres early in the year, and

while well known for his fanaticism before the outbreak, at once became one of its leaders. The Nana¹ too had recently made extensive journeys and pilgrimages, which may have also meant some attempt at combination.

The First Outbreak

The first serious signs of trouble that ensued happened at Barrackpore the headquarters of the Presidency Division close to Calcutta, where happily Sir John Hearsey commanded. It was extremely fortunate for the Governor-General that this officer was handy, for his knowledge of the army was second to none and his prestige and influence very great. He was a man of commanding presence, known in his young days as the 'Hero of Seetabuldi' for the charge he led during the attack on the Residency troops at Nagpur in 1818.

At Barrackpore were the 2nd Grenadiers and the 34th, 43rd, and 70th Infantry. The only British corps was the 53rd Foot with a wing in Calcutta and a wing in Dum Dum 7 miles from Calcutta. The next British Corps was at Dinapore 400 miles further up country. It was at Dum Dum, between Calcutta and Barrackpore as related, that the contretemps of the cartridge taunt had occurred, and it was to a Brahmin of a Barrackpore regiment. The news entirely upset the garrison there, and it is curious that the Sepoy mentality forgot their close confidence in their officers and let the grievance simmer, resorting to nocturnal incendiarism as an outlet to their feelings. A hundred miles or so north of Barrackpore lay Berhampur, not far from the battlefield of Plassey, garrisoned by the 19th Bengal Infantry, a detachment of cavalry and a native battery. On February 24th a small party of the 34th from Barrackpore marched in, and their story of the feelings and ferment at that place so worked on the minds of the 19th that they decided to disobey an order to exercise with blank ammunition on the 26th. They refused the cartridges which had nothing

¹ The Nana, Dundoo Punt, adopted son of the ex-Peshwa, who cherished many grievances against the British.

to do with the new rifle and were the same as used for years. Threatened with court-martial, they then obeyed, but that evening turned out in wild excitement and seized their arms. The arms of Indian troops, be it remembered, were kept in masonry 'bells' and were not in the barrackrooms or quarters. Their Colonel, Mitchell, who also commanded the station, ordered the artillery and cavalry to march on the lines of the mutinous regiment. It was a dark night and the road for the oncoming troops was illuminated by torches. The mutinous regiment, their European officers standing by, awaited the approach in trepidation. The colonel addressed the regiment and tried to soothe their fears. The men anxious not to push matters to the end offered to return their arms and fall out if the other troops marched off. This somewhat reluctantly, the colonel agreed to, and the excitement died away. Had he persisted it is quite probable that the other troops would have refused to act, and the general insurrection might have started two months sooner. That might in itself have been a blessing. When the news reached Calcutta, Lord Canning took the best possible step while the portent was being considered, he sent for H.M. 84th Foot from Rangoon. The happenings at Berhampur had of course caused great excitement at Barrackpore, and this was not allayed by the arrival of the 84th in Calcutta, on March 20th. In the meantime Government had decided to take the, to them, extreme step of disbanding the 19th so that no trace of so unworthy a corps should remain on the rolls. An extreme step it was, if we realize how sought after was service, how great was the prestige of the red coat, and how many men's careers would be broken by disbandment and dismissal. But however wise a decision and a punishment itself disbandment might be, the situation had far out-run such measures. The 19th was ordered to march into Barrackpore, where its sentence would be promulgated. Before it could arrive, however a graver ebullition was to take place. On the afternoon of March 29th, it was reported to the Adjutant of the 34th, Lieutenant Baugh, that several of the men of that corps were in a very excited state, and that one of them, Mangal Pandé, was

perambulating the lines, with a loaded musket, calling on the men to rise, declaring that he himself would shoot the first European he came across. The staunch adjutant got hastily into his uniform and taking his pistols rode to the regimental parade ground. En route he picked up the European sergeant-major who had already endeavoured to get the guard to act (in those days every regular corps had two European staff-sergeants), and together they made for the quarter-guard of the 34th. Immediately in front of this guard was the station time-gun, and behind this Mangal Pandé lurked. As Baugh rode up the sepoy deliberately fired at him, and brought his horse to the ground. Baugh drawing his pistols advanced on the mutineer. The latter had a sword which he now drew, and the adjutant fired his pistol at him, but missing, before he could fire again, Mangal Pandé had cut him down. Sergeant-Major Hewson, running up behind, called on the guard, a jemadar and twenty men, who were now looking on not thirty yards away, to seize the mutineer, but the jemadar forbade them. The breathless sergeant-major now attempted to seize the man himself, but was also cut down. The only man who tried to do his duty was the adjutant's own Moslem orderly who had followed him.

Mangal Pandé was now marching up and down in an excited state, having reloaded his rifle, taunting and reviling all and sundry, as the officers and Grant, the brigadier, began to assemble. At this juncture General Hearsey rode up with his son, who was his A.D.C., in the course of his afternoon ride. Seeing that immediate action was necessary, if the whole corps was not to turn out in tumult, he rode straight for Mangal Pandé saying when warned, 'Damn his musket !' The mutineer then shot himself, and the guard too had come to their senses. Mangal Pandé was secured and taken to the 70th quarter-guard. That for the moment put an end to the trouble, the General promoting Sheikh Pultoo the loyal orderly, to havildar on the spot. The next day, the 19th drew nigh, apparently in a humble enough state, and the 84th, a wing of the 53rd, and two European batteries marched in. The disbandment of the corps was carried out, amid curious scenes of good will and

sorrow when the General addressed them for the last time, the men cheering him as they left.

It is the fashion of the historian to criticize the delay in punishing the 34th, but given the strange and unwonted circumstances of the case this is not sustainable. Mangal Pandé and the jemadar commanding the guard were brought to trial. Mangal Pandé who had only wounded himself was tried and sentenced to death a week after, a delay due to his own wounds, and was executed two days later. A similar sentence on the jemadar had to go to the judge-advocate-general at Simla for confirmation by the C.-in-C. The papers had to get there and, in view of what was at stake, some thought was necessary. Only two days were needed in Simla for confirmation and the order for execution of the sentence was telegraphed. The jemadar was hanged acknowledging the justice of his end, on April 21st.

So much did the storm appear to have quieted on the surface, that the Governor-General was much reassured and even arranged to send the 84th back. None of the authorities civil or military had any conception of the deadly leaven running underground. Every cantonment in India was of course talking hard, and young officers in the assembly rooms lightheartedly spoke of 'Our Jacks' – the long disused phrase for the sepoys – and whether they did or did not fuss about the cartridges, what the parties coming back from the musketry schools thought about it, and so forth. Men of understanding such as Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow or Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpore, did realize how grave might be the trouble, but the British mentality generally accepted the lull as a sign that the storm had blown over. It was the leave season, ladies had already begun to move to Simla, Mussoorie and Murree, but an unusually cool year had kept many in the plains, while the non-existence of railways usually condemned those far from the Himalaya to stay where they were.

However moderate the season, it was quite warm enough for the usual hot weather routine to be in force, for the usual move to the Simla hills of three European battalions to have taken

place, and for many of the younger soldiers to have gone to the hill depots. Officers who were lucky enough to have shooting leave were in Kashmir and other parts of the Himalaya, and others had started for the health cure at the Cape which allowed of Indian pay, or else had gone Home, on the long voyage by sea, or the hot scamper of the overland route across Egypt. The remainder were settling down to hot-weather duty, routine, and amusements, just the hard-working life of the Indian civilian, and the daily routine of keeping men and horses in the regiments going through the summer. For the infantry there was the eternal musketry course then far simpler than now, but with the excitement of the first rifle and the greased cartridge trouble thrown in.

Early in May, Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow received his first warning. The 7th Oudh Irregulars refused their cartridges, and in spite of all remonstrances said that they must follow the fashion. On their breaking into violence Sir Henry the prompt and courageous, at once marched on them in the dark and attacked them.¹

Despite these signs, it was held throughout the military world, that though outbreaks of indiscipline might occur everywhere, yet after some local excitement all would quiet down. In view of past experience and the great tradition of the native army there was some justification for this impression. Who could imagine the patient 'Jack' in open mutiny.

Meerut and Delhi

But now were to occur the real outbreaks which started the great military mutiny as such, and which lit up the whole of northern India in a blaze. It happened in this wise. Meerut was the principal station in what were then known as the North-west Provinces, founded shortly after the occupation of Delhi in 1803 to watch the Punjab and the continual Afghan invasions. It had a considerable European garrison including the Carabiniers who had just arrived from England to replace

¹ *Vide* page 95.

one of the corps taken from India for the Crimea. This regiment was composed of young soldiers, and was almost entirely horsed by young untrained walers, in those days far more intractable before training even than now. It was not yet a cavalry regiment 'in being.' There was also a troop of European horse artillery, a European light field battery and the 60th Rifles. It was also the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery not long moved there from Dum Dum, and the brigadier commanding that corps, Archdale Wilson, was also the brigadier of the station.

The Indian garrison consisted of the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native Infantry. Of all the stations in India, with a European garrison of a strength almost equal to the Indians, Meerut was the one where disorder seemed least likely to occur. Forty miles away lay ancient Delhi, where the last of the Moguls Bahadur Shah, an old man of eighty years of age, a pensioned grand-son of the last blinded Mogul, ruled in miniature state, by kindness of the British in the old rose-red citadel of Shah Jahan. Two miles outside Delhi lay a brigade of three Bengal regiments the 38th, 54th, and 74th, and a native light field battery, (5th F.B.) commanded by Brigadier Graves.

On the 23rd of April Colonel Carmichael Smyth commanding the 3rd Light Cavalry, returned from leave. A disciplinarian without the human touch that understands, he like many another good soldier thought it was time to put an end to the folly in progress, and no place seemed more favourable than Meerut. He accordingly ordered the 'skirmishers' of his regiment, those men armed with carbines, to parade for exercise with blank ammunition and practise the recently authorised change in drill, devised to calm the crisis, by which the cartridges were torn open by hand rather than with the teeth. The men refused to handle the ammunition, and the Commander-in-Chief, also impressed with the need for some action, ordered their trial by a native general court-martial. They were convicted by a court of native officers and their sentences of long periods of imprisonment confirmed save in the case of a few young soldiers. Then on May 9th, occurred the scene

which undoubtedly caused in its actual form the notorious outbreak. The divisional commander Major-General Hewitt, an aged and quite undistinguished but amiable officer of the Bengal Army, directed that the condemned men should be shackled on a general parade of the whole garrison. Whether or no it was wise to submit the native troops to such a trial may well be argued. It was, no doubt, essential to bring home to them the enormity of the crime of mutiny, and the dire results that follow, and it was now thought necessary to add something more severe to the kindly admonitions and explanations to which the excited men had been treated. Right or wrong it took hours in the growing heat of that summer morning, and ending with a shuffling march of the 85 convicts down the lines of troops, Artillery, Rifles, Dragoons, Sepoys, now crying on the general for mercy, now taunting their comrades with leaving them in the lurch. It was undoubtedly a severe psychological strain for all. Assuming that it was necessary, some further steps were undoubtedly required such as a European guard over the prisoners for a while, and some action to watch their comrades and if need be, humour them.

The next day May 10th was a Sunday. The church parade of the Europeans was held in the cool of the evening, and it had from that day been put back from 6 to 6.30 p.m. It was just an ordinary hot weather Sunday spent in sleep, or at racquets, in lunch and tea parties by the officers and ladies of the garrison and civil station. Then as folk were ordering their traps for evening church, or the evening drive, or as the young men and women were thinking of their ride in the cool of the evening, or the soldiers with leave off church parade, were strolling down the bazaar, there came a sound of firing from the Native Infantry lines. The bazaars took fire at once as if they knew what was coming, the butchers and the bad characters seized their knives and tulwars, and every stray soldier, every Christian half-blood, whole-blood or Indian that was in sight, was set on. The crowd poured down on those houses within reach of the bazaars, bent on murder, plunder, and arson. The charm of the Pax Britannica was broken!

During the day odd servants and sepoy had sensed a storm, and warned their masters, but not unnaturally had been little heeded.

The less responsible accounts of the Mutiny have talked of plots and plans, but the careful enquiries made afterwards quite failed to produce any evidence of such. Moreover, in 1923 there were published¹ for the first time the private letters of Sir Archdale Wilson to his wife whom he had just left in Mussoorie, and they throw quite a new light on the somewhat controversial accounts of what really happened. There had been, no doubt, plenty of loose and fierce talk in the lines after the punishment parade. No doubt the young bloods of the cavalry had talked of releasing their comrades both in the lines and in the bazaars. The story that some men of the 3rd Cavalry had been taunted by the courtezans of the bazaar is true. The men were in a state of excitement and exaltation, and tinder to the suggestions of any plotters who might be nursing deep laid plans, or who were the tools of a wider organization. Whatever it was, something in the bazaar set men running to the lines with the yarn that the British troops were coming to attack them, a rumour possibly due to the recent alteration of the hour of divine service from morning to evening. The sepoy swarmed from their huts. Then some of the cavalry mounted and galloped for the jail, the men of the 20th rushed to their bells of arms, those of the 11th mustered more quietly, but their Colonel who came down to calm them was shot by a man of the more involved 20th. Then both corps lost their heads and fired at their officers who eventually made off. In the bungalows near the lines and bazaars there were a few cruel murders of officers and families, with plunderings and burnings, but happily the devotion of servants and orderlies saved most, and it was on stray British soldiers and on the humbler Christians that the brunt of the terror fell.

So much abuse and criticism has been vented on the authorities both with and without reason, that as an example and a study, the details as corrected by the more careful study of

¹ In the *Journal* of the United Service Institution of India.

facts, and the knowledge that accrues as the desks of the dead give up their evidence are worth recording.

The officer in immediate command was as stated Brigadier Wilson of the Bengal Artillery an elderly spare man, whose artillery reputation was considerable, whose more recent experience of stirring events was nil, and who, though efficient as a soldier and a disciplinarian in the good sense of the word, had never been credited with any remarkable energy or power. He might be described as a little above the average of the good regimental officer when advanced in years. He had only returned from Mussoorie a day or two before where he had gone to recover from an attack of small-pox. He was not therefore at his best.

At six o'clock the troops were falling in without arms as was then the wont for church parade. The regimental sergeant-major of the 60th, hearing the firing and shouting in the distance, with a rifleman's acumen, broke off the men before the officers had arrived, and ordered them to doff their white and fall in in green with their arms. At 6.30 the brigade-major rode up to Brigadier Wilson's bungalow to report that the native troops had broken out. Wilson called for his horse galloped to the Rifle parade ground, sending orders for the Carabiniers and Artillery to march to the same spot. The historians have made great ploy at the delay in getting troops under arms, but the Rifles were ready save for the longish business of issuing ball ammunition. The mounted troops took longer, as any one who knows the business of drawing saddlery and harness from saddle rooms in the dark and getting them on to the horses in stables lit by a few oil lamps, will understand. Finally Wilson, who had been joined by the old General Hewitt, commanding the division, moved down towards the Native troops' lines with artillery and Rifles ordering the Carabiniers to follow him, which they did, as many men mounted as had rideable horses, the remainder on foot with their carbines.

The British and native barracks or lines were as so often happens, by design some way apart, and in the case of Meerut divided by a deep watercourse. As the Europeans reached

the scene of the disturbance it was pitch dark and there was nothing to be seen, the Sepoys had fled, and no one knew whither. Meerut is surrounded by innumerable groves of mango and other trees and high sugar cane crops. A few men were lurking in adjacent groves and some shots were fired. The Rifles went through the lines in extended formation, a few round shot were fired into the groves. That was the end of it; though burning bungalows were still giving a glare, the uproar in the bazaars was now quelled, the convicts from the jail who had been released were no doubt mixed up with the bazaar riff-raff, and these were soon hunted off.

The 3rd Cavalry after releasing their comrades, and galloping about firing at all and sundry, had also disappeared, but a remarkable instance of discipline loyalty and the influence of officers occurred in the corps. Captain Craigie turned out his troop of these Indian light dragoons, fully dressed and accoutred, and with Lieutenant Melville Clarke and the lad Alfred MacKenzie, led that troop up and down the disturbed area, rescuing ladies and Eurasian families, cutting down marauders and generally acting as the loyalest and steadiest troops in the world, because they knew that what their officers did and told them must be right and true. Happily in this crisis there were many such officers and many such men. Incidentally it is to be observed that the curious fact that so many officers known to have similar influence were often among the first victims of an act of mutiny, was but a proof that the small clique trying to push a corps over the brink, knew something of their business, and aimed at silencing those voices which could at once calm excitement.

With the mutinous troops disappeared in the darkness, none knew whither, the Brigadier was in great perplexity. Were they lurking somewhere in the vast network of groves and cane brakes that surrounded the cantonment? Did they plan attacks on the European barracks and the very large population of women and children of all grades and kinds scattered about? The glare of the bungalows already burning hinted as much. Some thought that the men, sobered from their excitement,

would merely melt away and endeavour to reach their homes. The immediate steps required were to protect the cantonment, several miles in circumference, collect the families to be protected and release a portion, at any rate, of the troops for operations. The last thing that *appeared to any responsible mind, was that the broken excited troops with little ammunition would make for Delhi, where an ordered brigade was in being.* No one apprehended that the Delhi brigade from which native officers had come and returned for the general court-martial, was also likely to break out, still less proclaim the old image Bahadur Shah as Emperor of India. The telegraph line to Delhi had been down since four o'clock, but till the *émeute* broke out no one attached much importance to that. The immediate responsibility was that of the Brigadier, in whose lesser doings the Major-General would not interfere, but as the latter was present all responsibility was his, and from that there is no departing. But Field-Marshal Lord Roberts and Sir Henry Norman both on the staff of the force before Delhi in 1857 always gave it as their mature opinion, that they could not see what more even the most energetic commander could have done in the strange circumstances, unilluminated by the light of subsequent events.

Great play has been made by Kaye of the despairing wait for the expected Meerut troops during that terrible next morning at Delhi. That may well be believed, but if the situation be examined it is difficult to say what would have been possible in time to save them. It was pretty clearly shown in the careful enquiry that took place at Meerut afterwards, that the mutinous regiments had no concerted thought of going to Delhi. Horror-struck at their own position they hung about for a while, and then Delhi was suggested, whether by fell design of some small plotting clique, or whether by accident no one will ever know. The cavalry rode off in the dark and the infantry trudged on, probably in several parties. But it was forty miles, and the stories that survivors from Delhi were reported to have said of seeing the long columns of mutineers marching over the bridge of boats on Monday morning must

have been nonsense. If they started off at 10 p.m., and marching at three miles an hour for 13 hours, they would have arrived at 11 a.m., but such a continuous rate would have been unlikely at that time of year.

Hewitt and Wilson have been much blamed for not sending the mounted troops to Delhi. Assuming that they had known that the mutineers had gone thither, what would they have done? Six horse artillery guns and at the very outside a couple of hundred dragoons could have been made available. It was not a case parallel to that of Gillespie and his dragoons galloping from Arcot to Vellore some twenty miles by daylight in 1805. They were to follow a large force of mutineers in the dark on roads still further in shadow, by reason of the heavy avenues that bordered them, the country right and left covered in crops. To have trotted down that avenue after the mutineers in the dark must infallibly have meant the mutinous foot soldiers stepping aside and the dragoons running into ambushes. Had there been daylight it would have been another matter.

The possible military action, assuming that by then the mutineers were known to have gone for Delhi and not to be lurking, would have been to have started off in the early hours, perhaps at 3 a.m. Such a party would then have come up with the infantry probably straggling badly and very possibly have prevented them continuing their march. Assuming that the infantry mutineers were broken up, and scattered in the fields and groves, would the commander have then mustered his hot and tired men and still more tired horses and pushed for Delhi? Assuming he had, for he would have wounded to care for, would he have been able to cross the bridge of boats, and at what hour would he have arrived? In time perhaps to prevent the full troubles of the later afternoon, but not those of the morning which are still to be related. They were produced by the cavalry, the Delhi scum, and the local troops. It should also have been possible, just possible, to have collected enough conveyances, which were probably at work all night collecting families, and have jogged a couple of hundred infantry to a supporting position on the Hindan, if that bridge were not

defended, who, had the dragoons secured the bridge of boats at Delhi, could have then followed on. But at what hour! Look at it as you will, it was not a cheerful military proposition even in the hands of the ablest of leaders, and held no great hopes of success; and 40 miles in an Indian May is not a short distance. Nevertheless, an attempt should have been made.

Great ploy too has been made by the civilian historian of an offer by Captain Rosser of the Carabiniers to take his troop to Delhi, and as to whether or no he actually made it. That is all beside the mark. If the authorities wanted cavalry to start it was only necessary to give the order. Rosser may well have said to some friends on the staff that his troop had remounts fit to go if need be, but nothing more. For reasons good or reasons ill, they did not so decide, and we must content ourselves with saying that if they knew before daylight that the mutineers had marched to Delhi, they should have at once sent some one to hang on their heels and do the best possible. There were plenty of officers who could have done it. A further lapse that is hard to excuse is the failure to make some military attempt to warn Delhi, though the civil authorities had despatched mounted messengers. But cross-country riding by night is a slow business, no one knew the cross-country route and the Hindan had to be crossed. The prospects of arriving in time, for a British officer and a few men were not very promising and that is all that can profitably be said on the matter. That some message did get through is believed to be true because Mr. Fraser, the Commissioner of Delhi, drove up to cantonments to give news of trouble at Meerut *before* the arrival of the mutineers at the bridge of boats on the Jumna was known. But with the death of all concerned the exact truth could never be ascertained, and the same applied to many details of the darker points of the tragedy.

By morning Meerut was isolated except by telegraph with Agra, but this line was soon interrupted also. No move on Delhi of any sort or kind except a short reconnaissance was attempted. Kaye and other writers talk of the night of horror spent in

Meerut, and the long continued atrocities, but this is sensational over-colouring. Archdale Wilson's letter written the next day to his wife speaks of all being over and silent in an hour and a half, even the glare of the burning bungalows having died down.

CHAPTER III

THE DRAMA AT DELHI

Delhi from 1803 to 1857 - The coming of the storm - Cantonment and main guard - The action of the Commander-in-Chief - The advance on Delhi

Delhi from 1803 to 1857

THE coming of the storm from Meerut to Delhi, is the most dramatic of all the incidents of the Mutiny. The story of it although given fully in the histories, is not clear to those who would follow it on the ground, which thousands of European visitors wish to do. It is so full of examples of tragedy and of gallantry as well as pathos that it is worth study in detail, even long years after. And those who visit Delhi to-day should realize that the coming of the Mutiny to Delhi, is an episode entirely distinct from the story of the avengers on the Ridge. For four weeks the British flag had disappeared, as it never did from Lucknow and the larger storm centres elsewhere, and disappeared in woe and humiliation unbelievable, before the tattered ghost of the Mogul Empire and the house of Timur.

Before following the tragedy we must briefly survey history. In 1803, the Governor-General Lord Mornington, afterwards the Marquis Wellesley, the brother of the Duke, saw that it was to be a struggle as to who should be dominant in India, the British, or the Marathas with their impudent claim to the *chauth*, the fourth of all profits of the whole land.

The last of the effete Mogul Emperors shorn of all might and dominion, lay blinded in tatters in a Maratha prison, while they made merry with his seal and prerogative. So mighty, however, was the tradition, that away from the centre, there were still some that did him reverence. Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief

in Bengal, supported by Arthur Wellesley in the further west, defeated the French-trained Maratha armies, compelled their French officers to withdraw, rescued the Emperor Muhammad Shah, gave him comfort, pension and some shadow of dignity, leaving him even sovereign rights over the small enclave and crowded palace tenements, within the rose-red citadel of Shah Jahan.

Some reverence for the mighty tradition of the dynasty, some instinct to use the name for the better governance of India, some sympathy for the extreme abjectness to which the inheritor of so mighty a throne had fallen, had made the British hedge the position with quite unnecessary privilege. Coins were struck in the Emperor's name till so late as 1835, when the Company's rupees were issued for the first time. The British representative used to render tribute and do homage for many years, so much so that at times the position became a ludicrous scandal. In the meantime within the Palace all the vices and crime known to an evil world were being perpetuated. At last successive Governors-General had for some years previous to the Mutiny been engaged in planning an arrangement for ending an unnecessary anomaly. In 1857 the King of Delhi, the third in succession to Muhammad Shah whom Lord Lake had rescued, was the aged Ghazi-ud-din Bahadur Shah aged 82, an entirely effeminate poetaster. The last heir who had been born in the original if tattered purple was Prince Dara Bakht, who died in 1849. In recognizing the next heir, the Government announced that the pensions would only be continued on the condition of the successor leaving the Palace fortress of Delhi for the royal residence of Kutub, and accepting the title of Shazada instead of that of King. The heir Farid-ud-din, who with much chagrin had accepted these offers, also died – poisoned it was said. Government then declined to announce whom they would accept for the succession, though conveying to the old King's eldest son the intimation that recognition would be on the same conditions. That the decision was a right one could not be questioned on any ground except expediency, and the expediency rested on the extent to which the long memories of the

East attached real reverence and importance to the ghosts of other days that haunted Delhi. In the palace effete dismay had prevailed, especially among the horde of pensioners and tattered demalions of putative royal descent that dwelt in the crowded premises. The youngest and favourite wife of the aged King Zeenat Mahal was a woman of character and daring, and was deep in intrigue not only that her 18-year-old son should illegally be recognized as the successor, but that the proposed extinction of title and residence should not come to pass. The palace intrigues had for years been little more than attempts to cozen influential officials to support the wishes of the *Begum*¹ and other factions. But such places as Delhi Palace live on every whisper of intrigue and trouble. Ever since the disasters in Afghanistan in 1841, the hard-fought battles of the Sikh wars 1845-9, and the discontent of the Sepoys succeeding thereto, the bazaars of India and the Delhi Palace had seethed with talk. The war with Persia which had quite wiped out from Moslem memory the British defence of Turkey, was a new portent. Islamic intrigue and propaganda were at work, and Delhi it must be remembered is and was one of the great centres of Islam in India. Wherever Islam is in the ascendant there is also a leaven of fanatics ready to roll the drum ecclesiastic and shout for the Faith at any juncture.

The greased-cartridge mishap came to the Palace and to the fanatics as a heaven-sent happening to be put to such use as fate would show, and His Majesty Ghazi-ud-din Bahadur Shah composed the clever Persian couplet already quoted.

How far Zeenat Mahal who liked to call herself the Queen, was really in touch with the disaffected *punchayats*² in certain regiments was never known, nor how far there was anything definite in the plans for rising, but certain it is that she and the King's dissolute sons and their entourage leapt for the moment into the curious mirage of empire which actually stood for four phantom weeks, unmolested. And then . . . one fine summer's morning the Union Jack appeared once more on the Ridge

¹ *Begum* is the feminine form of the Turkish title *Beg* or *Bey*.

² *Punchayat*=committee. Literally 'committee of five.'

outside. How that mirage came to the horizon with its accompaniment of tragedy must now be told.¹

The Coming of the Storm

Monday, May 11th, at Delhi, opened as any other hot weather morning might, with folk going to their offices and business. The vendors in fly-haunted bazaars were at their vociferous callings, the native and Christian boys were on their way to school, and up in the cantonment on the Ridge, the troops had paraded early to hear the sentences read on Mangal Pandé and Issuri Pandé, the criminals of the 34th Bengal Infantry at Barrackpore. The troops had been dismissed, and the officers were back at their messes and bungalows, when news was brought that some cavalrymen from Meerut were crossing the bridge of boats.

Delhi was one of those places which furnished an 'officer's guard.' A company from the cantonment, under a British officer, was always present at the Main Guard at the Kashmir gate, one of the bastioned entrances to Delhi city. Within the gate was an open grass plot and at the far side a heavy white wood fence with gates leading to St. James's Church, and in one direction to the treasury, arsenal, and a group of civil bungalows which abutted on the wall and looked out² on to the Jumna river bed. Another road led toward the native city in which street, as now, were situated the principal European shops.

From this guard, detachments were furnished to the arsenal close by, in which was the lesser magazine, and also to the Calcutta gate, where, close to the Palace, the road from the bridge

¹ The story of the mirage and indeed of the whole tragedy and pathos – pathos for both sides – of the Mutiny has been told by Mrs. Steel in *On the Face of the Waters* in what is the best story ever yet written of Indian happenings. Her great knowledge of life in Delhi especially among the tattered nobility, her researches into all the details accessible, have enabled her to fill in many gaps that death had left, with a very shrewd vraisemblance, and all who would study the intense romance and horror of this drama, should read it.

² As they do still.

of boats entered the city wall. The walls of Delhi, had been much improved by British engineers after Holkar's attack on the city in 1804, and consisted of a series of curtains and bastions, with a ditch and inferior glacis. The citadel-palace in which the King dwelt and ruled was on the enceinte, with heavy walls and bastions facing the city, but curiously enough open to the river side, enclosed only by a long wall the top of which was level with the palace gardens and marble buildings of State overhanging the river. It is to be remembered, however, that the Jumna then ran much closer to this wall than now, and in high river actually washed it. Above, and below the palace on the Jumna banks, within the walls, were the two European civil suburbs, that between the gate and the Palace, the 'civil lines,' bungalows, offices, schools, courthouse and the like, and that of Darya Ganj, 'The river suburb,' beyond the palace, cut off from the Kashmir gate by a portion of the city. By the former, backing up against the walls were the arsenal and expense magazine, and a huge park of cannon, held in reserve for the equipment of siege trains and forts.

The King maintained a weak corps of infantry and some artillery for ceremonial purposes, and these were commanded by a British officer, Captain Douglas, who dwelt in the quarters above the main entrance known as the Lahore gate, and who was known as the *Killadar*, 'The keeper of the fort.' On May 11th the chaplain, Mr. Jennings, with his daughter and a friend Miss Clifford, were also in these quarters where they had spent the week-end. The main guard at the Kashmir gate was furnished by the 38th Native Infantry, the corps which had already a tradition of successful disobedience, having refused a few years before to go over the 'black water' to Burma. In the cantonment were also the 54th long commanded by Brigadier Graves now commanding the station, and the 74th whose reputation for good behaviour stood second to none, and with them De Tessier's light field battery, with native gunners and drivers.

The arsenal was one of the largest in India and lay just within the city walls between the Kashmir gate and the Palace. Its gates and a few of its large godowns remain to this day.

Sir Charles Napier when Commander-in-Chief, had protested against it being within a turbulent city and within hail of the palace comedy, but apparently did not raise his voice against the absence of any European guard for so vital a spot, so much was the sepoy army trusted. While Government did not remove the arsenal, they agreed as already stated¹ to all the ammunition except that in the expense magazine from which daily-use cartridges were made up, being sent to a new site on a spur of the Ridge, near the river bank some three miles above the city. It is essential to understand this as it governs the whole story of the siege and will be referred to later.

Now comes the story which the modern visitor should visualize and of which the account in the histories is not easy to follow. A handful of troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry, still in their French-grey jackets, and even their light dragoon shakos, had crossed the bridge and turning along the *beyla*, or river bed, between the Selingarh and the palace, galloped *zer jeroka*, that is to say 'below the windows' and terrace of the palace that overhung the river. This is the traditional place of petitioning and calling for royal protection, and *zer jeroka* is the Persian phrase well known in that sense, corresponding to the western expression 'at the foot of the throne.' There it was and not, as the histories have it, at the great Lahore gate on the city side of the palace, that they hailed and called on the king and on the House of Timur for succour and protection, so that frightened though he was the old king who had come out, listened with some stirring in his blood. But he sent for Captain Douglas to deal with this unexplained and noisy coming and Douglas hurried to the King's side. Then he and the old pantaloon looked down on them from that very Musammun Burj, the little tower and parapet that overhangs the river, from which the Emperors from time immemorial had gazed on their troops and people, and from which the King Emperor George V himself gazed also, in 1911, on his folk of the province.

Douglas would have gone down the steps to the level, to them, but the king seized his arm and prevented him whereon he

¹ See pp. 5 and 54.



NOTE. — The old cantonment lay between the British encampment and the ridge. The site of No. 3 Siege Battery was between the Kudsia Bagh and the Water Bastion.

called down to them not to disturb His Majesty but to present their petition in the usual manner. The men who had now been joined by others, replied insolently enough, and one unslung his carbine, it was said, and fired a shot at the officer. Then they galloped off but not before the *Begum* or Queen as we may now call her, had contrary to etiquette, herself thrown some word of encouragement from her own window.

In the meantime Commissioner Fraser had returned from his hurried drive to the cantonment and had arrived with the collector and magistrate at the Calcutta gate which he had had shut. The troopers who had come *zer jeroka*, joined by others who had found the Calcutta gate shut, had galloped round the *beyla*¹ and entered by the Rajghat gate and causeway, and while some galloped to open the Calcutta gate, the others rode at any Christian they found in the vicinity of the Darya Ganj, or in the great bazaar known as the Chandni Chouk, sabring all they could get at. To their side flocked the bazaar scum, especially the Moslem butcher folk and any stray Afghans who had stayed late in the land this year, or lived in the city.

To the Calcutta gate there now came Commissioner Fraser and Hutchinson, the collector, with Captain Douglas whom the former had summoned to his side. The mutineers at once attacked them, and Fraser, calling in vain on the 38th guard to fire, seized a musket from a policeman and shot the leading trooper. Then jumping into his buggy he drove for the Lahore gate of the Palace, and the collector wounded by a sword-cut, threw himself into the ditch of the citadel-palace and managed to get to Douglas' quarters, while Douglas doing the same, was hurt by his fall and carried home by his *chaprassis*.²

They were carried up to the quarters over the gate, and attended to by the two ladies and the chaplain, while Fraser harangued the crowd gathering in the archway at the foot of the stairs leading thereto. Douglas had by now, sent a frantic summons to the King for the Queen's litters to come and remove the ladies. When these arrived, as eventually they did, it was too late. Someone, accounts vary as to who, probably an

¹ *Beyla*=a dry river bed.

² *Chaprassi*=messenger.

Abyssinian lapidary, cut down the Commissioner. The crowd, rushing up the stairs, forced their way into the quarters, hacked the chaplain, the ladies and the two injured men to death. That was the end of British authority in the palace.

Cantonment and Main Guard

Up in the cantonment the brigadier had ordered the 54th and two guns under Colonel Ripley of that corps, to the palace and the Calcutta gate. Leaving two companies to bring the guns, Ripley and his battalion swung off towards the city with the old triumphant shout of '*Companee Bahadur ki Jai*.'¹ But little it was to avail them in the hour of trial. Straight through the Kashmir gate marched the battalion, the officers together at the head, the 38th guard presenting arms, and then on past the magazine towards the Calcutta gate and the palace. Then there galloped up to them a large party of the 3rd Cavalry followed by swordsmen and rabble. Exactly what happened was never quite clear, but the 54th's muskets were unloaded. Four officers were killed, the colonel was cut down, bayoneted he said himself, probably while on the ground, by his own men while the battalion melted away. The remaining officers got back to the Main Guard, the bodies were put in a cart which was sent to the Ridge, where it was found a month later with its burden,² and Ripley was carried up in a dooley but to die.

The two other companies and guns had now reached the Main Guard to hear of what had happened, and some of the main portion of 54th began to drift back. There was nothing however that those at the gate could do, but wonder. The men of the guard belonged to the 38th, which was one of the least satisfactory of the corps in cantonments, and they looked on sullenly. To the Main Guard were now coming refugees in the shape of ladies and children from the houses in the civil lines, terrified and astonished. Those who had conveyances went on for the most part to the Flagstaff Tower on the Ridge,

¹ Victory to the great 'Company.'

² A small walled enclosure near the tower contains their graves.

at which the brigadier had now directed families to assemble. On hearing of the happening to the 54th, he ordered down the 74th, the steadiest of all the corps, and two more guns, to the rallying point of the Kashmir gate.

The day was slowly wearing on, in astonishment and dismay, as havoc unexplained and unintelligible spread to the two separate civil lines described. The distant one of Darya Ganj was largely inhabited by European subordinates and Eurasians. The latter included whole families, old and young, of which the memorials in St. James's Church by the Kashmir gate bear such astounding and pitiful evidence, and show how massacre came even to the third and fourth generation.

Into both these lines swept the rabble, and the Darya Ganj folk, cut off from escape were murdered, or defended themselves in groups till they were eventually captured under promise of safety, and taken into the palace. There the men being killed, the women and children to the number of forty odd were confined in a sunken chamber. The civil lines folk who had not driven to the Ridge spent the rest of the day under cover in part of the Kashmir gate, wondering and frightened, and to this day men marvel why on earth they were not all got away to the cantonment.

In the arsenal were three officers, Lieutenants Willoughby, Forest and Raynor, who with six warrant officers and sergeants totalled nine Europeans of undying renown. They decided to defend the magazine, very soon ordering the guard of the 38th to march back to the main gate. Light guns were run out and loaded, and a train laid to blow up the powder. This consisted of fifty barrels used for making up expense ammunition. Three thousand barrels were by the unfortunate forethought¹ of Sir Charles Napier, now in the magazine three miles away guarded by a guard of the 38th furnished from the cantonments.

The events which are here recorded occurred through the long hot hours between eight in the morning and sunset, during which the nine in the arsenal, the refugees in the Main Guard at the Kashmir gate and the brigadier and the families crowded

¹ See p. 50.

into the Flagstaff Tower, waited sick at heart as the day wore on, for some sign from Meerut. The bank manager and his family had been murdered defending themselves with shot-gun and hog-spear on the roof of the bank. The unfortunates in Darya Ganj had pretty well been accounted for, all save a famous house of defence, and the 'Nine' in the magazine had spurned impertinent summons from the palace and had defended the buildings against a host of soldiery and palace retainers, after their own establishment had deserted. The story of this gallant defence need not be told again, so famous is it wherever brave deeds are kept green. Suffice it to say that at four o'clock in that long hot afternoon Willoughby after one last look from the bastion of the city wall for some sign on the Meerut road, seeing that the attackers could no longer be kept at bay and were swarming over his walls and adjacent roofs, gave the sign to Conductor Scully. Then those in the Main Guard at the Kashmir gate and at the Flagstaff Tower on the Ridge saw a great column of dust and smoke arise, and heard a mighty roar. The magazine had been blown up ! The defiance of the British to treachery and rebellion ! A few minutes later several of the blackened survivors crept into the Main Guard by a postern-gate, dazed and marvelling.

Up on the Ridge the brigadier bethought him of the 3,000 barrels that might well follow the road of the 50 in the arsenal, and sent two officers off to try and destroy it. But the guard of the 38th refused to let them approach the place, which was soon delivered into the mutineers' hands, and that, though no historian has explained it, accounts for the otherwise inexplicable miracle of the inexhaustible widow's cruise of ammunition with which the city defied the Ridge for three months on end.¹

It was about this time, that the two telegrams received at Ambala and printed in the next few pages were sent off, which apprised the Punjab and the Commander-in-Chief at Simla of what was happening. The first telegram was the signaller's

¹ See the reports of Brigadier Graves and the Director-General of Ordnance in India; also *Letters of Lord Dalhousie*.

message before closing office, the second was sent by the brigadier a little later when a staff officer from the Ridge made the signallers re-open the office, and then took them back with him to the gathering at the Tower. The office was not, as popularly supposed, at its former site, close to the magazine, but below the Flagstaff Tower, where it had been removed a year earlier. The dangers of the disturbance had not actually come near the telegraph office, though the telegraph-master himself, had gone out on the line in the early morning to see what had interrupted communication with Meerut, and had been killed by the sepoys coming into Delhi.

The 74th had marched into the Main Guard and had halted there, slowly absorbing the demoralization that was around them, when an order came for their return, to the dismay of the officers present. But the native officers implored the commanding officer to get them out at once, and not even to wait to tell them off or prove. They went back with the two guns, whose drivers would not even take them up to the Tower where De Tessier, the battery commander, was waiting for them, but drove on up the road to their lines.¹

No sooner was the 74th gone than the 38th in the Main Guard having shut the gate fired on the officers there assembled. The latter made to escape over the battlements, when the shrieks of ladies in some of the rooms reminded them of their responsibilities. Returning, those not already struck down helped the ladies up to the battlements through the embrasures, let them down by sash and belt and sword-slings into the ditch, and up on to the glacis, eventually escaping into the gardens without, all save one old lady too heavy to carry, whom they were compelled to leave in the ditch. After many hardships and wanderings, the majority reached Meerut, a few dying or being murdered by the way. And that was the last of the British and indeed of Christians in the city, save always those miserable pathetic forty souls in the black hole within the Palace.

¹ Lieutenant Aislabie in command tried to bring them to the Tower, but the guard of the 38th stationed at the 'Khyber Pass' (where the road cut the Ridge) shot at him. He escaped and eventually made his way to Meerut.

On the Ridge, the 38th almost in mutiny, the 74th twittering with contagion from the Kashmir gate, the two guns left with De Tessier alone in hand, the brigadier dared hesitate no longer. He bade the officers and civilians and their families make off as best they could to Karnal and Ambala or as some preferred to Meerut via Baghpat. It is noticeable that during all this time there was no attempt to arm and organize the males, of whom there were many, as escort, and withdraw a cavalcade in order. It was go-as-you-please in most disorganized manner, and might easily have meant serious loss of life.

The brigadier, it is said, endeavoured to collect the troops now skulking about their lines, and sounded the assembly on the general parade ground. It is also said that *one* sepoy fell in! And then the brigadier left for Karnal too, sad at heart, for he was a sepoy officer of many years standing. De Tessier's two guns, himself at their head, marched away into the dark for two or three miles amid many families in carriages, and then the drivers turned the guns round, pleading that they could not differ from their comrades. Had the withdrawal been better organized those guns would have marched on.

So that was the end of it in cantonment as well as city! By nightfall not an Englishman or Eurasian remained in Delhi save that house of defence in Darya Ganj which gallantly prolonged the agony, and the forty souls aforesaid. For a month the puppet dynasty and the *opéra bouffe* army pretended that the British had left the land. On the fourth day to make a Mogul holiday the forty odd Christian souls, almost all women and children, were brought out with a rope round them and hacked to death in the presence it was said, of the King's sons, so that the Mogul fairly stands in history beside the Maratha.

The Action of the Commander-in-Chief

It is now of importance to study the action of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff, as the historian has written plenty of ill-balanced criticisms. The want of alacrity or otherwise will be apparent from the chronology.

May 11th. The outbreak at Delhi. At three in the afternoon the first unofficial telegram already referred to, from Delhi, was received at Ambala, the chat on the line of one signaller to another, followed by a second one at four from the brigadier on the Ridge at Delhi. These had also gone through to Lahore. The first ran:

'We must leave office. All the bungalows are being burnt down by the sepoy of Meerut, we are off, Mr. Todd [Telegraph master, who had gone out to repair the line to Meerut which had become interrupted] is dead we think. He went out this morning and is not yet returned. We learnt that nine Europeans were killed. Good-bye.'

The second message ran:

'Cantonments in a state of siege, Mutineers from Meerut . . . 3rd Light Cavalry . . . numbers not known, said to be 150 men. Cut off communication with Meerut. Taken possession of bridge of boats. 54th N.I. sent against them, but would not act. Several officers killed or wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down but nothing known yet. Further information will be forwarded.' That was the first and last communication that came from authority at Delhi.¹

May 12th. The telegraph line had not yet reached Simla, and Sir Henry Barnard sent his son riding through to the hill-top, where he arrived on the 12th with the first strange telegram from the signallers. A copy of the second one arrived a little later. The Commander-in-Chief was at dinner with guests and put the message under his plate for the moment.* En route the 75th at Kasauli had been warned by Captain Barnard to be ready to march and also the 1st and 2nd Bengal Fusiliers at Dagshai and Sabathu. The same day General Anson sent his A.D.C. off to Kasauli to order the 75th to Ambala at once and the two Fusilier battalions to be ready to follow.

May 13th. The Chief ordered the Fusiliers to start at once also, and sent instructions to General Gowan commanding the Lahore division to secure the Ferozepore arsenal with the 61st

¹ See originals as reproduced opposite.

² *Vide Memoirs of Augusta Becher, 1930.*

MESSAGE TO BE SENT BY ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.

No.

At

Re.

Recd. for trans - Date

Time

To

From

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

For

By

Following just recd. from Delhi.
We must leave office at 10th May
are being turned down by the
of Punjab. They came in this morning
We are off again today. Mr. [Name]
in the [Name] for [Name]. He went out this morning
and was not returned yet. He heard
that some Europeans were killed
last night.

Time sent:
Time recd:
Cost:
Fund:

Received by
Repeted by
Sent on by
Rep. received by
From
To
To
From

Handwritten signature

Inspector of Police

REGISTERED NO.

6

HON'BLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.

100

Messages, (not exceeding 16 words) can be sent any distance, not exceeding 1 R.
Ditto 2 Rs.
Ditto 3 Rs.
Ditto 4 Rs.
Ditto 5 Rs.
Ditto 6 Rs.
Ditto 7 Rs.
Ditto 8 Rs.
Ditto 9 Rs.
Ditto 10 Rs.

Messages sent for delivery to the office of the Secretary to the Government of India

From *Delhi 11 May*
To *Amritsar*
Via *Amritsar*
By *Amritsar*
For *Amritsar*

Continent in a state of peace. Mr. [Name] from
Munster, 3rd of 18th Cavalry, under not having
said to be in [Name] and fifty men cut off.
Communication with [Name] by [Name] of [Name]
of the [Name] of [Name]. By [Name] of [Name] and
but would not act. Several officers killed and
wounded. City in a state of considerable
excitement. Report of [Name] [Name] [Name]
certain yet. Further information will be
by [Name] but to [Name] in [Name] and

Handwritten signature
Electric Telegraph Office,
12th May 1857

Handwritten signature
Inspector of Police

No reply respecting this Message as it is intended to afford the production of this Paper

N. B. - Please enter Time of delivery.

Despatch 7.20 PM

ORIGINALS OF THE FAMOUS TELEGRAMS ANNOUNCING
THE OUTBREAK AT DELHI

Foot, Fort Govindgarh at Amritsar with the 81st from Mian Mir, and to send two companies of the 8th Foot at Jullundur to secure the arsenal in the fort at Phillaur. Orders were sent to the Sirmur Gurkha Battalion at Dehra Dun, and the Sappers and Miners from Roorkee to march to Meerut. An artillery officer then in Simla was despatched to Phillaur to prepare a light siege train. In this connection it is to be remembered that the only guns in being with the British between Ambala and Meerut were three horse artillery batteries, one horsed field battery and two eighteen pounders in the Artillery school at Meerut, whereas at Delhi countless guns of all sizes lying in the arsenal had fallen into rebel hands. John Lawrence had thought of the same important points, and issued orders *three days later* than those already emanating from the Chief, when the Punjab became more isolated. The Chief now wrote to Lord Canning a brief account of what he was doing, and also to John Lawrence and in his desire to get to the telegraph line actually left Simla on the 14th. He has been accused of dilatoriness in moving, but the pity is that he took himself down into the heat and worry of Ambala so soon instead of staying to think and to plan and to order in the cool. He had a perfectly good Crimean celebrity with his staff commanding at Ambala and even the Army Headquarter heads are not needed to get a couple of brigades on the move. Zeal and anxiety, took him down into the inferno to his undoing.

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The European force available at Ambala when the battalions from the hills came in was:

Two European troops of Horse Artillery (less wagons).

H.M. 9th Lancers.

H.M. 75th Foot (then an ordinary line regiment).

1st Bengal Fusiliers.

2nd Bengal Fusiliers.

Also at Ambala were the 9th Light Cavalry, the 4th Irregular Cavalry (Lancers), the 5th and 60th Bengal Infantry. Brigadier Halifax commanded the station.

Frequent recommendations came from Sir John Lawrence to

disarm the regular native troops, but this Anson would not do. In the first place some very definite pledges had been given them by their officers, which he was not yet prepared to over-rule and secondly, a very essential minor consideration, he wanted to save the Europeans as much guard duty as possible. He had better have done it at once, for the 60th sent out into the district a little later, mutinied and went to Delhi, and the 5th had to be disarmed.

May 15th. General Anson arrived at Ambala, preceded by some and followed by others of the staff and departmental heads. He had by now begun to receive telegrams and letters from Sir John Lawrence and the Governor-General, as well as from Mr. Colvin the Governor of Agra on the importance of recovering Delhi. That however was obvious enough. Ways and means were his problem for he now was up against two difficulties, one merely incidental to the particular part of India in which this mutiny and outbreak had occurred, the other the peculiar system in which the Indian Army was organized, a system with which from his recent arrival in northern India he was not fully conversant. The first trouble was arsenals. The Delhi one maintained to equip armies operating in Central India or against Nepal was in the insurgents' hands, and the Meerut and Ambala troops required to operate in that direction had thus no base of supply. The northern arsenals Phillaur and Ferozepore were located to supply troops moving north against the Punjab and Afghanistan, or to protect the northern frontier. Thus the force he was assembling was between the two, and though it was possible to maintain the road to the north, time would be needed to move stores down. Thus when the head of his medical service said he had no sick equipment available, that was not his fault, but merely due to the orders and policy of the Government, and the unforeseenness of the situation. The next snag that he ran into was the Mogul system of running armies which had been adopted for economy's sake, and because it suited the country. The Army supplied itself through moving bazaars of merchants using the host of civil transport that could normally be

obtained. After the Sikh Wars all Government 'carriage'¹ had been disbanded. There was no army transport. For the peace requirements of the army, contractors existed, and do still in every cantonment, who given due notice will produce transport at an agreed-on charge. Notice must be given, and carriage which is always at work must be collected. With the country disturbed and frightened this took some time. Normally the civil authority aided on emergency by native cavalry would have scoured the countryside for it. This they now started to do with great zeal and they alone could do it, but with the cavalry shaky, and with the countryside hanging back, delay was unavoidable. Similarly, contractors had to collect grain, meat etc. and the same difficulties operated. Therefore, the abuse of the commissary-general and other heads of departments by the historians is entirely beside the mark. Stupidity there may have been of course, in minor details, and want of business-like promptness, but the situation explained above would account for anything. The Governor-General recognized this. He wrote home with reference to John Lawrence's urgings to the Chief. *'You must bear in mind however, in regard to his estimate of the time required which should have been sufficient to put the army in motion, that a great change was made in the Commissariat three years ago, when the Transport Establishments were given up, and it was determined to trust henceforward to hiring beasts for the occasion. We are now making the first experiment of this change. . . . Economically it was a prudent one, and in times of ordinary war it might work well, but I shall be surprised if General Anson was not impeded by it. Could it have been foreseen that our next operations would have been against our own regiments and subjects, no sane man would have recommended it.'*

His Excellency had put the whole story in a nut-shell, and in discussing the story for the sake of instruction, the only criticism that we can pass is that the Chief apparently allowed the Commissary-General to say how many days' food of all kinds he wanted to collect before the army could march. It was

¹ 'Carriage' is the term used to express all carts, wagons and pack animals.

the Quartermaster-General who, taking the Chief's orders, should have said, 'Collect so much and we start, and rely on local or following supply for the rest.' The carriage needed for all the Commissary-General wanted, meant too great delay, but no doubt some modification did take place, for after consulting with Sir Henry Barnard it was decided to concentrate forward forthwith at Karnal, a now abandoned but once famous British frontier station 45 miles from Ambala and 70 miles from Delhi, and close to the age-famous battlefield of Panipat. Brigadier Graves from Delhi had assumed temporary command there.

Yet another trouble confronted the generals in the peace organization of the horse artillery. The guns had only their limbers, and those not packed with ammunition. The wagon lines drawn by bullocks were kept in the arsenal at Phillaur, and bullocks must drag them down, so bogus was the fighting strength of the units as they stood in their peace time cantonments. The infantry also had not twenty rounds per man which too must come from Phillaur. All this, added to the troubles with the sepoy, might well induce General Barnard to write to Lawrence later of the position in which he and indeed General Anson had found themselves. *'It is a novel position for an officer to find himself placed in, who comes to the country prepared to treat its army as its own, to make every allowance to the difference of constitution, to encourage its past good deeds and honourable name, to have "sideblows of reproof" because he had not treated them with the utmost severity and rather sought occasion to disgrace than endeavour to support them.'*

Let it be remembered that Sir Henry, though just recently arrived in India, had been chief of the staff in the final days of the Crimea and was not unused to problems of authority and policy. A few days earlier we find him writing to Anson of his difficulties in getting his division ready, and of the Chinese conception of preparation, which the Indian peace time army policy suffered from.

These points have all been given in some detail because they have bearing on the problems of to-day, and were prominent

when Lord Kitchener came to his task of modernizing the Indian Army.

The Advance on Delhi

May 17th. Despite all the troubles the first échelon marched for Karnal on this date *but six days after the outbreak at Delhi*, followed by an échelon each day, till it was all concentrated there, on May 30th.

It was of first importance to get in touch with General Hewitt at Meerut still absolutely isolated, and in Anson's force was the man to do it. Lieutenant William Hodson of the Bengal Fusiliers had gained a name for himself in command of the Guides, from which he had been removed for his treatment of a Yusufzai chief suspected of the murder of an officer, and concerning whom controversy raged both before and after the Mutiny. Coming to the army late, after a university education, he started with advantages usually denied to the army officer, and was admitted by friend and critic alike to be an irregular cavalry leader of intense energy and ability.

Anson sent for him and made him head of his intelligence staff. Hodson now offered to go through to Meerut and open up communication with Hewitt. This being accepted, Hodson went on his daring ride with an escort of some horsemen belonging to the Rajah of Jhind. Starting on the 20th he had ridden the seventy odd miles from Karnal to Meerut through a country much disturbed by the recent events, delivered his message and was back at Karnal on the 23rd and in Ambala by post cart four hours later.

Anson then commissioned him to raise a squadron and afterwards a whole regiment of irregular horse something on the lines of his Guides. In fact Hodson from that moment proved himself one of the men of the hour.

May 26th. The last échelon having started for Karnal, the Chief himself left also and driving post reached there the same night. Next day he was in the agonies of cholera and passed away in the small hours of the 27th, an hour or so after handing

over in a whisper his command to General Barnard who had arrived at midnight. 'Barnard I leave you command. You know how anxious I was to do my duty. I cannot recover. May success attend you, God bless you. Good-bye,' and so passed out the 'Horse Guards' general, over whose failure to act it was the custom to make merry; dead, as the clever malicious but unjust gossip of the Punjab had it 'of an attack of John Lawrence.' Facts, dates, and the opinion of the great soldiers who began their staff service under him pointed otherwise, but whether or no he would have been a successful leader must forever be unanswered. Certain it is that his plan to move the Ambala and Meerut troops on Delhi held the field.

May 27th. General Barnard decided to move on at once without the light siege train, to meet the force from Meerut under Brigadier Wilson which moved from Meerut on the same date. But death and exhaustion were still at work and Brigadier Halifax also was sent back to Ambala from Karnal to die on the way.

So much for the question of promptitude and otherwise; and before studying the position in other parts of India and with the Supreme Government, it would be well to accompany Sir Henry Barnard in bringing the Union Jack back to Delhi, at the head of an eager enthusiastic force.

On May 30th Brigadier Wilson's force from Meerut reached the river Hindan, which they found to be held by a strong force of the mutineers. This tiny force, then, two squadrons of Carabiniers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, one horse and one field battery with two eighteen pounders, some native sappers and a few native cavalry, fought and won with supreme gallantry the first battle of retribution, against vastly superior numbers, capturing five rebel cannon. Next day fresh hordes of mutineers came out from Delhi only to be defeated again, with heavy loss. Then Wilson wheeled his force and moved to Baghpat where the Ambala force was already awaiting him. A few miles nearer Delhi, the mutineers were entrenched at Badli-ka-Serai in front of the guilty city itself.

Next morning, July 8th, at early dawn, four weeks after

Brigadier Graves had sounded the vain 'Assembly' that evening on May 11th, the joint force of Wilson and Barnard threw itself with a wild fury of vengeance against the entrenched mutineers, 3,000 in number. Helter-skelter they were driven from their position, but not without severe loss, which included Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General of the Army killed.

The same day the force advanced to the Ridge, cleared it of the enemy, and took up their camp on the parade ground of the old cantonments.

At Badli-ka-Serai Major-General Reed, the senior officer in Upper India, arrived to take up the provisional command of the Bengal Army, but was too knocked up by the heat of the journey to assume executive command of the Delhi Field Force, which remained in Sir Henry Barnard's hands. It was a curious position, with Army Headquarters present in this camp without a real head, but the presence of General Reed even if prostrate, enabled the Headquarters office to settle legally the thousand and one administrative matters, which daily needed handling.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST REACTIONS TO THE OUTBREAK

The Governor-General and the crisis – The Punjab – The Peshawar valley – John Nicholson and the Movable Column – The situation between Meerut and Calcutta – The lull in the Mutiny – Sepoy psychology – After the lull – Jhansi, Nowgong and Saugor – Gwalior and Rajputana

The Governor-General and the Crisis

NATURALLY the historian's criticism must fall on the Governor-General and his action, which however much it failed, if fail it did, failed because of the absence of his military advisers, the entire novelty, as well as the peculiarly disconcerting nature of the situation, and the undoubted weakness of his council in knowledge of any of the world's business, save of a peaceful and academic evolution of the routine of civilization. There was no one with knowledge of the virile races and stirring conditions which were always present in the upper provinces. Bengal, mild and revenue-producing with a flair for perverse litigation, was their milieu. But what Lord Canning did must stand by itself, shorn of the lesser lights of local controversy. The 84th on the advice of General Hearsey had not been sent back to Burma. He sent, at the suggestion of Sir John Lawrence and Sir Patrick Grant, a fast ship to intercept the troops en route to China, a course which Sir George Grey at the Cape was also taking with the second échelon. He sent for the troops returning from Persia with Generals Outram and Havelock, to come round to Calcutta. Perhaps best of all, he sent for Sir Patrick Grant from Madras, to assume the command of a new Bengal Army, and create the new departments which alone could equip with clothing, supplies and ammunition the troops which would soon be on their way, a vital process without



LIEUT -GENERAL SIR PATRICK GRANT
whose name was a household word

which nothing could be done. All cavalry for instance would come without horses and so forth. It has already been explained that most of the arsenals were in the north, and that one of the largest was in the insurgents' hands.

Lord Canning then set himself to get in regular touch with his governors and those in authority in the disturbed areas, with John Lawrence in the Punjab, with Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, with Mr. Colvin, the Lieut.-Governor of the North-West Provinces at Agra, and so forth. Nor can we do ought but admire the level tone of his letters to them, calm and judicious and well calculated to give them confidence. Both he and others felt that many of the troops might be driven into rebellion by mistrust, and surrounded as he was with them, a Bengal Infantry guard always mounted at his residence while both he and Lady Canning drove freely about, calm, and in her case, gracious, with their escorts of the Hindustani Bodyguard.

What was obviously wanted was a success in the centre at Delhi to steady men's minds and give time for the re-inforcements to arrive, and the fact that there was a lull in the outbreaks seemed to indicate that the Sepoy mentality was astounded. It was hoped that the situation might yet steady itself, as indeed it might have done had it been possible to make an example at Delhi forthwith.

But however much we may admire Lord Canning's steadfastness and his prompt action when he realized what was doing, we cannot but be painfully aware that there was no Lord Dalhousie at the head of affairs, with his definite orders to do this and that as a part of a co-ordinated whole.

No comprehensive plan and method of gripping the crisis, and no definite orders were issued compelling attention to the safeguarding of essential points, such as Allahabad. His Excellency was content so far as *haute direction* went, to applaud all who showed wisdom and determination without putting himself at the head of the control, which was perfectly possible for many weeks in all the country south of Cawnpore. Sir John Lawrence has been rightly enough belauded for the self-denying way in which he stripped the Punjab to secure the fall of Delhi. But

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it may be remarked without detracting from his reputation, that under a more effective Governor-General he would, after some exchange of views, have received quite definite orders as to the force to send. Failing the receipt of such orders it was obviously up to him to do what he did. Happily he was the man to act fully to the limit of his responsibilities.

It is probable that there was not quite as much alacrity at first as desirable, in organising the machinery for moving up reinforcements, and we may certainly criticize the refusal of Government to avail itself immediately of the civilian offer to form infantry and cavalry and artillery Volunteer Corps for the defence of Calcutta, an offer accepted a month later. We may equally criticize the delay in many places of forming 'refugee' officers, European and Eurasian civilians etc., into Yeomanry, as was done a little later also. In Calcutta perhaps it was the Governor-General's pose of confidence which made him elect to refuse for four valuable weeks, this offer which would have released many regular soldiers.

Perhaps the least understanding criticism passed by both Kaye and Malleson is on Sir Patrick Grant. They expected this officer to desert his post as the creator of the new war machine, and sweep up the country, as they styled the slow tramp by bullock dawk with the small force available in driblets from Persia. But he had the Commander-in-Chief from Persia, Sir James Outram, coming with his own forces, preceded by one of its own leaders General Havelock. What more suitable than that in the initial stage this latter general should lead the first advance. It is one of the penalties of high military command that the leader must stand by the controls, and not himself lead in the fighting line. The Army at the time, it is true, were disappointed that 'Pat' Grant did not hurry up country, but they were critical for a different reason. Grant's well-known influence over the Bengal Army, partly due to his commanding appearance and graceful manners, greater even than Wheeler's or Hearsey's, would it was thought, act like a potion on the minds of the sepoys. They forgot how far the evil had gone. Three months earlier perhaps the well known voice and hand might

have saved the Army. Now things had gone far beyond that. So 'Pat' Grant arrived from Madras on the 23rd June and at once sent Havelock forward preceded by Neill, and then Outram, while he himself stayed to use all his knowledge to create the new machine and give Government his counsel.

The Punjab

It was in the Punjab that the crisis was grappled with the greatest promptness, and the reasons therefor were many. The province was controlled by one of the finest of the Indian Civil Service's scions in the person of John Lawrence. His staff had been specially selected from the whole civil and military services of India, and enterprise and character was the basis of selection. The Punjab was a 'non-regulation' province, that is to say outside the old hard-and-fast time-honoured establishment of precedent and seniority selection. It was full of bloods and tigers, and its seniors were largely men who had come to the front in the difficult time of the First Afghan War or the Durbar period between the First and Second Sikh Wars. Some of the best young engineers of the Army were there engaged in development. The British garrison as has been explained was far more numerous than in the lower provinces, and though the Hindustani troops were also numerous they were more or less balanced instead of being, as farther south, almost alone. Further, the great arsenals of the field army were in the north and either at places with a European garrison or within hail of one. As soon as the same faltering unofficial telegram as was received through the hands of Captain Barnard by the Commander-in-Chief, reached the Punjab authorities, energetic and distinctive action began. It was at once proposed that General Reed, the Peninsular veteran commanding the Peshawar Division and the senior soldier in the Punjab, should become the military commander in the Province. This would get the civil and military authority round the same council table, leave the key position of Peshawar in the more active hands of Sidney Cotton the brigadier, and provide the machinery

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for prompt military orders. The Commander-in-Chief agreed. General Reed, as we have seen, was summoned a little later to take over the command of the Bengal Army itself on General Anson's sudden death, and his place as what we should now call the G.O.C.-in-Chief in the Punjab, was taken by Major-General Gowan of the Artillery who commanded the Lahore Division. The next important step was to arrange to censor all sepoys' letters, which soon showed the strange underground movement in progress, and where it was venomous, and where it only indicated alarm and consternation. The Punjab Government had then under its own orders the Punjab Irregular Force which later was to add to its renown as the Punjab Frontier Force, the 'Piffer' of modern fame and legend. It was commanded by Brigadier Neville Chamberlain the most distinguished of a family of renowned soldiers whom Afghanistan and the Sikh Wars had brought to the front. It was decided to form at once a movable column under Chamberlain, consisting both of some of his irregular corps and of British units, which lightly equipped, should sweep down on any disturbed areas.

A proposal to raise levies and corps from the old Sikh soldiers and the wild men of the frontier was not at first accepted.

The most important place of all not even second to Peshawar, was Lahore, the capital of the Punjab and the centre of the Moslem and Sikh kingdoms of the past. Any disturbance here might raise untold elements of unrest. Lawrence on his way to the Himalaya, was at Rawal Pindi. When the news of Meerut on May 11th was followed on the 12th by that of Delhi, the Commissioner of Lahore, Mr. Robert Montgomery, saw that prompt action was necessary. The telegraph to the Chief Commissioner was interrupted, the divisional commander, General Gowan, also was away. Montgomery saw the brigadier, Stuart Corbett, a Company's officer of forty years' service, but with more energy than most at his age. Montgomery proposed the removal of the ammunition, Corbett was prepared to 'go the whole hog' and disarm the entire native garrison of Mian Mir, the cantonment six miles from Lahore City. And thus was staged the first of those effective disarmament parades

which were so successful in the Punjab, and which were eventually copied not always with the same success elsewhere.

The disarming at Lahore, was in many ways sensational and remarkable in its setting. The Native troops were the 8th Bengal Light Cavalry, and three infantry battalions, the 16th, 25th and 49th. The Europeans consisted of the 81st Foot and the two troops of Bengal Horse Artillery. Two of the Bengal regiments carried their heads very high. The 16th had been made Grenadiers for their conduct as one of General Nott's 'beautiful sepoy regiments' at Kandahar, and the 26th created Light Infantry for their distinguished conduct with the avenging army under Pollock that restored our prestige at Kabul. The disarming and indeed the whole crisis was so new that it must have come with great bitterness to the hearts of the British officers of such regiments. But the civil government believed the reports that said that the Mian Mir garrison were rotten with '*fissad*'¹ and Corbett as the oldest Sepoy officer, was prepared to carry out disarmament in the face of all objectors. The night of the 12th was peculiarly suitable as the eve of such an occurrence, which could only be successful if secret. The 81st Foot were leaving the station, and the Bengal Artillery were giving them a farewell ball in the artillery mess which is the artillery messhouse to this day, and still has on its walls the trophies of the old Sikh army borrowed from the arsenal for the occasion and never returned.

Fortunately there was due occasion for a garrison parade, as the troops had to hear, as had the Delhi troops on the morning of the 11th, the sentences on Mangal and Issuri Pandé of the 34th at Barrackpore.

The ball was to be kept up late, and the officers in the know would go straight from ball room to preparation for parade. Loud were the grumbles at authority for having a garrison parade the morning after a ball. Many a lady was warned to be up on her horse despite her fatigue, to see the parade, which might be the safest place in cantonments.

And so the parade was duly held, and a picturesque sight at

¹ Rebellion.

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that. The infantry in scarlet and shakos, the light cavalry gorgeous in their French-grey kit of George IV pattern, and the horse artillery in their old dragoon helmets with tiger-skin rolls, their dress jackets and their high knee boots. In the corner of the ground Mr. Montgomery and his assistants with two or three important Indians, watched the proceedings. When the Governor-General's orders had been read to the troops, the lines changed front and as the manœuvre was finished the native troops found themselves facing the 81st, behind whom the guns had unlimbered.

An officer read to them an explanation and address from the brigadier, and then came the order to pile arms. At the same moment the 81st (there were only 250 of them) fell back and exposed the line of guns in action, with their port fires ready, and the order rang out '81st, Load !' For a moment the Grenadiers hesitated, but the line of guns implied no denial. They and the other two corps piled their arms, the cavalry unbuckled their swords, and the whole filed off. It is not on record, but to this day the story is told in Lahore, that the officer commanding one of the troops of horse artillery, limbered up his guns and galloped forward to come into action among the piled and abandoned arms, so that none should repent them of their compliance. While the 250 rifles of the 81st were on parade at Mian Mir three companies of the same regiment were marching hard for the old Mogul fortress in Lahore city, to disarm a wing of the 26th stationed there, and another company in carriages was driving hard to secure the Sikh fortress of Govindgarh at Amritsar, 30 miles away, held only by a company of artillery. All passed off well, loud were the congratulations of the Punjab, and British prestige stood at the top of its orbit.

But few had yet learnt the extent to which sedition had honeycombed the Bengal Army, and many felt that such action had now tarred the whole of the native army with distrust, and made them all prospective mutineers. This aspect will be discussed later. At Ferozepore it will be remembered, where the new arsenal existed, General Anson had ordered the 61st to take possession thereof. Here were the 61st Foot, a European

field battery, the 45th and 57th N.I. and the 10th Light Cavalry. Innes, the brigadier had only taken over the command on the 11th, but hearing of the action at Lahore and the dramas of Meerut and Delhi, he endeavoured to act. Want of decision and a definite plan however resulted in an attempt by the 45th to seize the arsenal, which was defeated by the 61st Foot. The bazaar scum in the station burnt many of the bungalows while the British troops were securing the arsenal. It was a badly managed business, retrieved by the fact that the 10th Light Cavalry hunted the mutineers of the 45th for many miles, and the station eventually resumed its orderly condition while the 57th remained steady. The 10th Light Cavalry, instancing the general disturbed condition of sepoy psychology, mutinied later.

The Peshawar Valley

Nowhere was the energy and promptness of the Punjab authorities more to the fore than in the comparatively recent Afghan province of the Peshawar Valley. In that ancient Buddhist city where the ashes of the Buddha himself were finally laid to rest, recently to be unearthed in their golden casket, was collected all the backlash of centuries of invasion and lawlessness. Under the twenty years of Sikh régime General Avitabile, its Italian governor, ruled with a tasselled gibbet at the four corners of its garden. Eight years of British rule had straightened out to some extent the lawless aspect of the province, and brought some better sense of order among the knaves of the frontier city than had Avitabile's tassels. But only eight years had passed since General Gilbert had chased into the portals of the Khaibar, the five thousand Afghan horse under Sirdar Akram Khan, who for the only time in history had allied themselves with the Sikhs, after the rebellion of the Durbar army. In the great ring of mountains and in the plains of the valley the Afghan tribesmen looked with intense excitement to what might befall. The unrest in the sepoy army that beat them, was eagerly canvassed, and the attitude of the masters keenly

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discussed. In general opinion matters were likely to go hardly with us.

As has been explained, General Reed commanded the Peshawar Division at the time of the outbreak; Brigadier-General Sidney Cotton of the 22nd Foot, the Peshawar Garrison; Colonel Herbert Edwardes, who eight years earlier had come to much renown in leading his Derajat Levies against the rebellious Sikhs at Multan, was the commissioner of the division, and John Nicholson was deputy commissioner. The garrison of the district under General Reed's command was a big one, but big with the troops that were tainted, though not without a stiffer European leaven than in most places. In Peshawar were the 70th Foot the 87th Fusiliers, the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, several batteries, the 21st, 27th, 51st and 64th Bengal Native Infantry with the 24th at Fort Mackeson. At Nowshera 24 miles from Peshawar, were the 27th Inniskillings, the 55th N.I. and the 10th Irregular Cavalry, while at Hoti Mardan a few miles nearer the border hills, was the famous Guide Corps under Daly. The 64th N.I. who had been the ringleaders in the batta agitation of a few years before, were sent out to the frontier posts on the Mohmand border, where at Abazai, was also the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, a corps of Shah Shujah's contingent, taken into the Bengal Line for its signal services in the defence of the Afghan town of that name. The 17th and 18th Irregular Cavalry were also in the district.

The first step taken by John Lawrence in the general activity was sending off the Guides, which belonged to the Punjab Irregular Force, to Pindi to join the Movable Column. Starting on the 13th they immediately secured the bridge and fort at Attock then held by a Hindustani corps and handed them to a Punjab detachment from Kohat which had been hurried to the spot. The 55th from Nowshera relieved the Guides at Mardan leaving a few companies in the former place, which had been left empty through the summons of the 27th Foot to Rawal Pindi for the Movable Column. But almost at once Lawrence decided to send the Guides as his first contribution towards the capture of Delhi. On June 18th it started from Pindi on its memorable

forced march which created the sensation of the hour, as the famous corps rode and tramped through the plains of the Punjab, and jaunted through the various cantonments en route.

General Reed had repaired to join the Chief Commissioner, and Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain and Herbert Edwardes also came to him at Rawal Pindi on the 16th, and their plans were then concocted, Lawrence being a little disturbed at the disarming at Mian Mir which he felt must upset any regiments still loyal.

Later as he realized how widespread and universal was the taint he became the leader of the disarmament policy. His military secretary, Major J. D. McPherson, was probably the active head both with him and General Reed and his successor, in all matters military that were guided from Punjab joint civil and military headquarters.

Returning to Peshawar on the 21st Edwardes found that things were none too rosy, and the attitude of the Frontier chiefs and the bigger men of the countryside was 'when we know you are top dog we will support you.' He and the brigadier were not long in giving an example. That night came news that the companies of the 55th at Nowshera had mutinied and had marched towards their headquarters at Mardan. Cotton decided to disarm at Peshawar, and summoned a conference, at which the commandants of the Sepoy regiments bitterly protested against disarming their loyal corps. Cotton however insisted and the garrisons paraded at dawn. The men, taken by surprise in the face of two European corps and guns, piled their arms, and many a British officer's spurs and sword were thrown with them too. As Edwardes wrote, 'How little worthy were the men of such officers who could nearly mutiny for their sakes.' The 21st, a corps of great reputation, were allowed to retain their arms and serve on guard duties.

The news spread round the border like wild-fire; many were the congratulations poured on the Commissioner as he rode back from the parade ground, loud were the offers of assistance from the local chiefs. Huzza for the top dog, and the masters who could rule!

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The troops in Peshawar disarmed, it remained to deal with the 55th, now in the fort at Mardan. A force under Colonel Chute of the 87th accompanied by Nicholson, moved out on the 23rd and approached Mardan on the evening of the next day. The 55th broke out on hearing of their approach, their Colonel, Spottiswoode, shot himself in his grief and chagrin, and his battalion swarmed off to the frontier close by where they and the 64th at Abazai had offered their services to the aged Akund of Swat if he would raise the borderside against their masters. Pursued however, by Nicholson and his frontier police, accompanied somewhat half heartily by the 10th Irregular Cavalry, they reached the border in remnants, only to be refused sanctuary and to be robbed, killed for their accoutrements, and enslaved. Their fate it was, that prompted the story of *The Lost Legion* that Rudyard Kipling has told so powerfully. To those who were captured, 150 in number, the death sentence was awarded, but Lawrence averse to wholesale bloodshed and vengeance, reprieved all but forty. Already had the garrison in Peshawar paraded to see a native officer and twelve men who had deserted from the 51st hung. Now to the astonishment and admiration of the borderside, these forty were blown away from the guns in the presence of all the garrison armed and disarmed. The flow of recruits to our new levies and all who would march to Delhi doubled itself. Strong men are worth serving. To their credit be it said, that the mutinous sepoys went to their terrifying but withal merciful death with dignity, salaaming to the guns as their turn came to be lashed thereto.

The 24th at Fort Mackeson, the 64th at Abazai and the neighbouring posts were now disarmed, the Kelat-i-Ghilzie regiment in whom all had confidence being left, and they and the 21st alone of the regular Hindustani troops now carried arms in the Frontier province. Then came the turn further south. The Movable Column under Chamberlain was to assemble at Lahore.

The record of the Punjab however for resolution and acumen in handling its problems is not without some stains. At Jullundur was a brigade under Brigadier Johnstone of the

British service with the 8th Foot, Renny's 5th troop (native) H.A., some European Artillery the 6th Light Cavalry, 36th and 61st N.I. Colonel Hartley while in temporary command had carried out the Commander-in-Chief's orders to secure Phillaur Fort where the 3rd N.I. were stationed. The Ordnance officers there had sat anxiously by their portfires till 150 men of the 8th Foot and two horse artillery guns marched in. But in Jullundur itself nothing was done save to arrange for the safety of the non-combatants, nor did the brigadier returning almost immediately from leave, act with decision, deferring the disarmament which he at first contemplated. The light siege train that General Anson had ordered to be prepared for him had actually marched from Phillaur on the 24th, seven days after the order to get it ready, with its long teams of yoked bullocks, escorted by a party of the 3rd N.I. still steady enough, and some Irregular Cavalry.

On June 7th, the 6th Light Cavalry started the mutiny at Jullundur in the evening, galloping about and attacking Europeans, till dispersed by the native horse artillery firing on them.¹ The Infantry now rose, and, unmolested by the British garrison, after setting light to bungalows and killing an officer or two, marched for Phillaur and the bridge of boats on the Delhi road. At Phillaur the 3rd were waiting for them, but a young assistant-commissioner, Thornton by name, had cut away the bridge of boats. The officers of the 3rd had escaped to the fort, and the three mutineer battalions then headed for the ferry some three miles above the fort and succeeded in crossing. Not far from Phillaur on the Delhi side of the river, stands the city and civil station of Ludhiana, once a large frontier cantonment. It was full of Afghan refugees and plenty of turbulent folk generally. Ricketts, the deputy-commissioner, finding that Wilde's Rifles, marching to join the British force at Delhi was in camp, obtained three companies under Lieut. Williams, and with a couple of guns and some horsemen belonging to the Rajah of Nabha, endeavoured to stop the progress of the mutineers, attacking their camp at dusk. After some gallant endeavours in

¹ Renny's famous troop, soon sent to join the Delhi Force.

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which Williams was wounded, and all the British ammunition expended, it was found that the force was too big for them. They withdrew, and Ludhiana, with the assistance of the mob, was burnt and looted. It was not till Coke's Rifles, another of the Punjab Irregular Corps also heading for Delhi, swung in a little later that the town could be brought to order. The mutineers had already hurried on; the British from Jullundur arrived at the Sutlej too late to catch them up, in spite of the delay due to the cutting of the bridge and their search for the ferry. Their handling was a sorry affair.

Elsewhere in the Punjab however, affairs prospered. The 33rd N.I. was holding various cantonments in the Hoshiarpur district and also the famous fortress of Kot Kangra, held in immense reverence by the countryside. This was now entered peaceably by the Sher-dil¹ military police battalion, one of the old corps taken over from the army of the Khalsa, and the 33rd moved out. Far down the Punjab, without Europeans save a company of artillery, an important link with Sind and the guardian of the routes from Kandahar, stood Multan. Its security was essential if help was to come up the Indus. Its garrison consisted of the famous Hindustani irregular corps known as Skinner's Horse, under the distinguished cavalry leader Crawford Chamberlain, and also the 62nd and 69th N.I. When the troops in Jullundur by mutinying under the noses of the Europeans, showed how wide spread was the desire to get to Delhi and how tainted corps after corps had proved, Lawrence was anxious that Multan should be secured by disarming the Hindustani infantry. Chamberlain was the only man there fit to do it, and General Gowan agreed to put him in command over the heads of the others and do the job. It was done brilliantly and Lawrence felt that for the moment anxiety as to danger from his troops was over.

With Peshawar secure against mutiny and the frontier-side impressed with the British resolution, with the Hindustani troops in the principal garrisons disarmed, Lawrence had time to breathe again and devote some of his energies to the important

¹ Sher-dil=lion-hearted. A favourite name for an Indian corps.

task of reinforcing the troops under General Barnard at Delhi. He had already realized that his first conception of a Delhi hastily and easily disposed of, was not within the range of practical proceedings.

The greatest fear of all, that the Punjab but eight years subdued might rise against us, was for the moment eased by the remarkable dislike of the Punjabis for the Hindustani troops and the eagerness they showed to march against Delhi the ancient enemy. So long as *we* made no mistake the Punjab would see us through, but Delhi *must* be taken.

John Nicholson and the Movable Column

The Movable Column was now ready at Lahore but it had to change its commander, for Neville Chamberlain had been appointed to succeed Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General of the Army killed in the first fight with the Delhi mutineers. To the delight of the younger men, and the chagrin of some of the older, Captain (local Lieut.-Colonel) and Deputy Commissioner John Nicholson, was appointed to command it with the rank of brigadier-general, and no man in India was as fitted for the post. An officer of 17 years' service, he had as a lad experienced the bitter humiliation of the surrender of Ghuzni to the Afghans. He had been present at Ferozeshah in the First Sikh War, and seen a great deal of the Second, including the pursuit of the Afghans to the Khaibar. A year or so before he had been actively engaged on behalf of the Sikh Durbar in taming and humanizing the lawless folks of Bannu, the backlash of countless centuries of invasions and camp followers, and there was hardly a difficult job to be done in the Punjab under the Lawrences in which he had not taken part. Tall, bearded, taciturn, as hard as nails and at heart as gentle as a woman, he was emphatically the man of the hour, and the man of the hour he remained, till he fell at Delhi in the moment of victory.

The Movable Column now moved down the lower Punjab to assert our prestige after the folly of Jullundur. It consisted of H.M. 52nd, Dawes' troop of horse artillery, Bouchier's

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field battery, a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry, and the 33rd and 35th Native Infantry. The last two Hindustani corps, the 33rd having come in from the Doab, were kept with him lest worse befall, and until he could comfortably disarm them, while marching kept them from thinking. He eventually disarmed them at the end of a day's march at Phillaur taking them as they arrived, tired and dusty at the tail of the Europeans who were drawn up for them, a kindly enough act which saved them any possibility of resistance and destruction. Then he turned back, taking them tramping with him. How he came to Delhi with his column, and how he died in the hour of victory, must be told later.

The Situation between Meerut and Calcutta

We have seen the Governor-General holding his head erect in the crisis and issuing not unsuitable orders, we have seen the Commander-in-Chief struggling with the Indian Governmental system which forbade prompt action, but slowly overcoming it, and we have seen Lawrence in the Punjab playing the good cards in his hand to perfection. It now remains to glance at the most unpromising area of all, that between Calcutta and Meerut. It has already been shown how small was its European garrison. A Queen's battalion at Dinapore, 400 miles from Calcutta. Another Queen's battalion in Oudh at Lucknow, and then at Agra a battalion of the Company's Europeans, the 3rd Bengal Fusiliers recently raised and somewhat below the Fusilier standard of efficiency.

Agra, the great Mogul fortress-city and palace, was more important than now, being the capital of what was then known as the North-West Provinces, governed by the able and sympathetic but somewhat academic Mr. John Colvin. To him as to many others the outbreak at Meerut seemed due to local circumstances and the direct cause, as it was, of the Delhi massacre. He saw that if Delhi was not captured forthwith the trouble must spread, but did not realize how under-run with mutiny was the whole army.

It has been explained how the main cantonments of the Bengal Army were on the Jumna and the Ganges. Dinapore and Benares on the latter, Allahabad at the junction of the two, Cawnpore on the Ganges and then Agra and Delhi on the Jumna. Between Dinapore and Agra were only a few European artillerymen, and the most strategic of all, the great fortress of Allahabad was without any Europeans. Sir James Outram had indeed protested against this, so recently as 1856 when Oudh was annexed, but the drain of the Punjab and the Frontier as well as of the Crimea, had allowed its proper garrisoning to stand over. The vital effect of this error on the whole course of the Mutiny has been slurred by the original historians, but it was directly responsible not only for the tragedy of Cawnpore and the besieging of the Residency in Lucknow, but ultimately for the need for the re-conquest of Oudh and its martial peoples.

In addition to the main garrisons on the rivers there were many smaller stations garrisoned by one infantry or cavalry regiment, while at Bareilly for the maintenance of Rohilkhand, was a whole native brigade.

The garrison of Agra, in addition to the 3rd Fusiliers, consisted of the 44th and 67th N.I. and a European field battery. Mr. Colvin's first idea was to occupy the great Mogul fortress, but this was protested against. He then addressed the whole force on parade on the subject of Delhi and Meerut, with apparent success. But to everyone's horror he issued a proclamation that all sepoys engaged in the late disturbances if they gave up their arms to the nearest Government post, might return to their homes. It was the act of the man whose nerve had never recovered the shock of the failure of his Afghan policy. Lord Canning vehemently disapproved and ordered it to be recalled but this was not done before Agra was isolated. On the 20th May, the headquarters and wing of the 9th N.I. at Aligarh influenced apparently by Meerut, mutinied, closing the road between Meerut and Agra, followed by its detachments at various outstations. It was not however till the 31st, when two companies of a detachment from Agra mutinied at Muttra and seized the treasury, that Colvin gave way to reiterated

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recommendations, and approved of Brigadier Polwhele disarming the 44th and 67th, which was done without mishap. But it was evident as news came in from the out-lying cantonments, of mutiny after mutiny, that all authority was dying, wherever troops were present. Away from the demoralizing effect of these events, his officers held their own for some time, but eventually further mutinies caused Delhi and Meerut to be more isolated than ever.

The Lull in the Mutiny

One of the most noticeable phenomena about the commencement of the Mutiny, was the lull that took place between the Meerut and Delhi dramas and the general outbreak. With one or two exceptions, from the 11th of May to the end of the month, nothing of note occurred, and the officers had time to study their corps and the civil officers their districts. Indeed it almost seemed as if the whole world waited to see if retribution swift and stern were to fall on the guilty Mogul capital and its mutinous garrison. While vengeance tarried, the force of rebellion gathered momentum. This lull also gives support to the belief that such direction as there was, had settled on May 31st as the day for a general uprising. Mr. Commissioner Williams, to use the phraseology of the day, who made an exhaustive inquiry as to the Meerut occurrences was fully persuaded that there was a concerted date viz. May 31st. Colonel Carmichael Smyth, who was so censured by public opinion for forcing an issue in the manner he did, without consulting his superiors, openly vaunted that his action had saved India by bringing the trouble out in the open before the plotters were ready. However probable this may be, there was never any definite proof of the existence of a master mind, nor of anything more perhaps, than a revival by the same leaders as engineered the discontent over the Sind and Punjab batta question, of their previous machinations, and such system of regimental inter-communication as may have been set on foot thereby. On the other hand, Sir James Outram, and no better

opinion than his could be forthcoming, always held that the rebellion was a Moslem rising or movement, using the fortune-sent cartridge trouble as the occasion to bring the Hindu soldiery with them. As has been said, with a country in which so many discontents and disaffections were unavoidably rife, all causes tended to run together. In one part of the world Hindu and Maratha discontent used the military dissatisfaction, in another Moslem ambition and fanaticism took advantage of the same trouble, and in any case there was ample evidence of the come and go of bitter Moslem hostility, eagerly forgetting our defence of orthodox Turkey, to assail us for our quarrel with heretic Persia, or for the abolition of the equally heretic throne of Oudh.

So while, largely through inability, the British failed to use the lull to punish Delhi, and in other places to disarm soldiery, the ferment went on. Then, as if in support of the theory of a pre-arranged date which could not be expedited to synchronize with the premature outbreak, of which Carmichael Smyth made boast, broke out all over the provinces on or about the 31st. We must give our fullest admiration to our countrymen who during this period of lull, and indeed during the subsequent weeks, while mutiny or rebellion hung in the balance, sat on the burning magazine, slept in the lines with their men lest they should be seized with sudden fear, and went about their daily business, their women and children with them, knowing in many cases that their men only bided their time to turn on them. In the districts the magistrates held on, never knowing what day might be their last, playing one faction against another, and feeling, like the juggler, that so long as the balls were in the air all was not yet lost.

Sepoy Psychology

But be the day short or be the day long, sooner or later in almost every isolated case, the mutiny came to pass, whether in the crack regiments of the Line on whom honours and distinctions had been conferred, whether in the disciplined Light

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Cavalry or whether it was in the Irregulars, the pride and pet of the hard-bitten young officers who had raised and commanded them . . . one and all caught the prevalent fever. The regiment that clamoured, and possibly genuinely clamoured, to be led to Delhi, one day, would go sour in the night and murder their officers next day. How true this may be, we can see in the report of the court-martial on the men of the Garhwalis disarmed at Peshawar during the disturbances of 1930. The officer commanding the company, in giving his evidence said 'the men suddenly changed, I did not know their faces, nor had I ever seen Garhwalis like that.' So it was in 1857, regiments went sour in the night like a pan of milk, some murdered their officers with savagery, some escorted them and their families to safety, some offered large sums to their colonels to lead them in the service of the King of Delhi. Some native officers commandeered their colonel's coat to wear before the great Mogul, others bribed another corps to shoot their colonel for them so that they might deem themselves 'true to their salt.' Yet it was not always so. A few regiments survived the Mutiny by reason of isolation, but a few from sheer devotion and the magnetic control of their colonel, or some of their officers, notably the 13th who helped defend the Residency at Lucknow to the end, the 31st at Saugor, the 1st Irregulars at Multan, and Renny's troop of horse artillery at Delhi, with a few others.

Then again the clan instinct at times prevailed against the men's personal wishes. De Tessier's guns marched awhile with him from Delhi, and then the men said they owed it to their comrades to return. The model 50th N.I. at Nagod in the Central Provinces rose after they knew that Delhi had fallen, and many another curious anomaly was noticeable.

But, whatever it was, by the end of July almost every unit of the Bengal Army that dare do so had mutinied, some to march with colours flying and regimental airs a-playing to the phantom throne at Delhi, others to what was to prove a far sturdier Moslem revival at Lucknow, others again to hang around some local flag of rebellion or terrorize the countryside.

Here we may pause to sympathize with the great cadre of officers of the Bengal Army, but not because of the tragedy and death that overtook some of them and their families, nor because of the terrible hardships endured in escaping from their men. Rather do we sympathize for the professional and psychological horror of seeing the army they had spent their lives in, and the men they loved and whom they had so often led, fall away from them so unexpectedly and in so tragic a manner. The 'refugee' officers as they were called, making their way to such garrisons as existed, or such forces as were forming, found themselves without a job, and usually without pay and means of subsistence, with no one to give orders on the subject. Where commanders were wise or sympathetic work was found for them, sometimes on odd appointments, sometimes in the ranks of volunteer horse, sometimes with new units. The field officers as a rule found little scope, and drifted to the hills in the last state of dejection and disillusion. New irregular corps wanted the younger men, and the lesser vessels found little to do. It is a sad story, paralleled to some extent also, in the horror and dismay of the retired officers in Britain, who could not believe or understand what had happened, or the disappearance of a century of glory and satisfaction so suddenly. Equally bemused were their ladies who had spent happy sheltered lives among the men of their husbands' corps, or with their mankind engaged in administering and fathering vast provinces.

An interesting fact rarely referred to, cannot be overlooked in the study of regimental psychology, viz. that the furlough season had been open several weeks. It must have happened that in some corps the better disposed men and native officers were away. Possibly the plotters, if any, had arranged their own furlough for the later batches. The fact, however, might equally work the other way and corps remaining staunch may have had their unsteadier spirits away.

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After the Lull

When the lull was over the Mutiny proceeded to flare up on the date which seemed to have been agreed on, viz. May 31st, and this date of outbreak, or one shortly after, held good in all stations within reach of the Delhi and Meerut incidents. Almost adjacent to Delhi was the old Rohilla state, still hostile in memory, in which the main cantonment was at Bareilly, with lesser garrisons at Shahjahanpur, and Moradabad.

Within hail of Delhi were two garrisons in Rajputana occupied by Bengal troops, those of Nasirabad close to Ajmere and Nimach nearer to Indore. Within reach of the Jumna in the recently annexed state of Jhansi, there was a force at Jhansi itself, 140 miles from Agra with detachments at Nowgong in Bundelkhand, while away somewhat further from the Jumna and its influence were the cantonments of Jubbulpore and Saugor the latter with several corps, at one time the headquarters of a division and now commanded by Brigadier Sage. The story of these out-stations may well be told here, as most of them affected Delhi. Further must be remembered the great Gwalior Contingent with its principal body at Gwalior itself not far from Agra, and detachments scattered over Central India.

In echoing to the Delhi reverberations, there was variety in the amount of murder and outrage, and whereas at some places the sepoys were leaders therein, in most cases they let their officers away, and left it to the town rebels to hunt down lonely Europeans and helpless women and children. Only at Jhansi was the massacre organized and universal.

Punctual to the day, the brigade at Bareilly mutinied on the 31st of May. Here were the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Bengal Infantry and the 15th Bullock Battery (native). The outbreak began in the infantry lines, and the first officer to be killed was Brigadier Sibbald who rode down to the lines at once. The Irregular Cavalry did not harm their officers, and but for the treachery of one Indian officer, would probably have followed Captain MacKenzie of the regiment against the mutineers. Colonel Colin Troup, who succeeded to the command

withdrew most of the officers and residents to Naini Tal. Twelve native officers of the 8th and a few men stayed with their officers and served during the rebellion.¹ Several residents who could not get to the rendezvous in the cavalry lines were butchered. Then the brigade proclaimed Khan Bahadur Khan, a descendant of the last Rohilla chief, who was in the enjoyment of two Government pensions, as chief of the province under the Mogul. After this taking the treasure with them the brigade marched to Delhi under the command of Subadar-of-Artillery Bakht Khan,² a stout and elderly Moslem, who eventually became commander of the rebel army in Delhi. There, this brigade clung together much envied for their treasure, which they kept to themselves, and when Delhi was captured the survivors still as a brigade in being, returned to Rohilkhand till exterminated by Sir Colin Campbell in 1858. A European sergeant-major (see Chapter IX) of one of these corps was taken prisoner to Delhi and remained in the regimental lines during the siege. On May 31st also mutinied an outlying battalion (the 28th) of this brigade at Shahjahanpur, attacking the residents while in church that morning. Several were killed, but the Sikhs in the corps (about a hundred) protected the remainder and sent them off to Muhamdi in Oudh. On the road they were massacred by some of the 41st Native Infantry and Oudh Irregulars marching from Sitapur. The 28th marched to Delhi with the Bareilly Brigade and went south after the siege. On April 20th '58, in a fight with a brigade near Arrah, it is recorded that a dead subadar of the corps was found with its colours wrapped round him.

At Nasirabad close to Ajmere, the administrative centre of the Rajputana Agency, were the 1st Bombay Cavalry the 15th and 30th Bengal Native Infantry and the famous 6th Light Field Battery (native), which had taken part in the defence of Jalalabad and had the 'mural crown' engraved on its guns. On June 8th all except the Bombay Cavalry mutinied and marched to Delhi,

¹ Because of these just men, the regiment was reconstituted after the Mutiny. *Vide* Appendix III.

² Full name was Muhammad Bakht Khan.

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the 15th trying to kill their officers, but without success. The Bombay Cavalry made several attempts, probably half-hearted, to charge the mutineers but were repulsed. They however remained staunch and in their lines under their officers.

At Nimach 120 miles further into Rajputana, were a wing of the 1st Bengal Light Cavalry, the 72nd Bengal Infantry, the 7th Gwalior Contingent Infantry and a troop of native horse artillery (1/4th Bengal). All mutinied on June 4th, but their officers and other Europeans succeeded in maintaining themselves in the fort for a while. The mutineers hearing a rumour that European troops were approaching made off towards Agra. Some men of the 1st Cavalry and 7th Gwalior Infantry, who had rejoined them after seeing their officers to a place of safety, were shot by their comrades for their pains. This force kept together, attacked the Agra force and defeated it, having been joined by the Kotah Contingent, and then marched to Delhi. It maintained itself as an efficient force till destroyed by John Nicholson.

Jhansi, Nowgong and Saugor

The Mutiny at Jhansi was one of the most bloodthirsty of incidents. Here resided the ex-Rani brooding over the grievance of the lapsed state. The garrison consisted of a detachment of foot artillery (native), the right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry and the left wing of the 12th Bengal Infantry. Arrangements had been made by the officers to seek refuge in the Star Fort in cantonments which was victualled for the purpose. On June 4th a company of the 12th unorderd, marched in and took possession. The Cavalry then rose and murdered all they could find. The remainder, to the number of forty-five men women and children, took refuge in the main fort at the edge of the city. Here after holding out a few days without food or ammunition they surrendered on a promise of safe conduct from the Rani. As they filed out they were roped, the men separated and the whole led in procession by the chief men of the town, principally Moslems to solemn execution, in which none

were spared, an unusual and especially aggravated case of atrocity.

At Nowgong most of the Europeans got away unmolested, when the other wings of the corps at Jhansi mutinied. There too was a company of native artillery, manning the 18th Bullock Battery, which had hugged their guns in a wild scene of apparent loyalty, a few days before they mutinied with the other units on June 10th.

At Saugor far away in the Narbada Territory, Brigadier Sage seemed to have shown more sound sense than was usually evinced, and had not the least intention of allowing the officers to be sacrificed to a sense of misplaced confidence. He moved the company of Bengal Artillery (68 Europeans) from what is now the Cavalry School, to the fort, with all Europeans and Christians and marched out the Sepoy guard, ordering the officers of the regiments in the brigade to sleep in the fort barracks. The native troops consisted of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, the 31st and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry. It was not till the 1st of July that the 3rd and the 42nd broke into open mutiny, the 31st remaining staunch. A little earlier two companies of the 31st had been sent to Lalitpur, where the 6th Gwalior had mutinied and had actually attacked the fort they were in and captured it. A little later they too mutinied and released their prisoners of the 6th. The main part remained staunch at Saugor, and actually fought and drove out the others over a quarrel, led curiously enough not by their own officers, who were absent in the fort when the quarrel began, but by two young British officials of the Salt Police. The main bulk of this regiment remained staunch and were doing duty when Sir Hugh Rose arrived eight months later and relieved the fort from its long isolation.

Gwalior and Rajputana

The behaviour of the powerful Gwalior Contingent commanded by Brigadier Ramsay with headquarters at Morar, five miles from Gwalior itself, was realized on all sides to be a very important factor. It has been explained that this Contingent

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was recruited from the same area as the Bengal Army, and was likely to be tainted by the same spirit, while the state troops of Sindia were composed of Marathas and other races among his subjects. The Contingent was 8,000 strong and consisted of 2 cavalry regiments, 4 companies of artillery and 10 infantry battalions, stationed in addition to the main body at Morar, at various small cantonments throughout Malwa, at Asirgarh, at Nimach, at Lalitpur, Guna, Sipri and at Hattras.

The officers in the eastern stations proposed to send their families away to Agra for safety, and to free their hands, but this the brigadier was foolish and obstinate enough to forbid. Then Sindia invited them to the better security of his Palace but the brigadier ordered them back. Thus it came about that when the outbreak at Morar took place¹, seven British officers, six warrant officers, three women and children were murdered, the chaplain being shot in front of his family. The cavalry and artillery at Hattras did their officers no harm but sent them into Agra while most also escaped from Sipri. The outlying corps mutinied with other troops in their vicinity.

Having got rid of their officers the Contingent remained sulkily at Morar for some time plaguing Sindia for money and concessions. Except the battalion that remained with the Nimach brigade none went to Delhi but eventually formed the bulk of the force which attacked Wyndham at Cawnpore. After their defeat by Colin Campbell, half went back to Kalpi, there they remained with Tantia Topi and went with the force that attempted to relieve the siege of Jhansi, the remainder scattered and some probably went to Lucknow.²

In Rajputana the only regular troops were at Nimach and Nasirabad on the confines. There was a small detachment from Nasirabad at Ajmere, the winter headquarters of the Agent to the Governor-General, now Henry Lawrence's brother George, who was however at the time in the summer resort of Mount Abu in the Aravalli mountains. Ajmere was saved by the Mair

¹ The 1st Gwalior Infantry at Morar, behaved sufficiently well to be incorporated in the New Army as the 41st Bengal Infantry.

² *Vide* Chap. XI.

Corps brought in 37 miles to replace the Bengal sepoy's belonging to Nasirabad in charge of fort and arsenal. Four days after the outbreak at Meerut, Lawrence had issued a proclamation calling on the Chiefs in Rajputana to support the British, and with very few exceptions they responded most loyally, helping later in forming the corps of horse that were to pacify the country side. Some of their contingents mutinied, notably the Jodhpur Legion at Erinpura and the Kotah Contingent, which had been sent in to Agra to support the Government. Abu which had a few British invalids was attacked but relieved by a column from Deesa. Some of the Moslem population in the cities of Rajputana were fiercely rebellious but without being able to do much harm, and George Lawrence had the satisfaction of seeing the Agency weather the storm well, a result due to a considerable extent to Henry Lawrence's conciliatory and sympathetic attitude while head of the agency, which his brother was anxious to continue.

Such rebel forces as held the field in Rajputana were handsomely beaten in November at Kanaud, on the road to Ajmere, by a force consisting of the Carabiniers, Guides, and 1st Bengal Fusiliers, under Colonel Gerrard who was unfortunately mortally wounded, and that was the last of anything serious in this area despite the doings of Tantia Topi in 1858.

The Nagpur Contingent on the edge of the Madras Army area was able to weather the storm. The 1st Cavalry were reported to the Resident to be on the verge of mutiny, and the famous Hill of Sitabaldi was occupied as a defensive post. The 1st were disarmed by some details of Madras Artillery and the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and the rest of the Contingent including a battery and four battalions stood firm. Two men of the 1st were hanged and an incipient mutiny at Raipur was repulsed by the determination of a few European residents.

CHAPTER V

THE ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE OUDH AND CAWNPORE

The Line of the Ganges – The situation in Oudh – The preparations of Sir Henry Lawrence – Cawnpore – Sir Hugh Wheeler's plans – Reinforcements from the south – Neill at Benares – The tragedy of Allahabad – The coming of Neill

The Line of the Ganges

THE Ganges and its tributaries had always been the great line of communications of the British and it was up this river and its tributary the Jumna that the great cities of the land lay as well as the British cantonments. From time immemorial a hardy race of boatmen had navigated the rivers, and to these for thirty years had been added the steam boats of the West. The 120 initial miles of the new railway system had not as yet detracted from the supreme importance of the control of this line which alone ensured communication with Allahabad and the stations already enumerated. On the Himalayan side of the Ganges, the Gogra was also navigable in full river to beyond Fyzabad in Oudh. With Meerut and Delhi in uproar, the maintenance of the line was most important and since the newly annexed province of Oudh bordered the Ganges for many miles, the preservation of authority thereon was essential if reinforcements were to pass up towards Delhi. The Province of Oudh originally confided to the sympathetic hands of Sir James Outram in 1856, had as related during his absence in Europe on sick leave, been left in wrong hands. The supreme Government had refused to make available as officiating Chief Commissioner, the man whom Outram had recommended, and it fell into the hands of two red-tape officials, who brought it in a very short time to the

verge of rebellion. Outram's return was prevented by his selection to command the expedition to Persia, and in March 1857 the much debilitated Henry Lawrence was hurried there from Rajputana where he was agent to the Governor-General. But Henry Lawrence well, or Henry Lawrence ill, his was a name to conjure with, and in this case where a vast staff of court officials, court pensioners, and redundant troops had been reduced, it required the most statesmanlike and sympathetic handling, if all was to go well. The hand of Henry Lawrence on the helm immediately steadied the ship, and a régime of confidence was commenced which, had it had a little more time to bear fruit, might even have kept Oudh staunch.

The military headquarters of the force in Oudh and the Ganges *Doab*¹ was at Cawnpore, where Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler was in command of the division, a man of 54 years' service in India and therefore well past the age which in these days is considered the limit suitable for activity. But he was slight and spare and a constant rider, so that his years, outwardly at least, bore lightly on him. His knowledge of the Indian army and the affection of the sepoy for him were unrivalled, save perhaps in the case of his old friend Sir John Hearsey who had just spent all April with him, on his way from Sialkot to take up the command of the Barrackpore Division.

Brigadier Jack at Cawnpore, and Brigadier Handscombe at Lucknow, commanded the regular troops, while there was also forming in Oudh a new force to garrison that province and absorb the best of the disbanded soldiery, in the shape of the Oudh Irregular Force, modelled on the Punjab Irregulars and partly raised by officers from that force. It consisted of 3 horsed batteries one garrison company of artillery, 3 cavalry corps, and 10 infantry battalions. Further there existed a strong force of military police of 700 horse and 2,400 foot. The Irregulars, as of course the military police, were under the Chief Commissioner, the Irregular Force being commanded by Brigadier Gray.

¹ *Doab*=two rivers, i.e. the land between.

The garrison of Cawnpore was a considerable one but far less than when that place was the headquarters of the force that watched the Nawab of Oudh. But the occupation of the Punjab and Sind had, as has been explained, much strained the resources of the Army and the divisions down country had been stripped of most of the Europeans. So much was this the case that the only European units in the division were the 32nd Foot at Lucknow and a battery of Bengal Artillery at Cawnpore and Lucknow respectively, in which only the gunners were Europeans. The 32nd Foot had only recently left Cawnpore, where most of its wives and families and its convalescents remained. The battalion itself was accommodated at Lucknow in the magnificent Royal Mews known as the Chowpegra Istabal. The actual regular native troops at the two principal stations of the Cawnpore division were the 7th Light Cavalry, the 13th, 48th and 70th N.I. with Simons bullock battery (2/8th) at Lucknow, and the 2nd Light Cavalry with the 1st, 53rd, and 56th N.I. at Cawnpore and two companies of native artillery,¹ with the 41st N.I. at Sitapur and the 22nd N.I. with Mills 13th Battery (5/7th) at Fyzabad, both in Oudh. The Oudh Irregulars were also stationed at numerous places within the province including those occupied by regulars, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry, the 7th Infantry and two horsed field batteries being at Lucknow itself.

The Situation in Oudh

The situation that was developing in the earlier months of 1857 was pregnant with warning to the well informed minds both of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler. Both saw clearly the significance of the greased cartridge trouble. Indeed, Sir Henry Lawrence, who was the author of many essays on the Indian Army, had written after the disasters at Kabul the prophetic words already quoted² that were now coming true.

From the moment of his arrival he had been getting into touch with the troops in Oudh as well as making friends with

¹ No history has mentioned these. It was they who worked the guns from the magazine (6/7 and 1/8 B.A.).

² See page 19.

the notables. He and Wheeler had been in constant communication and had they been younger men would have discussed the troubles in person, Cawnpore being but 48 miles from Lucknow, in these days but an hour and a half's run. The hot weather had set in, Sir Henry was ill, Sir Hugh aged, so that it happened that these two experts did not lay their heads together, save by telegraph and letter, the former fortunately erected a year or so earlier. Added to the military unrest, was the trouble referred to, the many sore hearts and empty purses that the annexation had caused, enhanced by the unsympathetic control which had temporarily existed.

Reference has already been made to a disturbance among the Irregulars at Lucknow. On May 3rd, seven days before the outbreak at Meerut, which was the real commencement of the Mutiny, the 7th Oudh Irregulars gave signs of a mutinous spirit, refusing to take any cartridges at all for drill (the old pattern), and threatening the life of their adjutant. Letters from them to the regular corps in cantonments were also discovered. Sir Henry at once marched the regular brigade down to the lines, where the 7th had been ordered to parade. The distances were great and he did not arrive till after dark. The regiment in front of the line of guns gave up its arms and then broke in panic to be pursued and brought back as prisoners.

The Preparations of Sir Henry Lawrence

Sir Henry had now his warning. He assembled a Durbar for all the Indian officers, addressed them at length on the situation, explained how absurd were the intentions attributed to the British Government, reminded them of all that Government had always done for its soldiers, and presented dresses of honour and rewards to those who had done well in the affair of the 7th Irregulars. A few hours later came the first news of the trouble at Meerut.

Sir Henry, unwell though he was, had lost no time in acting

in the most effective manner. The great city of Lucknow lay for some miles on the right bank of the river Gumti. Along that river below the city, where it made a wide loop, lay the fashionable residential area containing many royal palaces and gardens. At the city end of this was the group of buildings containing the British Residency, and the bungalows in which had resided the former Residency staff in the days before the annexation, which was now the Government centre. This area, open on the river side, though otherwise close to a portion of the city, stood on slightly elevated ground, containing among others the gateway and guardhouse named after an earlier commander the Baillie Guard, the name by which the Residency and its defence was known to all Indians. '*Baillie guard gya*,' a man who had been at the Baillie Guard was the description of any one who had served in the defence or relief of the Residency.

On the north side of the river three miles from the Residency, lay the cantonment of Mariaon occupied for many years by a brigade of the Bengal Army, as a support to our ally the Nawab of Oudh, and still in occupation by the troops already detailed viz. three native infantry battalions one European and one native and two irregular batteries. A mile or so further on was the cavalry cantonment of Mudkipur with the 7th Light Cavalry. The corps of the Oudh Irregular force stationed at the capital, were scattered on various sides of the city. One corps had been largely raised from Sikhs, including many who had been in the Nawab's service, and were known as 'Hardinge's Sikh Cavalry.'

Three quarters of a mile above the Residency on the river bank was an imposing and roomy though not very strong fortress known as the Machi Bhawan. Sir Henry at once prepared this as a place of refuge, had it thoroughly cleaned out, and collected as a garrison all the Sikhs in the regular and irregular regiments, amounting to six companies, with a company of the 32nd Foot. A wing of the 32nd was sent out into camp at the city end of Mariaon cantonment and Sir Henry himself went into residence there so as to be near the troops.

As soon as the news of the mutiny at Delhi came through, Sir

Henry had telegraphed to Lord Canning asking to be put in military command of all troops in Oudh. This was at once done and the rank of brigadier-general was conferred on him. The Governor-General at the same time wrote courteously to Sir Hugh Wheeler explaining his action which took away the greater part of the latter's command and deprived him of all Europeans save 60 artillerymen, leaving him and his staff quite unable to control affairs in his own division. On the other hand it was important to put the regular and irregular garrison of Oudh under one control.¹

Sir Henry was now busy also fortifying the Residency area itself and collecting there as much supply of food and treasure as was possible. Unfortunately this was not done through the agency or with the knowledge of the commissariat department, who had no idea of the really vast store which had been collected in the empty swimming bath under the Residency dining hall, which will be referred to later. During all this time every possible step was taken to encourage the troops and restore confidence. Sir Henry at Mariaon kept open house and entertained many guests each night at dinner.

Cawnpore

It is now time to glance at Cawnpore itself, as the scene of the greatest tragedy of the Sepoy Mutiny. For six miles on the right bank of the Ganges straggled the civil and military station, while in about the centre standing back some three quarters of a mile, lay the vast native city already a centre of many industries, notably, as in modern times, those of the manufacturers of tents and leather goods. The civil station and treasury lay in the northern portion of the area, as also the ordnance depot known as the 'Magazine' a fortified and extensive enclosure on the river bank. The original cantonment had also been in this area, but had gradually moved to

¹ We can now see that Sir Henry should have been made Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cawnpore as well as Oudh, and Sir Hugh should have joined him with his staff.

the south of the city, where was now situated the divisional commander's house, the residences of most of the officers and all the barracks, and lines. A set of European cavalry barracks was also in process of erection and the railway embankment was being got ready for the approaching line from Calcutta. In the long areas on the river banks between the northern and southern portions of the station were the residences of the very numerous European and Eurasian civil and business community, which included the Assembly Rooms, Masonic Hall, etc., while as a centre of the railway preparations there was a considerable staff of railway engineers. Sir Hugh Wheeler's mind was therefore more than full of how to protect this large Christian population, which consisted of over two hundred able-bodied men and over three hundred women and children, daily augmented as families came in from places round.

When the news came of the outbreak at Meerut and the loss of Delhi, Sir Hugh was under no illusions, but he did count on his own knowledge of the men and their confidence in him, to keep at any rate his own garrison, steady until Delhi should fall and troops be brought up from below. When it became evident that Delhi was not going to be recovered promptly, he saw that if help was to come it must come from below. He was or thought he was, in possession of excellent information of what was in the sepoy's minds, and therewith is bound up the whole inner working of the story and the behaviour of the Nana.

The history of the Dundoo Punt, the Nana, is too well known to need elaboration. Suffice it to remind readers that when in 1817 the Peishwa the head of the Maratha confederacy – that Baji Rao whose clansmen's horses' hoofs are still heard o' nights beating the Dekkan – utterly faithless to his treaties, led a movement to break the British power, he was beaten, deposed, and exiled to Bithur, fourteen miles from Cawnpore. There, with ample private wealth and a handsome allowance, he ended his days in semi-regal state. He left his wealth to his adopted son Dundoo Punt. But the Peishwa though adopting this Brahmin lad of the Dekkan to be his worldly heir, had not made

him his spiritual and corporeal one. True Hindu adoption is a uterine ceremony that must be carried out before birth. For this and other reasons, wisely or unwisely, the British Government refused to continue Baji Rao's allowances to Dundoo Punt. This grievance he took home to the Court of Directors, and the Cabinet, through the hands of one Azimullah Khan, a servant whom he had raised to an intimate position. Azimullah much over-lionized by foolish hostesses in England visited the Crimea, and there witnessed the repulse of the first British attempt to storm the Redan. The Nana's emissary failed to bring about any change in the decision of the Directors, and the Nana not unnaturally highly chagrined thereat, was said to be nourishing a bitter hatred. Nevertheless though rarely coming to Cawnpore himself, he entertained the European community generously at Bithur, and was known to have shown considerable kindness to young officers and their families.

The General was intimate with him, and so was Mr. Hillersdon the collector or chief magistrate of Cawnpore. Sir Hugh placed considerable faith in the Nana's views of what was in progress, despite Sir Henry Lawrence's warning to distrust him, and the secret of this has not been stated. It is common knowledge that Lady Wheeler was an Indian lady of family, but as a matter of fact those who knew, said she was a *Puntni* a caste-fellow of the Nana. The friendship borne to her and extended to the general, was therefore possibly genuine. There were several anomalies in the whole of the official story of the tragedy that have always puzzled people, and this supposition does account for some of them. The Nana had always said that if the sepoys mutinied they would march to Delhi, which they did, taking the lives of no officers and no Europeans.

Sir Hugh Wheeler's Plans

During the days of the lull, that is to say between the 10th of May the Meerut date, down to the 30th, Sir Hugh was busying himself in making preparations for a place of shelter and refuge, in which he could protect his non-combatant Europeans from


the attacks of the city scum, and then forward them down river to Allahabad and Calcutta. In this connection it is to be remembered that the date was approaching when the rising of the Ganges would allow steamers to come right up to Cawnpore. He also knew that arrangements were being made for the transit of reinforcements from Calcutta and hoped to be able to keep all quiet till they arrived. The localities possible for a place of refuge were two. One was the magazine some miles north of the military station, defensible, but hard to get at, depending largely on the river for water, with the actual running water some distance away across the sandbank until the river rose. This magazine or ordnance depot was full of military stores, many guns of various sizes and a store of ammunition. It was guarded by a sepoy guard, and had the usual staff of ordnance officers and warrant officers with *lascars*.¹ There was thus this position, none too well placed to receive several hundred women and children with their goods and chattels. It was, as has been shown, hard to get at in times of excitement and some way from the trunk road and the road to Lucknow. The other possible site, was two large barracks built for European troops, one too a hospital fitted with those sanitary out-houses and conveniences which would be so essential a feature of a place of refuge in hot weather, with also a good inexhaustible well. The buildings were out in the open, and close to the road from the south. Believing that the soldiery would march away north and on the balance of argument as it appeared to him, Wheeler chose the latter. It is difficult to say on the data before him that he was wrong.²

Having decided on this site, he ordered it to be defended by a parapet and gun emplacements. This parapet it is said

¹ *Lascar*=soldier, but invariably applied by the Army to departmental employés.

² Well-informed and sympathetic Indians in the city had another story. It was the month of June and the General was well over 70 years. Lady Wheeler they said, knowing that her old soldier would be riding there at all hours in the sun to watch preparations, urged him to decide on the hospital site, close to his own residence pointing out how the Nana had assured him that the sepoys would go straight to Delhi. The story is not improbable. General Neill has recorded that the magazine site in his opinion was adequate and was suitable.

Sketch of Cawnpore in 1857.



References.

- 1 Bibi ghar.
- 2 Nand's Hotel.
- 3 Windham's Bridgethead.
- 4 Artillery Lines
- 5 Assembly Rooms.
- 6 Position covering Cawnpore held later by Windham.

was of friable earth, and quite useless as a defence against bullets. It is probable that the ground was very hard and stony, but he had engineer officers and there must have been tens of thousands of cornsacks obtainable, which filled with earth would have made a good enough parapet, and this failure to make the parapets efficient is unintelligible.

Towards the end of May, Wheeler expecting an outbreak on the Id¹ and having been deprived of his power to protect himself and his division by the Governor-General, besought Lawrence to send him some of his own 32nd. Lawrence sent him 84 men in carriages with two squadrons of irregulars, still thought to be trustworthy, and all came through in one day. With them came Captain Fletcher Hayes in command, who writes a somewhat pitiful account to Lawrence, of the old general plagued and besought all day by all and sundry, and unprotected by his staff, and of the disgraceful scenes of confusion as the refugees assembled at, and shook down in, the entrenchment. The brigadier and station staff, or whoever was in charge of the business seems to have been apparently incapable of organization.²

Fletcher Hayes unwilling to expose the Irregulars to cantonment influences, took the squadrons out to a district needing pacifying, only to be murdered for his pains, the squadrons mutinying and killing him and the other officers. One got back to Cawnpore.

The residents and Europeans were now concentrated in the entrenchment, the sepoy officers however still sleeping in their own lines or even with the men, anxious to maintain confidence and to preserve them from any hysterical panic that might drive them to an outbreak, a noble gesture characteristic of the officer of the period.

The actual defenders that Sir Hugh could envisage when all had been mustered, were probably as follows:

¹ The festival at the end of the Moslem period of fasting, in memory of the death of the sons of Ali, pronounced 'Eed.'

² But those who have seen a panic in, say, the Lahore railway area, of Anglo-Indian families will realize that this is a hard business to handle. It was equally badly done at Lucknow and Agra.

European artillerymen	60 (with 6 guns)
Invalids of the 32nd	70
Detachment of 32nd lent by Lawrence	84
Unattached officers, civilians, engineers and other male refugees and Christian drummers	200 40

The number of women and children can never be accurately gauged but was probably about 330.

But circumstances were to alter somewhat before the day of trial came.

Sir Hugh like Sir Henry Lawrence was not long in realizing that personal prestige and influence could do little to prevent the sepoys from catching the 'prevailing disease' and the most they could hope for was to play for time, for the reinforcements that were coming up. Any and every device was employed, and among others the confidence in the Nana which was shared by Mr. Hillersdon went so far as a request that he would send some of his retainers with guns as a counter-poise to the soldiery, 200 horse, 400 foot and two guns eventually coming in. These were posted at Nawabganj near the treasury and magazine in the northern portion of the station. On the 1st June bullocks and elephants were sent down towards Allahabad, to help establish the convoy system for the reinforcements that were now approaching.

Reinforcements from the South

It is now time to study the story of the reinforcements, from which it will be seen that Sir Hugh Wheeler's judgment was hardly at fault, and that Cawnpore was relieved, in so far as the first trickle of reinforcements actually reached him, and had also reached to Lucknow. It will then be possible to deal with the great strategical factor to which the historians have not given anything like due importance, that is to say the failure to make Allahabad and its fortress good, and the interruption that was

allowed to occur after the first head of the reinforcing stream had got right through. This failure directly brought about the fall of Cawnpore, the siege of Lucknow, apart from the secondary cause the Chinhat disaster, and should have been regarded as *the* scandal of the period, the neglect of a strategical move which in vulgar parlance was 'sticking out a mile' to be dealt with.

It has already been shown that the country from Cawnpore to Calcutta boasted but two European battalions in its garrison throughout a distance of 628 marching miles and 954 by water. These were the 53rd Foot in Fort William Calcutta and the 10th Foot, at Dinapore. It has also been related how the 84th Foot, had been brought over from Burma after the trouble of Mangal Pandé at Barrackpore, and how Government in its blindness had then proposed to send it back, and had made no use of it while waiting. But when the outbreak at Meerut frightened the optimists and gave some clue to what was in store, the nearest troops were summoned, first and foremost the Madras Fusiliers from Fort St. George, half of the 37th Company of the Royal Artillery from Ceylon, and the 37th Foot from Moulmein, while the 64th and 78th returning from Persia were to come right round by sea.

Government now set about sending the 84th up country, and as soon as the Fusiliers should arrive, they too were to hurry up. Whether or no the bullock trains and elephants which were to take men on from railhead were collected with sufficient energy and resource is not on record, but in any case in times of trouble such supplies are apt to hang back.

The somewhat tardy decision of Lord Canning on June 12th to raise the Calcutta Volunteer Guards had added considerably to local strength. On May 24th the Madras Fusiliers arrived in Calcutta, commanded by Colonel James Neill an officer of reputation and character, who had recently returned from organizing Bashi-bazouks of the Osmanli contingent during the Crimean War. A first class regimental officer and a man of determination and judgment, his arrival in Calcutta was a breath of fresh air. Parties of the 84th were already struggling up

country and Neill took his corps forward at once, with orders to assume command of all troops moving and to take command also at Allahabad and organize further movement. Part of his battalion was to go up river by steamer and part to proceed at once by train to Raniganj 120 miles and thence by bullock and elephant stage.

It is amusing to the modern reader, to find the historians illustrating his marvellous strength of character and fearlessness in responsibility, by the story of his arrival at the railway station at the head of his men who were a little delayed, and finding the train about to start and, the station-master refusing to wait, Neill at once put a guard on the station-master and engine, with orders to see that the train did not start till his men were entrained. 'A man who could thus brave the civil power was not likely to quail before mutineers,' says Malleeson.¹ That Neill was a determined man we know, but this act which any modern subaltern would do in a crisis, is hardly a sufficient illustration to be quoted in all the histories.

In advance even of Neill, some parties of the 84th and a few of the Madras Fusiliers arrived at Allahabad and were actually passed on towards Cawnpore, while large quantities of bullocks were collected at the former station for the Government bullock train which was to take up the troops.

Neill at Benares

The Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta after leaving the railhead at Raniganj strikes the Ganges at Benares and crosses to the left bank. Benares lay within the Patna division of the army, where Major-General Lloyd at Dinapore with the 10th Foot watched his native regiments and the fanatical city of Patna, without taking decisive steps. The Dinapore garrison in addition to the 10th Foot were the 7th, 8th and 40th N.I. and a European battery.² While at first Lord Canning had forbidden disarmament, General Lloyd was perfectly free to carry it out later, and lost opportunity after opportunity until in the face of

¹ In *The Red Pamphlet*.

² 11th Field Battery 4/5 B.A.

almost a complete European battalion, he allowed his native troops to splutter into mutiny on the 25th of July, with results that will be related hereafter.

At Benares were the 37th N.I., the irregular Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs, and a wing of the 13th Irregular Cavalry and a battery of European artillery under Captain William Olpherts.¹ Benares as the first point on the marching road for reinforcements occupied by native troops was naturally of importance. The cantonment called Jeccole three miles inland from the city,² was the headquarters of the brigade commanded by Brigadier Ponsonby, a cavalry soldier who had made his name at Parwandarra in Afghanistan sixteen years before. He was now neither young nor fit in health. The garrison had recently been reinforced by sixty men of the Madras Fusiliers sent on by Neill a hundred and fifty of the 10th Foot from Dinapore. These with the European artillery should have had some settling effect, but it is noticeable that unless in very effective hands the presence of Europeans was in no sense a check on the sepoys.³

On July 3rd Neill himself arrived. On the 4th came news of the mutiny on the same day of the 17th N.I. at Azimgarh sixty miles to the northward. Ponsonby asked Neill's advice as to disarming the 37th. Neill insisted that if done at all it must be done that very evening. But disarming was a measure neither of them knew much about. The colonel of the 37th was ordered to disarm his men. The men were obeying on their own parade ground when the Europeans were seen approaching on one side, the Sikhs and Cavalry from another. The sepoys then seized their arms again and opened fire on the 10th, some of whom fell. The 10th returned their fire and Olpherts opened on the mutineers with grape.⁴ Neill now assumed command from Ponsonby, for whom the heat and the situation were proving too much. The Sikhs were coming up on the left of the Europeans, when firing broke out in their

¹ 2/3 B. Arty.

² Not identical with the modern site.

³ Cf. Meerut, Ferozepore, Jullundur and Lucknow.

⁴ The Benares 'mess-up' is indicative of the extreme difficulty and delicacy involved in disarming.

rear, one of the irregular cavalry having fired at his commanding officer. The Sikhs some of whom were disloyal lost their heads and rushed on the guns; Olpherts swung his guns round in time to give them grape and then they and the Irregulars, with the 37th, broke and disappeared, some to return next morning. The danger for the moment was over to the great relief of the community, but at the price of what in military slang would be called a 'mess-up.' Further there was spread the fear already visible up-country, that the arrival of Europeans meant forcible disarmament if not an attack on the native troops.

As soon as the situation was clear, Neill pushed more of his Fusiliers up to Allahabad and left himself on July 9th.

The Tragedy of Allahabad

The contretemps at Benares brings us up to the time of the tragedy of Allahabad, that as already shown lost Cawnpore and brought on the leaguer of the Lucknow Residency area. Allahabad, 'the City of God,' stands at the *sangam* or junction of the Jumna and the Ganges, and since all joinings are holy and still more so a junction with Mother Ganges, it was and is a very holy site indeed. Between the city and the actual junction stands a Muhammadan fortress, a great massive building bastioned and loopholed, from which the Moslem conquerors of India dominated the Hindu city of Prayag and made it a town of their own. Standing at the junction, not only did it over-ride the navigation but also the roads to Delhi, Agra and into Oudh, it also held a considerable Ordnance depot or lesser arsenal. Despite Sir Charles Napier's views on commanding sites, despite the earnest recommendations of Sir James Outram, Allahabad stood in 1857 without a British garrison. In May the troops in the station consisted of one company native artillery and the 6th N.I. to which had lately been added the best part of Brazier's irregular Sikh Corps.¹ Sir Henry Lawrence, mindful of its safety as his one link with help, had sent down two troops

¹ The regiment of Ferozepore.

of Oudh irregular horse to steady as he hoped the sepoy garrison and to be at the disposal of the civil authorities. The cantonments lay two or three miles from the fort, with the civil station nearer the latter. The 6th N.I., one of the smartest and best thought of corps in the Army were in the cantonment, the Sikhs were in the outer fort, and on the fort-gate a guard of the 6th.

As May wore through and alarms and ill-news increased, the European families moved into the fort, where something like a hundred civilians were formed into a volunteer corps, and eventually the military authorities moved up some sixty European artillery pensioners from the Chelsea of Chunar. That was all that was done to secure this vital strategic point, although within a reasonable distance at Dinapore was a whole European battalion while at Calcutta the 84th Foot had been available for weeks. Dinapore, however necessary for the watching of Patna, was not on the main line of communication. At Allahabad further, a most important duty was being performed by the civil authorities and the Commissariat Department, in collecting carriage for the reinforcements that were on their way, 1,600 bullocks for the train having been obtained besides elephants.

Already had the first slowly creeping head of reinforcement passed through and on towards Cawnpore where it actually arrived, in the shape of a company (110) of the 84th and 15 of the Madras Fusiliers. On May 19th the 6th had made what at the time was possibly a perfectly genuine gesture, by clamouring to be sent against Delhi, to the joy and pride of their officers. Up to June 4th all seemed quiet and it appeared that the race against time might yet be won. Neill was at Benares and the stream and tide of succour was gathering force. Then there occurred the mishap of Benares. The news reached authority at Allahabad, and a company of the 6th, with a gun from the fort armament was sent down to guard the bridge of boats over the Ganges, lest the mutineers should attempt to cross. On the 6th in the cool of the evening, the 6th N.I. were paraded to hear a congratulatory message from

Lord Canning on their loyal offer of service against Delhi. The Commissioner attended and addressed the corps, who were dismissed with cheers on their lips. How far this was pure hypocrisy, and how and when the distorted news of the shooting of their comrades at Benares had spread, will not be known. The news may just have turned the balance of the good and evil in the ranks. It was believed that the guard at the bridge heard first. At any rate hardly had the men lodged their arms after the congratulatory parade, and the officers turned into the mess house for dinner, when the regiment broke out. Officers hurried to the lines. Several were killed, and in a very short while everything was over. The artillery officer at the bridge endeavoured to lead the Oudh Irregulars against the party there, but without avail. A wild scene broke out, and the city *badmashes*¹ hastened to join. Colonel Simpson commanding the 6th and the station, returning to the fort from the parade escaped wounded. A tragedy which stirred the whole of India was the slaughter of six cadet officers just arrived from Home and attached to the 6th while awaiting posting, long known as the 'massacre of the Griffs.'²

Long and pitiful was the scene of disorder and burning, involving the massacre of all Christians who had not gained the shelter of the fort. The savagery of the Moslem population exceeded, or at least emulated, the worst of the risings and led by a Moulvi of a neighbouring village, the Mogul rule was proclaimed. Within the fort, all was consternation, and all feared that the behaviour of Brazier's Sikhs might be disturbed by the apparent mishandling or misbehaviour of the Ludhiana regiment at Benares, also magnified and distorted. Happily Brazier had his men in hand, and in the presence of the volunteers at the parapet of the inner fort, and the veteran artillerymen at the guns, the company of the 6th laid down their arms and were marched out.³ The fort was saved, though the Sikhs celebrated the occasion by an orgy among the stores

¹ *Badmashes*=evil-livers, roughs.

² Griffin then being a term, now extinct, for the last joined from Europe.

³ Also the native artillery.

of 'Europe' liquor. But alas ! one of the worst results was the loss of the 1,600 bullocks that were to take on the reinforcements. On the 7th Lieutenant Arnold arrived by bullock train with 50 more Fusiliers sent on by Neill, men who, had all been secure, would have gone on to Wheeler at Cawnpore in continuation of the first draft. Arnold got over the river the bridge being broken, with great difficulty by steamer. On the 9th in marched another party, and two days later Neill himself arrived almost prostrate from heat with forty more of his Fusiliers. With him unfortunately came the cholera which racked his ranks and hampered his movements.

The Coming of Neill

Great was the relief of the heterogeneous garrison, as Neill appeared at the Fort gate, and at his at once assuming the command in accordance with his orders.

To Allahabad still in most evil mood, Neill came like a lambent flame. The whole country had burst into insurrection, and the station of Fatehpur, 40 miles further on the Cawnpore road, had fallen on its Europeans. There was now no question of sending troops up the line by bullock train, reinforcements must go as a force in being. But relief had actually reached Cawnpore, and as the head of the stream had marched in talking of more immediately behind, generous Wheeler actually sent them on to Lucknow. That is the real tragedy of Allahabad; Cawnpore and Lucknow had been almost relieved, when the sword of relief snapped as it were in the wielder's hand.

A blow was now needed to restore some faith in the British Raj, and Neill was the man to strike it. While many of his brave Fusiliers writhed in the grip of cholera, the others were the better for work. The Sikhs for precaution's sake were put outside the fort, heavy fire was opened on the rebellious city and suburbs, and Neill, for some days too prostrate to go out himself, sent forth his avengers.

The suburbs and villages near the fort were soon clear, and by the 24th Neill had 360 Europeans and felt that he could move

forth and take a wider offensive. With Fusiliers and a gun on ship-board, and Europeans and Sikhs by land, the troops and fighting rebels under the Moulvi were defeated, the cantonment re-occupied and the work of organization for advance put in hand. Heavy was now the hand of justice and retribution and few trees lacked their fruit. In the circumstances discrimination was little thought of.¹ A blow was needed and Neill dealt it. But the retribution dealt had the effect of causing good and bad to flee, and markets and the collection of supplies and transport were much hampered thereby. The hand of cholera had moreover fallen heavy on the first arrivals and soon after Neill's first successes he had had a hundred cases and over fifty deaths among his Europeans. Yet preparation tarried not and by the last day of June it was possible to make the first move forward to Cawnpore now known to be hard pressed. Major Renaud led forth that day 200 of the 84th Foot, 200 Fusiliers, 300 Sikhs, two guns with European gunners and a party of Palliser's Irregular Horse. Neill himself hoped to follow close behind. Just as Renaud was marching out Havelock himself arrived, highly approving the orders that had been given to Renaud, and to a party of 100 Fusiliers with a gun under Spurgin, who were to move by steamer on the same errand.

¹ When the harshness of Neill's measures are dwelt on, the blame must rest on those who commenced atrocities. *Vide* pp. xi and 255.

CHAPTER VI

THE DRAMA OF CAWNPORE AND LUCKNOW

The outbreak at Cawnpore and the defence – The surrender and the massacres – The tragedy at Fatehgarh – The outbreak at Lucknow – The Mutiny at Sitapur – The glory of Arrah

The Outbreak at Cawnpore and the Defence

It is now time to turn back to Sir Hugh Wheeler and his many troubles. We have seen how on May 24th, the rumour of an outbreak on the occasion of the Id, had brought some assistance from Sir Henry Lawrence, how he had assembled his families and his Europeans in the entrenchment, and how wild was the state of confusion that prevailed. But in a few days this had settled down, and in the last days of May the expected reinforcements began to arrive. By the end of the month 110 of the 84th¹ had come in and 15 of the Fusiliers, speaking confidently of more behind. Sir Hugh's policy of the entrenchment seemed to be justified, and all seemed saved. Sir Hugh mindful of Lawrence's situation sent back to him on June 3rd not only his party of the 32nd in carriages, but with them 50 of his newly arrived 84th so confident was he of the continued flow of those promised 'more behind.'²

Alas! again were these belated plans for reinforcement to gang agley. The whole edifice, as we have seen, fell with the outbreak of mutiny at the unsecured Allahabad, and no more of the 84th and Fusiliers were to come through. Sir Hugh had parted with his lifeblood in the confident hope of immediate

¹ Sometimes stated to be 150, but 110 seems correct.

² As an instance of the utter failure of all staff and departmental organization in the Barrackpore division or at Calcutta, we find that though the 84th had been many weeks in India having come too from Rangoon, Sir Henry Lawrence complains that these fifty men of the 84th had arrived with only cloth clothing and not even the usual white cap covers to their forage caps.

fresh injections. On the 3rd however, Lieutenant Ashe brought in 2 guns of the Oudh Artillery who had been marching with an escort that had mutinied.

The lull in the Mutiny referred to earlier, was over, the widespread risings on May 31st had taken place, and yet still Sir Hugh's influence seemed to be holding his sepoys. There had been as we have seen much rumour and many alarms. There had been an incident which upset the garrison, when a cashiered officer living in a bungalow by himself, being in drink, had fired on a party of noisy sepoys; but still the garrison held. Then on the night of the 4th the 2nd Cavalry opened the ball, declaring, possibly not without some truth, that they could bear suspicion no longer, and called on the 1st to join them and seize the Treasury. The latter, driving away but not injuring their officers, did so, as well as the Nana's troops. But the rest of the brigade were none too mutinous. The company of the 53rd at the Treasury fought for their post for some time. Next morning thinking that the 53rd and 56th were in open mutiny, which they were not, Sir Hugh sent Ashe's guns to fire on them and the two corps reluctantly broke. Even so all the native officers of the 56th and many men came to the entrenchment and were accommodated in a neighbouring barrack. Then as the Nana had prophesied, the whole brigade marched northwards on its way to Delhi having touched none of its officers and committed no outrage despite the scenes of pitiful confusion, folly and panic, that had been going on under their eyes for several days, in which the white race must have lost much of their prestige. Well may it be said that this story of Cawnpore is full of anomalies and inconsistency.

Then for a couple of days the Europeans in the entrenchment went about their daily round with a load off their hearts, and but waited for the expected Fusiliers. On the 6th however all was changed, for there came a letter from the Nana to the General saying that the sepoys were returning to attack him. Cawnpore city folk always said that this letter was but an instance of several showing that the Nana was anxious to save the Wheelers and their companions. However that may be, the message

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whatever its inspiration, was followed very shortly by round shot. The sepoy had returned and had surrounded the entrenchment, and with them as many guns as they could use from the store in the magazine, in which some ineffective arrangements of Wheeler's to emulate the heroism in the Delhi magazine, and to destroy the ammunition, had miscarried.

On the 7th commenced such a hell on earth for the unfortunate white people cooped up in those buildings and earthworks, without one shotproof corner to rest in, as can hardly be imagined. It was the most intense period of the Indian summer, when life even with the alleviations of a good house and cooling appliances is extremely trying.¹ For our non-combatants – people gently nurtured, ailing ladies and children, soldiers' wives, some ailing some hearty enough, and the less robust Eurasian – there was neither shelter from the glare nor from the myriad flies, there was no privacy, there was little conservancy and no shelter from bullet and roundshot. Death, disease, horror, thirst and fear stalked unabashed. The hospital walls kept out no roundshot, the earthworks did little more than mark the line of defence, the guns stood *en barbette* and the gunners were quite unprotected.

The actual garrison when the time of trial came had varied from that already given. The company of the 32nd had gone and only the invalids remained under that Captain Moore who was the life and soul of the place. The garrison now stood at:

Artillerymen	61	
32nd invalids	74	
84th Foot	60	
Madras Fusiliers	15	Total 210 rank and file
Officers, volunteers and drummers	30	Total 240 ²

The total of women and children had risen to about 375.

¹ A few years ago it was found that one of the two barracks had a huge underground chamber, capable of sheltering many, which was unknown to the garrison.

² There are two authorities for these figures which vary, those of Lieutenant Delafosse, and of Mr. Shepherd the Commissariat agent.

The details of this defence and all it entailed, the burial of the dead by night in a well, the struggle for water, the fierce attacks on the days of native festivals, the daring sorties, the undaunted spirit, the cannister made up in women's stockings, the children chasing trundling roundshot in glee, have been told often enough. A few of the earlier letters sent out by runners reached their destination. It is well known that certain officers were the life and soul of the defence. Sir Hugh, it is believed, was largely in a state of collapse from heat and strain, Brigadier Jack was not heard of. The names that have come through are Moore, of the 32nd, Vibart of the 2nd Cavalry, Captain Whiting and a few others.

The artillery of the attack increased daily as more guns were brought up from the magazine. Beside mortars and lighter guns, two heavy twenty-four and three eighteen pounders whose shot would crash through any building, were brought to bear, as well as twelve and nine pounders. The defenders who had left these guns to their enemies, had but a few six and nine-pounders with which to reply.

What need to go on with the prolonged agony, the deaths of matrons and maids, old folk and children, the difficulty of burial! In the house of massacre was found a brief diary kept in a lady's hand in pencil on a sheet of blue notepaper. And this is how the pitiful story ran:

- | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| May 21st. | Went into the barrack. | |
| June 5th. | Cavalry mutinied. | |
| June 6th. | First shot fired (it was really 7th). | |
| June 17th. | Aunt Lily died (Mrs. W. Lindsay). | |
| June 18th. | Uncle Willie died (Major W. Lindsay). | |
| June 27th. | George died (Ensign G. Lindsay). | |
| June 27th. | Left the barrack. | |
| June 29th. | Taken out of the boats. | } refers to the massacre at
the Ghats. |
| June 30th. | Taken to the Savada Kothi. | |
| July 9th. | Alice died. | |
| July 12th. | Mama died (Mrs. G. Lindsay). | |

(July 15th was the end of all their miseries, just as Havelock won the fight of the Pandu Naddi.)

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To add to the troubles one of the two barracks, the hospital building, had a thatched roof, admirable to lessen the heat, hopeless in the face of bombardments. On the 11th this caught fire and women, children and wounded were rescued with difficulty under a hot fire and laid in the open, or crowded into the remaining barrack that was already full. Medicines and surgical appliances were lost.

Early in the defence it had been necessary to send away the loyal soldiery who had rallied round their officers. There was neither accommodation nor food, and ere long there was no native within the entrenchment save 50 servants and 20 orderlies. On the 23rd another fierce assault was made, driven off after a severe struggle, and on the 25th arrived a half-bred woman a Mrs. Jacob, with a message from the Nana to Sir Hugh, offering boats and a safe conduct to Allahabad 'to all who had not taken part in the acts of Lord Dalhousie.' The older officers and the general as well as most of the younger ones were for holding out, but those most prominent in the defence notably, it was said, Captain Moore, urged acceptance. Perhaps they realized better the straits to which they had been reduced, and saw no hope of saving non-combatants any other way. Next morning an armistice was arranged and a treaty was executed, whereby the British would give up their position and guns and march to the river a mile away, with their arms. There boats and provisions would be provided, and carriage from the entrenchment to the boats for all who were helpless. A committee of officers went down to the river to take over and pass the boats waiting at the Sati Chaura Ghat.

The Surrender and the Massacres

On the 27th the garrison and their precious charge slept such a night of strange quiet as they had not experienced for many weeks. The boats were correct and ready, the transport was waiting to take them thereto. Early next morning the guns were handed over and our people moved out, a strange weary dishevelled crowd, with such an assortment of valuables

and oddments as the survivors still clung to. The road to the ghat and river bank was lined with the rebel soldiery many of whom condoled with their officers on their sorry plight or expressed admiration at the defence. Men were helping their old officers and even carrying the children. Grim and dour among the procession at intervals marched the able-bodied survivors grasping their weapons.

While this strange and pathetic scene was in progress, let us for a while turn our gaze on the central figure, Dundoo Punt, on whom all the compressed odium of the civilized world has been turned. His entourage were his two brothers Bala Rao and Baba Bhat, Azimullah *ex-khidmatgar*,¹ of London fame, and Tantia Topi Maratha, the only man of martial spirit among them. Tantia Topi eventually went to a judicial trial and hanging, and his story was before the court. Not so the principal actor, whose end, as related, is wrapt in mystery and legend.

The general deductions from the careful enquiry that was made afterwards, amounted to the belief that it was the Nana who persuaded the mutineers to return to attack the entrenchment, and that what now followed was the result of a carefully prepared plan of the deepest treachery. That is the accepted story, and it, with the eventual tragedy of the Bibighar, are credited to his bitter hatred of the British and their ways, and his undying malice in the matter of the pension. A disappointed Easterner and a Maratha Brahmin at that, may easily be credited with the fellest design. There were however well informed writers who were concerned with clearing up Cawnpore afterwards such as Colonel Maude and Mr. Sherer who thought that every sinister act need not necessarily be accredited to him. Evidence afterwards with the gallows in the offing was necessarily hard to reconcile. Well informed native opinion in certain quarters, and they were quarters which had suffered severely from the rebels in the outbreak, believed that the Nana was himself friendly to the Wheelers² and anxious to get them away safely and be rid of the whole boiling at any

¹ *Khidmatgar*=servitor.

² For the reasons already referred to.

price. They quote his letter of warning of July 6th to Wheeler. They believed that the massacres at the *ghat* were not pre-arranged, that the troops were crowding to the banks as sight-seers, and were by no means arranged for action. Some of the Nana's entourage may have planned it all as an act of double-dyed treachery, but their view was that as the women had got into the boats and the troops were being distributed, some one by accident or possibly by fell design, not necessarily the Nana, let a musket off. The British, naturally intensely suspicious of treachery, and most highly strung, replied all along the line. Then the fat was in the fire and the massacre began. There was a curious little story current, so likely in its oriental incongruity as to be worth telling, and it has some faint bearing on the foregoing. The Nana it was said had sent by the hand of a cavalry trooper, a farewell letter to the General wishing him and Lady Wheeler a safe exit from their troubles, and the general seated in the stern of one of the boats was scribbling a reply, the rebel trooper all the while waiting *strictly and correctly at the salute, for the reply*, and that while so doing the firing broke out. The most that can be said is that it may be so, and one would like to think that, whoever was or was not at the bottom of the treachery, the sepoys who carried the children and congratulated their officers on the defence, were not. Evidence at Tantia Topi's trial, brought out the fact that the unholy quintet were sitting on the temple steps at the Sati *ghat* watching the embarkation with possibly some or all in the secret of what was to follow.

As our people got down to the water's edge about 8 a.m. all seemed correct and they were stowed into the boats with their little bundles of gear, the troops were distributed and some of the boats pushed off. Then began the firing, and the boats' crews fled or jumped overboard taking the oars and poles, and firing it was said, before they went, the thatched roofs of the boats. Soon the guns opened, and a scene of horror and massacre commenced that endured for some time. At last the Nana ordered the killing to cease and the survivors to be brought to him. Then the men of whom there were sixty,

were killed and the women sent to the Savada Kothi a big house at the edge of the cantonment. One boat got away and floated down stream. A boat-load of sepoys which followed was destroyed by its occupants. Eventually it stuck and the gallant Vibart, Mowbray Thompson of the 56th, and Delafosse of the 53rd with 11 privates went ashore to attack some tormentors on the bank. Overpowered they were forced into a temple, while their boat floated away. Smoked from their shelter they rushed for the bank and plunged into the river, amid a hail of bullets. Eventually Thompson and Delafosse with privates Murphy and Sullivan after swimming for many miles were sheltered by an Oudh rajah and finally brought to safety with Havelock. The boat they had left ran aground again and the contents were recaptured to be taken to Cawnpore, the men to be put to death like the others, the women to be added to the miserables in the Savada Kothi. One or two other boats drifted some distance to meet a similar fate, and that was the end of the British in Cawnpore, saving alas the survivors in the Kothi, to whom were also added a large party from Fatehgarh. In a few days the women and children with a very few surviving men were moved to a miserable little bungalow and courtyard near the Nana's hotel, known to pity and history as the 'Bibi-ghar' the 'Ladies' House.' There, fed by sweepers and kennelled like dogs they were to pass a miserable fourteen days, save only those whom merciful death called earlier. It was not a story calculated to make the avenging troops on their way up merciful, and there was worse to follow. If we would criticise the punishment let the blame rest on those who first banished all ruth from the face of the earth.

The Tragedy of Fatehgarh

A side drama was also enacted at Fatehgarh on the Ganges some miles above Cawnpore, where was situated the carriage factory of the army. The story is connected with Cawnpore in that 130 non-combatants, men, women and children who had been sent away by boat down stream by the commandant,

were captured by the Nana's people during the attack on the entrenchment, the men being slaughtered forthwith, the women and children kept and added to those who found their last resting place in the well at Cawnpore. At Fatehgarh were the 10th Bengal Native Infantry, and the artillery officers connected with the gun-carriage factory and many civilian employés of the same establishment as well as some planters in the district. Fatehgarh is situated in the district of Farrukhabad, one of the Afghan colonies analogous to Rohilkhand, the local magnate being the Nawab of Farrukhabad. At the beginning of June Colonel Simpson commanding had sent to Cawnpore by boat 170 of the civil residents and their families, though forty after proceeding some way returned, the remaining 130 as stated above going on to their fate. The 10th on the 16th of June informed the commandant that they had had a summons from the 41st who had mutinied at Sitapur to join them, and that they had refused. Two days later however they recommended Simpson to take all the officers into the defences of the factory. Thirty-three of the refugees were officers and others capable of bearing arms. The 10th leaving them unmolested, proclaimed the Nawab as ruler and possessed themselves of the treasure, after which a considerable number made for their homes. Then the 41st arrived and demanded a share of the treasure from those of the 10th who remained. This was refused whereon a struggle ensued, which ended in the discomfiture of the 10th, who now joined the 41st in an attack on the factory. The garrison who alone possessed a gun or two, resisted for some days and after suffering the loss of their best men, they decided to try and escape by three boats which were secured to their wharves. The sepoys discovered them in the act of departing by night and attacked. The boats got away, but one soon grounded. The freight was distributed and two boats proceeded. Then down the stream after them came two boats of sepoys and opened a hot fire. Eventually some of our people jumped into the river and were drowned, others landed and fought to the death with their tormentors. Some were taken back to the Nawab and slain. None escaped – a sad and sorry

ending to a gallant defence. Among the party thus destroyed were still several women and children, whose fate was no better than that of those who reached Cawnpore.

The Outbreak at Lucknow

There is still another page to turn, before authority in Oudh dwindled to that few acres represented by the Residency entrenchments. We have seen Sir Henry Lawrence actively at work increasing his precautions and also endeavouring to rally important people to support the Government. All during May the effects of his prompt dealings with the mutinous 7th Irregulars, and his precautionary measures kept Lucknow quiet. As we have seen, on the 24th he had sent the detachment of the 32nd and other assistance through to Cawnpore and it was not till the 30th that his real trouble began. His information from his staff was that the troops would mutiny that night, at gunfire. As the hour came and the evening gun boomed forth he sat with his guests at dinner in the Mariaon Cantonment, a wing of the 32nd camped near by, and he laughingly remarked to Captain Wilson 'Your friends are late.' Hardly were the words out of his mouth when the sound of firing came down on the breeze from the native troops' lines. Instantly Sir Henry ordered his horse, and turning to the *subadar* commanding his guard who had asked if he should load, said 'Yes, load and see that while I am away no harm is done here lest I hang the lot.' He then rode off to where the 32nd with the European battery had fallen in and saw red riot in the distance. While they were waiting, the colours and 300 men of the 13th N.I. marched up and ranged itself alongside the 32nd, followed by small parties from the 48th and the 71st. But in the lines all was uproar and the officers' bungalows aburning. Brigadier Handscombe had been killed and also Lieutenant Grant, adjutant of the 71st,¹ with others wounded. After coming into collision with the advancing Europeans the mutineers disappeared, towards the cavalry cantonment, to advance again later, and were reported

¹ A son of Sir Patrick.

to be drawn up on the race course. There Sir Henry marched on them at early dawn, with his Europeans, some of the Oudh Irregular horse, and a portion of the 7th Light Cavalry. Several of the latter joined the mutineers, after killing a cornet, but the remainder remained staunch for a while. Fired on by the artillery the mutineers fled and were pursued many miles. Only a few were killed but some 60 were captured.

Then Sir Henry returned but still kept his Europeans in Mariaon with over 600 loyal remnants of the three corps. It was however not a satisfactory handling of the native brigade — three officers killed, much damage done and the brigade gone off, with their arms! On the other hand an attempt to disarm them would have meant a certain breakout of all the various regulars and irregulars in Oudh and the massacre of many Europeans. This Sir Henry had hoped to avoid and preferred to play for time, for already had letters come from Neill, and the reports of the coming reinforcements were cheering. So Sir Henry called high, gambled and lost, but who can say they could have done better?

Unfortunately the lull in the Mutiny was over; the outbreak at Lucknow coincided with the general date which so many corps were seizing, and throughout Oudh in all the garrisons regular and irregular, the hour had come. The outbreak at Lucknow but gave the signal. One and all the stations went, at some the officers were murdered, at others they escaped to suffer great hardships and eventually to be slain by others, or to be sheltered by chiefs and sent through to Naini Tal, so varied was their fate. Some corps suborned others to kill officers they scrupled to touch themselves.

Gallant Sir Henry continued to hold his own in Lucknow itself and in Mariaon, with the help of the loyal remnant of his regulars still numbering some 600 men, of the isolated Sikhs in the Machi Bhawan, and his Europeans, among whom alas! the cholera fiend had made its appearance. It was not till the end of June when Neill was pushing off Renaud's column, that he was compelled by circumstances to be related later, to leave the cantonment even and concentrate on the Residency area and



THE RESIDENCY AT LUCKNOW
as it was at the outbreak of the Mutiny

the Machi Bhawan. So early as June 3rd there returned to the Residency the detachment not only of the 32nd sent by Lawrence but by that magnificent super-gesture of Sir Hugh Wheeler's, 50 men of the 84th, those first fruits of the stream that failed. Relief had trickled to Lucknow, and then on the night of June 4th came down that final blanket of fog and isolation, the rising of the Cawnpore troops.

The Mutiny at Sitapur

It is not necessary here to describe in detail the orgy of mutiny and murder that now followed in the Oudh cantonments. The mutiny at Sitapur, the largest of the stations, is typical of what was happening to so many of our people in this province and elsewhere, and is described at some length but as an illustration of the drama that was so universal, at Sultanpur, Fyzabad, Secrore, Muhamdi and Bahraich. Sitapur was a place of importance, as headquarters of one of the four civil commissioners' divisions into which the new province was divided, and it was the first to follow Lucknow. Mr. Christian, the Commissioner, was confident that he could hold his own. He distrusted the 41st N.I., but like Sir Henry had some faith in the Irregulars and military police. Looking back on it after the lapse of years it is hard to understand this faith in the Irregulars, but the reason must have been the fact that belonging to a different group in sentiment, they had been handled by young and selected officers, and that great kindness and care had been shown in taking into the service the best of the Nawabi troops of Oudh. Outside the regular officers, people were very conscious of an outworn system and routine that seemed to learn nothing and forget nothing. The other troops at Sitapur were the major portion of the 9th and 10th Irregulars and a considerable body of military police. Christian collected all the women and children at his own house, a large one in the bend of a stream, except four ladies of the 41st who would not leave their lines, and brought near him close on a thousand armed men of the Irregulars and military police, who were placed between the

house and the regulars' lines. With them also were four light guns. This done he could but sit down to wait, expressing the opinion that if the 41st went they could merely break, and that with the other troops he could carry on. It was pathetic enough this gallant confidence in themselves of these determined British officers, and their power to control mutineers with men of the same class. Time and again it did come off, by sheer courage added to the confidence of men in the justice and power of the Raj, and their affection for their officers. Times more and it failed. Yet as the story is pondered over and digested, it is to be seen that India as a whole was with its rulers.

Christian it will be noticed having placed all his faith in the Irregulars, the stream at his back prevented practically any escape from them, and a trap his position was soon to prove.

On June 3rd Colonel Birch of the 41st returned to cantonments with a wing of his corps which had been in the district. That very morning he heard a rumour that the Irregulars were going to attack the treasury, held by a 41st guard. He accordingly took down some men to their support. Firing was soon heard, and a wounded officer came galloping back to say that the colonel, another officer and the sergeant-major had been killed by their own men. The Irregulars as soon as the firing was heard at once shot five officers of the 9th and 10th with a lady and child who were in their midst. An officer and two staff sergeants escaped to the Commissioner's house where the mutineers now rushed, firing at all and sundry, and setting light to its thatched roof. Mrs. Christian had fled down to the river bank with her infant and a tiny Sophy toddling by her side. Mrs. Christian was shot, as was Christian who followed after her. As she fell she called on some one to save Sophy, and Lieutenant Burns, taking her on his pony, got her over the stream. It is needless to follow the story in detail. Twenty-four Europeans, men, women, and children were killed, a few gathered in the woods across the stream, of whom some got away, receiving grudging help from villagers and chiefs. The remainder were eventually handed over to the mutineers and taken into Lucknow, the men to be shot the women kept in

duration till at last, as the rolling tide of vengeance came along some one plucked up enough courage to send them in to Outram. Little orphaned Sophy had faded away in the course of the severe duration and confinement.

The Glory of Arrah

After Neill and Havelock had passed on from Allahabad, events of serious importance which may well be added here, occurred behind them on the rivers, ending, happily in glory rather than the usual tragedy.

The story of Arrah belongs to the happenings of the long Ganges line in July and August when anything that stopped the flow of reinforcements was more than harmful, and is one of the most famous and glorious episodes of this fateful period. It can only be told as an adjunct to the story of the line, and yet it is one which on the forefinger of time should sparkle for ever.

Arrah cannot be separated from the futility of Dinapore and the aged ineptitude who there commanded. Neill had passed through and disarmed the garrisons at Benares, but the whole scheme for the relief of Lucknow and Cawnpore had been blighted by the 6th at Allahabad being allowed to mutiny. Patna seethed with sedition, and still Major-General Lloyd, despite the presence of the best part of the 10th Foot and some European artillery left his three native battalions with arms in their hands. Often and often had the Commissioner Mr. Tayler, a tower of wisdom and strength, protested. He had a few of Rattray's Irregular Sikhs at his disposal, and had raised a small force of volunteers which the General should have been managing.

At last the time for action seemed inevitable. On July 22nd a steamer came alongside with two companies of the 5th Fusiliers.¹ Still the General hesitated, and let them pass. Two days later came two companies of the 37th Foot. Then Lloyd took heart of grace and decided on the trivial measure of removing the caps from the magazine. This was done next

¹ This battalion had now reached India and was coming up-country by detachments.

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morning, the British corps, viz. the 10th, two companies of the 37th¹ and a company of artillery parading close to the magazine while the caps were removed therefrom, the 7th N.I. protesting. Then as a measure well calculated to annoy the native soldiery, the General ordered the three native corps to parade while the Europeans were at breakfast a couple of hours later, and give up the caps in their pouches. They replied by firing on their officers and then marching away to the Soane on the road to Arrah 25 miles away, after recovering the rest of the caps. The European troops turned out, but too late to fall on the mutineers in their lines, and the General made no attempt to follow, though the passage of the swollen Soane a few miles off must have presented difficulties to the fugitives. There was some ineffective business with a steamer which stuck on a sandbank and that was all.

At Arrah the leading spirit was Mr. Vicars Boyle an engineer at work on the railway track, heartily supported by Herewald Wake the magistrate, to whom Mr. Commissioner Tayler had sent fifty of Rattray's Sikhs. Boyle had prepared a small out-lying bungalow built as a billiard room, for defence and with fifteen European and Eurasian volunteers² all told, prepared to hold his own. He had to hold it against not only three highly trained battalions of the Bengal Line but a large force of the retainers of a local Sirdar³ and landowner, Kunwar Singh, who, intensely embittered by private legislation and new land regulations, had decided to try and get his dues by war since peace had failed him. Kunwar Singh had also a couple of ancient guns which were quite good enough to batter a bungalow even though projectiles were a difficulty. The mutineers breaking open the jail, then looted the treasury and proceeded in a leisurely way to attack the bungalow, but to their surprise they found that they had caught a tartar, as well-directed fire struck their ranks. The Commissioner had implored the General to send troops towards Arrah, and when news came of

¹This battalion had now reached India and was coming up-country by detachments.

² Some accounts say eighteen.

³ Sirdar=man of importance.

the leaguer he was compelled to do so. On the 29th a force of 343 Europeans and 70 Sikhs with a few gentlemen volunteers went off by steamer and up the Soane by boat, landed and advanced by night. Captain Dunbar who commanded insisted in continuing his advance when the moon had gone down, and actually reached the outskirts of Arrah in the dark. A terrible fire burst forth on all sides, Dunbar was killed and a wild confusion turning to a *sauve qui peut* ensued. The disaster was complete, 7 officers and 128 rank and file were killed outright or left behind while but 1 officer and 50 returned unwounded. It was worse than Chinhat and far worse than Sacheta. Nor was there any sort of military excuse or reason, as in the other cases. One hundred and thirty-five good lives and immense prestige were thrown away, yet there must have been a dozen more experienced and competent officers in the garrison who could have been put in command. The Arrah defenders having heard the firing die away, hardened their hearts and decided to die where they stood. Lloyd became more helpless than ever and would have left Arrah to its fate, when chance brought the gallant Vicars and Wake relief.

On the 25th a steamer had touched at Dinapore with a European battery on board, with field guns but no bullocks, commanded by Major Vincent Eyre of the Bengal Artillery, who had attained distinction in the Afghan campaign of 1839/42, and had plenty of experience in accepting responsibility. On arrival at Buxar he heard of the trouble at Arrah 45 miles away, but pushed on first to Ghazipur said to be in danger. Finding Ghazipur safe he exchanged two of his guns for a loan of 25 of the 78th Highlanders and returned to Buxar. Here he found the party of the 5th Fusiliers sent on by Lloyd on the 22nd had arrived, and by agreement with Captain l'Estrange who commanded these and with the remainder of his guns, he felt adequate to relieve Arrah, and even send back the Highlanders to Ghazipur. With the help of Captain Hastings the remount officer in charge of the stud at Buxar, supplies, transport, and gun bullocks were collected and the march commenced at sunset on the 31st. Next day came the news of Dunbar's defeat. Pressing on all

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August 1st Eyre arrived at a village close to Arrah, where he halted for the night, to hear at dawn the mutineers' bugles close by and to find that they were blocking his route. Advancing to the attack and getting his guns to bear, his well-handled force after being attacked and surrounded for hours in jungle, finally drove the mutineers before him, and the little garrison who had been hard-pressed and had lost considerably during several days of attack, heard the firing and had the satisfaction of seeing the rebels packing up to make off. Next morning, August 3rd their deliverers marched in to marvel at the stand made against such numbers. Eyre was not yet prepared to stay his advance. Demanding reinforcements from Dinapore and receiving 200 of the 10th mad to avenge their comrades and 100 of Rattray's Sikhs, he now led his force against the mutineers in Kunwar Singh's village of Jagdispur, and inflicted on them a heavy defeat.

The rebels dispersed for a while and, British prestige thus restored, Eyre led his troops to the river again, and once more proceeded on his way. To both the defenders and the relievers of Arrah, history and the British Army will ever render homage.

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CHAPTER VII

HAVELOCK'S ADVANCE AND THE INVESTMENT OF LUCKNOW

The phases of the Mutiny and its aftermath—Havelock's advance on Cawnpore—The battles of Cawnpore—The first attempt to reach Lucknow—Lucknow in June—The disaster of Chinhat—The investment of the Residency

The Phases of the Mutiny and its Aftermath

It is now possible to see the Mutiny and the subsequent campaigns in some perspective, and without separating the phases in our minds, the whole picture will appear but a blur. The drama was presenting several successive scenes in several separate theatres, in which the course of the outbreak and its repression took quite distinct and separate lines.

The phases were:

- (1) The outbreak and immediate action of local authorities with local resources to obviate it.
- (2) The capture of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow.
- (3) The conquest of Oudh and the smashing of the rebel army.
- (4) The suppression of the rising in Central India.
- (5) The extinguishing of the smouldering embers over a wide area.

The separate areas were:

- (1) The Punjab.
- (2) Delhi.
- (3) Rohilkhand.
- (4) Central India.
- (5) Oudh.
- (6) The country between Allahabad, Calcutta and the Himalaya.

It will be necessary to realize that these areas actually operated as separate foci of rebellion without any particular reference one with another, and that the mutinying troops as well

as any rebel chiefs tended to remain in those areas and group themselves together. The exception to this would be the move of the Delhi mutineers towards Oudh after the capture of that city. It will also be evident that both Delhi and Lucknow acted as magnets, which drew the mutineers from many of their stations to one spot, and thus prevented them upsetting the administration of the districts other than those through which they actually passed.


Havelock's Advance on Cawnpore

With the return of the force from Persia were to come commanders and staffs as well as troops. Just as Sir Patrick Grant was about to sail from Madras in response to the Governor-General's summons to join him in Calcutta, there arrived from Mohammerah in the Persian Gulf, Brigadier-General Henry Havelock, whose name was to become such a household word in Britain. An officer of the 13th Foot, he had spent most of his service in India where he had served in the Burmese Campaign of 1824-5, with the army in Afghanistan, taking part in the defence of Jalalabad, on the staff. He had also taken part in the Gwalior campaign of 1843 and in the severe struggles of the Sikh wars. In the sonorous Persian, he was truly *Jang-dida*, i.e. war experienced. He had held many staff appointments and in 1857 was Adjutant-General of Queen's troops when he was summoned to command a division under Sir James Outram in the expedition to Persia. Now on his way back, he was the first commander of merit to the hands of Government, when Sir Patrick Grant resisting the popular clamour to rush up country with a few troops, and leave the Government of India in the lurch again, selected him as the suitable instrument to lead the first advance that should save Cawnpore and Lucknow. Arriving with Grant on June 17th, on the 25th he was on his way to Allahabad, having telegraphed to Neill that he was coming. The historians make some quite unnecessary allusions to Neill's disappointment at Havelock's succession, for it was obvious to the former that he


MAP EXPLAINING THE AREAS AFFECTED
BY THE MUTINY
SHEWING THE MILITARY THEATRES

Miles

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 800



- I *Punjab and Frontier*
- II *The Delhi Area*
- III *Bareilly*
- IV *Central India*
- V *Oudh*
- VI *The Eastern Area*



I N D I A N O C E A N

did but lead the advance guard. Equally egregious are the allusions to Havelock's chagrin at his commander-in-chief from Persia superseding him later. Such things are written in pure ignorance of armies and their ways, and in fact 'supersession' is the wrong word to use. It was obvious as the force increased that higher commanders would be appointed, and that Outram, the former Chief Commissioner and a victorious commander, was the one man to command the force destined for Oudh as soon as he was available.

Early on the 30th, Renaud had started with orders in his pocket from Neill to push on for Cawnpore to deal faithfully with rebels, to exterminate the Pathan settlement at Fatehpur, which had led the trouble there and murdered Tucker the judge, but otherwise to refrain from miscellaneous severity. An hour or so later that very morning, Havelock was breakfasting with Neill in the fort, and highly approving the latter's instructions to Renaud who, it will be recalled, had with him 400 of the Fusiliers and 84th, 300 of Brazier's Sikhs, 200 of Palliser's Irregular Cavalry, and a couple of guns.

At this time, be it remembered, Cawnpore so far as was known was holding out. Havelock was to have four British battalions as soon as they should arrive, the Madras Fusiliers and 84th already about Allahabad and moving up, with the 64th and the 78th Highlanders on their way to Calcutta from Persia. But the bugbear of carriage and supplies was weighing heavily, and it was not till July 7th that Havelock despite all exertions could make a move. The difficulties which Anson had experienced at Ambala were now to be realized further south.

But also the incentive to prompt advance was to change. On the 2nd came a native runner from Lawrence to say that Wheeler and his force had capitulated on the 27th and had been annihilated. Lieutenant Chalmers rode in with a similar report on the 3rd. Havelock made no doubt that the news was true, and Renaud now three marches on, was ordered to stand fast. Neill hoped on and then took the first step in making the lamentable breach between him and Havelock. He wired to the

Commander-in-Chief that he considered Renaud should press on.

By July 7th however Havelock, who had two first class staff officers at his disposal, Lieut.-Col. Fraser Tytler, and Captain Stuart Beatson, both with Persian experience, was ready to move. His little force had by now reached a total of 1,000 British infantrymen of the four battalions 130 more of Brazier's Sikhs, six guns organized by Captain Maude's company of Royal Artillery from Ceylon, from odd guns and equipment, the first of the Royal Artillery to serve in India for a century, and last but not least Captain Barrow's troop of 18 Volunteer Horse, chiefly unattached officers, planters and the like.

By the 12th, Havelock had effected a junction with Renaud at Lohanga, marching into the latter's camp with the pipes of the 78th a-skirling at the head of the column, amid great enthusiasm, and the combined force pushed on towards Fatehpur. The soldiering was not too good, for four miles from that place, while the troops were waiting for breakfast, a 24-pound shot was lobbed into the camp and the 2nd Light Cavalry in their French-grey uniforms were seen approaching. The troops hurriedly formed up to meet the threat, unfed in the growing heat, but the sepoys were met and driven back through Fatehpur; their guns, more numerous than those of Maude, were captured one by one, as the astonished rebels fled, having dreamed that they had only Renaud's detachment to cope with. Palliser's Irregulars failed Havelock, so that pursuit was impossible and on the next morning they were disarmed and dismounted, which left but Barrow's volunteers for all the mounted work. The Enfield rifle and the well served guns had sufficed, and no casualties occurred save through the arch enemy, the sun, but twelve Europeans died from its effects and the bad arrangements that had sent them to fight unfed.

With Havelock was Mr. Sherer, the magistrate of Fatehpur who was able to restore the Raj, and hunt out the Moslem deputy-magistrate who had murdered or failed to protect the judge. By now vengeance was taking a juster form than the hasty executions which Renaud had instituted, and which had

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the effect of driving away in fear all who could have purveyed supplies. Nevertheless condign vengeance was exacted from all who had joined in the ruthless butchering of Christians in Fatehpur. On the 13th, Havelock moved on, leaving the Sikhs to the congenial task of burning the guilty town. On the 15th, a strong force of mutineers were found in their front at the village of Aong, amid walled gardens and heavy groves. Again there was little to it, for the élan of the Fusiliers and other units, together with superiority of fire direction, once again drove the mutineers headlong. The avenging army, mad with the stories of the massacre at the boats was not to be denied. Six miles further on was the Pandu Naddi, spanned by a masonry bridge the passage of which was important. Havelock called on his sun-weary troops for another push to gain the bridge before it could be destroyed, and by a noble effort far more to be admired than the exciting feat of battle, pushed on and secured it. Behind the river was Bala Rao the Nana's brother with a line of heavy guns but Maude pushing on within range so punished them that the bridge, already undermined, was abandoned, and Stephenson and his Fusiliers swept over.

The Battles of Cawnpore

Modern soldiers will not be inclined to speak of the sun-drenched if enthusiastic engagements that Havelock's little force had already fought by anything but the old fashioned and somewhat intriguing term of 'affair.' But the battle that was to take place in front of Cawnpore with the whole of the Nana's forces, reinforced as they were by part of the 6th N.I. and a good many bits and pieces from Oudh, was worthy of that name both in its results and in its setting. Bivouacing close to the Pandu Naddi on the night of the 15th dog-weary and caring for little save sleep, the army lay waiting for the start that they fondly hoped would give the women and children deliverance from the mutineers. But as they slept and while the piquets kept watch and ward, those sainted folk to the number of 200 were being done to death with sword and gun, with spear and

hatchet, in the miserable little quarters close to the Nana's hotel known as the *Bibighar*.¹

Whether from chagrin at the loss of the Pandu Naddi, whether from bitter hatred at the thought of the relentless advance of the British soldiery, whether of his own volition, whether urged by miscreants who wished to see him burn his boats for ever, the order went forth, though it is believed that the sepoy guard refused to carry it out. But the butchers of the bazaars, the same that to this day will slice the breasts from their fellow-countrywomen, in the hours of communal excitement, were sent for and set to work. Butchery is a lust that can soon grow in even civilized souls, and thoroughly those butchers did their work, while the weary army slept on its arms. There is no need to say more on this oft told tale. Those who would ponder on it can best do so at the marble Well of Remembrance within which the victims lie. It is better to return to the soldiery.

Long before dawn the force was under arms, advancing to find the rebel array set out in a semi-circle, across the two roads that forked a mile or so from cantonments, the right to the magazine, the left the trunk road on to Delhi. Across these two roads the rebels held a concave line of villages with all their guns in position. As soon as the position of the rebels was ascertained Havelock led off his force to the right, so as to attack the sepoy flank. When ready they advanced without firing on the sepoy position, despite a furious artillery fire, listening to the rebel regimental bands playing British airs, and enlivened by the skirling of the 78th pipers. It was long past noon and men were dropping from heat, but the line of villages was carried and the sepoys were in full retreat. They however, again halted and spread out for one more struggle.

The news of the tragedy had not yet reached the troops, and they were keyed up to unimaginable exertion, in the sweltering heat that the heavy rain only made more oppressive. From village and tope and shrine the rebel troops and the Nana's

¹ 'Women's quarters'—usually applied to the quarters built by British officers in earlier times for Indian wives.

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retainers were driven and stampeded, fight they never so doggedly, and by sundown the weary yet elated troops slept where they fell, on the edge of Cawnpore. That evening the retreating mutineers passed their criticism on Wheeler's great omission. They blew up the magazine, which they had not yet exhausted. It was not till the morning of the 17th of July while mustering to advance again on cantonments and city, that the evil news of butchery was communicated to the British troops. Dazed and furious they tramped into the deserted cantonment and civil station, and gazed on the entrenchment, the Bibighar and the well of sepulture. Grim and pitiful was the scene of the outrage but the writings on the wall, so often described were not there. They were added by soldier sightseers later, in satisfaction of a grim human interest in tragedy.

There was for the moment nothing to be done but vow vengeance and assemble and rest the force, which had brought with it the germs of cholera, and prepare for the next task to save a greater tragedy, the relief of Lucknow. The Ganges had to be crossed by boat, with troops and transport, for a bridge could not yet be made. Troops must be detailed for defence of the bridgehead and the protection of the hospitals already only too full, as the men who had been buoyed up by their excitement now collapsed. On the 20th, Lieutenant Spurgin's river party steamed in, and Neill himself arrived by road with a small reinforcement. The weary troops under Havelock were just recovering from an orgy, brought on from strain and the discovery of huge stores of European liquor in the Cawnpore shops, a discovery which at that period the discipline of the army was not proof against. The same fate had fallen on Neill's troops at Allahabad till he had either destroyed all liquor, or bought it up as Government stores.

The First Attempt to Reach Lucknow

To Brigadier Neill, General Havelock who had been given the local rank of major-general entrusted the command at Cawnpore, and the duty of restoring order and getting at the

bottom of the story of the massacres. Havelock's troops still only consisted of the reduced cadres of his original four British battalions and Brazier's Ferozepore Sikhs. The most that he could leave for the defence of what was now practically his base was 300 rifles. This too, when, in addition to the Nana's forces, there were in the offing somewhere two compact and intact mutineer forces, the Nimach Brigade and the Gwalior Contingent, ready to fall on the microscopic forces of the avengers.

Havelock's headquarters and indeed Neill's before him, had been in constant communication by spy runners with Lucknow. Letters from Fraser Tytler had given very optimistic dates for the arrival of the relieving force, and at one time the Lucknow garrison had been much elated. While waiting for Neill's and Spurgin's parties, Havelock had commenced fortifying a piece of rising ground on the bank as a bridgehead, while the boats and boatmen for the usual bridge who had been scattered, were sought for in the country round. The troops destined to attempt the relief of Lucknow were in the meantime being ferried over. Such was the width of river, four times that of the Thames at London Bridge, and the strength of the current, that each passage took eight hours before the boat was back.

It was not till July 25th that the small force with all its transport was assembled on the far side, to the magnificent total of 1,500 men, Highlanders, Fusiliers, the 64th and 84th and Brazier's Sikhs and six guns. The small cavalry force had been raised by volunteers from the infantry to 41, mounted on the horses of the disarmed irregulars. Early that day Havelock took farewell of Neill and joined his force, advancing next morning to Mangalwar a village five miles on the road to Lucknow. It was a superb gesture when we remember what was in front of him, but with four victories won, and his glorious remnant of a force that should have been four thousand strong, nothing seemed too great to dare.

After a halt for two days at Mangalwar while transport and supplies came up, the advance commenced in earnest at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 29th. A few miles ahead was encountered a large force of sepoys in a village and bastioned

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enclosure, in front of the town of Unao, which was protected by swamps and flooded fields. A frontal attack against them, along the causeway of the road alone was feasible, but the 78th and the Fusiliers flung themselves along it and took the enclosure, while the 64th stormed the village and destroyed an obstinate body of defenders, capturing their guns. Just as this was completed a staff officer rode up with the news that 6,000 men from Lucknow were just marching in. Not realizing that the British were drawn up waiting for them, this force was heavily punished. The day of fighting however, was not yet over for pushing on, the victors found a few miles ahead the walled town of Bashiratganj strongly held by the enemy. Again the little force flung itself on the mutineers, and again their enemy fled before them.

Two victories on one day, glorious though they were, carried their own nemesis in such weather. Cholera, exposure, and the bullet had wrought havoc and that evening the General found himself with but 850 effective rifles, and his advance hardly begun.

There were no more troops to come from below for many a day, ammunition was failing, large forces threatened Neill. The General thought hard and bitterly during the night, saw clearly that his task could not be carried out, and decided to withdraw to Cawnpore. His little force hugely elated with their success, would eagerly have gone on. Officers argued that they would now reach almost to Lucknow unmolested so widespread would be the news of their victories. But Havelock knew better and decided that it could not be. Perhaps the only criticism that can be made is that he must have known how it would turn out before he left Cawnpore, but the answer to this may be, that he did not expect to have to fight so hard at such a distance from his objective. So with sad hearts, on the last day of July, the victorious column filed back with its long trail of sick and wounded men to Mangalwar once more. Then occurred another of the unbalanced acts of Neill. He wrote a letter of remonstrance to Havelock, in unmeasured and improper terms. But he had written to the wrong man, and got such a rebuke as

few soldiers have had to stomach. The General further told him that only the inconvenience that would accrue to the public service, prevented him putting him (Neill) under close arrest. For so may heroes disagree.

At Mangalwar, by combing out Neill's detachment, one company of the 84th and half a battery of bullock-drawn guns, were the most that could be added to the force, while from below came news that the only battalions available for many weeks were required to cope with mutinies along the Ganges and in Bihar. The situation was no better than before, but the hesitation of zeal fell on Havelock and disturbed his balance so that on August 4th he sallied forth on the road to Lucknow once again. Again did he find the enemy in Bashiratganj, and again did he attack them with the usual result, and then with cholera still rampant, wisdom came again and he retired to Mangalwar a second time. By now the communications with Cawnpore had been much improved, the lesser channels were bridged, and the sand spit corduroyed, while a big ferry raft spanned the main stream, but Havelock retained his force at Mangalwar the better to keep in touch with Lucknow. On August 11th however, Neill reported 4,000 rebels collecting at Bithur and threatening Cawnpore. The General was loth to let his Lucknow opponents feel that they had driven him across the river and before moving to Neill's assistance on the 12th of August, he suddenly retraced his steps and fell on the rebels who had returned to Bashiratganj. The remnant of Highlanders and Fusiliers bayoneted the rebel gunners at their guns and turned the captured pieces on their fleeing owners. This done, Havelock returned and swiftly withdrew his whole column across the Ganges so that by August 13th all were back in Cawnpore. Sorely the little band of heroes needed rest, and it was not till the 16th that Havelock dare put his troops to the strain again. Then they moved out against a line of villages and orchards in front of the town of Bithur, where a considerable force commanded by Tantia Topi in person had placed themselves.

The British advanced to the storm with the same indomitable

spirit that had animated them from the beginning. Boldly enough did the mutineers stand up to them, and one sepoy battalion actually crossed bayonets with the Fusiliers. None the less complete was the British victory and heavy the rebel losses, although without cavalry no victory, could yield its full fruits, and the force withdrew to the bridgehead at Cawnpore. The battle of Bithur was the last in which the General was to have independent command, for Sir James Outram now succeeded. Few people even who study the history of this phase of the struggle, realise that it was not till near the end of September, two months after Havelock's first crossing the Ganges, that the advance to Lucknow could commence again, and for six solid weeks after Bithur, the British could but await reinforcements. The withdrawal of Havelock, however necessary, had one specially disastrous effect which turned the war from a military rebellion to a national outbreak. There were plenty of Rajput and Moslem chiefs and sirdars, who from sympathy with British rule, and possibly from worldly wisdom had not yet joined the rebel movement. Now they wrote that no longer could they hold aloof and must throw themselves into the cause of mutiny. The entire Province of Oudh rose in rebellion against British rule and British domination.

While the force waited and recovered to some extent from its exhaustion, it was able to throw off the diseases which supreme fatigue and exposure produce, and the essential process of endeavouring to exact due vengeance on those concerned with the massacres went forward. Some of the earlier penances imposed by Neill were more than severe, but fully justified during the first fury that the sight of the well and the *Bibighar* raised in the minds of the unfortunates' countrymen. More temperate measures now ensued, and confidence began to be restored in the city, with the result that supplies were forthcoming and the factories of Cawnpore could get on with the matter of the supply of military equipment, which was so alarmingly deficient. Large stocks of tents and the like could be prepared, with harness and leather goods, which even in those days were a considerable product of the city.

Preparations for a bridge of boats as soon as the river relaxed its monsoon current were well in hand, against the day when forward operations could commence in earnest, and the districts in the immediate vicinity were brought back to order. The Nana had disappeared immediately after the battles of Cawn-pore and, announcing that he was drowning himself, crossed over into Oudh, never to be found again. His end, probably in the Terai Jungles, has been the subject of many stories which cropped up for many years after. As he was never brought to trial, his conduct never went through the searching inquiry of a court of law, though the trial of Tantia Topi must have covered the same ground.¹ Well informed opinion made no doubt that the malaria of the jungles and the strain of pursuing and search parties had been too much for his worthless person.

Lucknow in June

In the last chapter we left Sir Henry Lawrence on June 29th still 'on his perch,' still holding sway in Lucknow itself as well as in the Mariaon Cantonment, despite the revolt of his regular troops, and the irregulars in and round the city, and despite the outbreak of all the troops in the outlying cantonments and the disappearance of all administrative control. The people of Oudh however, as a whole, with the great land-owners and chiefs still held fast while wondering, and were to do so for some weeks more.

But the weeks that had passed since the revolt at Mariaon had not been easy ones, although every day passed in quiet was a day to the good. The fortification of the Residency area continued, and supplies of all kinds poured into the Machi Bhawan and the Residency. But on the 11th and 12th the forces at his

¹ Some there will be alive who remember the excitement at Morar in the seventies when a man was arrested as the Nana, and was brought in heavily escorted. A European from England was brought out to identify him, but was unable to do so, gossip said by order, lest the old fierce controversies and hatreds be raised again for no good purpose. Again when the untoward occurrences in Manipur took place in 1891, rumours of his existence were prevalent. See p. 251.

disposal were still further diminished by the departure en masse of the mounted and foot military police. Their Chief, Captain Gould Western, with persistent gallantry rode after them, and brought some back with him, who remained faithful to the end, but their leaders would not allow him to address the bulk. The party of loyal Purbiah¹ troops from the regular corps, still remained and Mr. Gubbins² most persistently urged their disarmament. To this however Lawrence, realizing the amount of terrain to be held, would not agree. About June 11th the latter unutterably weary and below par handed over control to a small board while he rested. Gubbins now persuaded the board to send the loyal men away to their homes all save 350, probably Sikh, till November. Lawrence however on hearing of this was so indignant that he at once resumed control, recalled all he could who returned to the number of 150 and also summoned the military pensioners to join him. Over three hundred responded and some eighty odd were selected for duty. It was indeed fortunate that he did so, for the long defence—prolonged for many more weeks than anticipated owing to Havelock's inability to advance for two months—so wore out the British garrison that without the help of some 700 loyal soldiery the Residency could not have been defended. The fact that half the famous defenders of the Baillie Guard were Bengal sepoy is usually overlooked, on the days when we remember to honour that defence.

For the next fortnight Lawrence was much pressed by Gubbins to do something, to sally forth and try and strike at various gatherings of mutineers in the neighbourhood. This Lawrence was loath enough to do knowing that the days for such vigour had passed. Conservation of resources was his game to play now, and to wait while relief was moving nearer. Nevertheless the goadings he had received were responsible for what was probably a great error of judgment as well as a grossly

¹ *Purbiah*=Easterners from *Purāb*=East. The name by which Oudh men were known.

² Mr. Gubbins of the Civil Service was judicial commissioner in Oudh, the next in position to Lawrence, and a man of great energy and courage.

mishandled episode, from which all the troubles of the siege directly date.

On June 29th, only a few days before the culminating catastrophe of Allahabad, it was reported to Sir Henry that a large rebel force encouraged by the fall of Cawnpore was at Nawabganj, 17 miles from Lucknow, and that their advanced guard had moved forward some 10 miles to Chinhat.

The Disaster of Chinhat

Sir Henry Lawrence decided to move out and attack them, a venturesome act, hard to carry out successfully in that great heat. The night of the 29th troops and folks in Mariaon were ordered into the Residency, though even after all the preparation, no good arrangements for this in-quartering, so long foreseen, appear to have been made.

The force to act against the mutineers at Chinhat consisted of the following:

300 32nd Foot.

170 Native Infantry (mostly of 13th N.I. with some of 48th and 71st).

36 Volunteer Horse.

84 Oudh Irregular Cavalry (from 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regt.).

10 Guns: 4 of European horsed battery.

6 of 2nd and 3rd Oudh batteries.

1 Howitzer, drawn by elephant.

Sir Henry Lawrence in his debilitated state, took the entirely unjustified course of going out in command himself, which with his want of military experience, his nominal position as Commander-in-Chief in Oudh did not warrant his doing. He had two perfectly competent lieutenant-colonels of the 32nd, of whom one was destined to succeed him. Brigadier Gray of the Irregular Force and several other seniors were all at his disposal.

The force was to have started at earliest dawn, but so bad was the staff work that they did not march out till the sun was high in the heavens, and even then the Europeans had not had their breakfast, that great protection against the sun.

After marching three miles the bridge of Kokrail was reached, and here the force halted, and Lawrence ordered that the 32nd should breakfast. For some unintelligible reason the 32nd had both their lieutenant-colonels with them, Case and Inglis, but not their breakfast. Sir Henry had ridden forward to reconnoitre and no enemy being seen, the order to return was given, and the force had actually counter-marched. Then it was that Lawrence heard of the enemy and that their scouts had fallen back. Thinking he had but a small force in front he ordered the troops to face about again and advance.

Slowly the troops then moved on towards Ismailganj a village a mile and a half beyond the bridge. The enemy were seen to be in some trees in front of Chinhata a mile still further on, whence a round shot crashed into the British. With the 32nd in and behind Ismailganj, and the detachment of loyal sepoy and the cavalry on the right, Lawrence opened artillery fire. It was believed that this had had considerable effect on the rebels, when some of the latter who had been working through some unguarded groves to the left of Ismailganj suddenly rushed that hamlet expelling the small garrison of the 32nd. Advancing at the same time round the British right, another party attacked the loyal sepoy who were now between their fire and that from Ismailganj. At this juncture the native gunners and cavalry deserted. The 32nd tried to retake Ismailganj, but weary and faint without their morning food, they failed. Colonel Case fell mortally wounded, and Lawrence afraid of being surrounded ordered a retreat. The enemy's horsed artillery now galloped in on each flank, and their cavalry had managed to get round in force to the bridge on the Kokrail between our troops and Lucknow. Then occurred an act of great gallantry and dash. The small force of volunteer cavalry composed of officers of rebel regiments, civilians, etc., a parlous small body, whipped out their sabres and charged the enemy's mass. The fury of the white faces was too much for the mutineers, and the body of rebel horse fled before them. The bridge was now open, and the retreat which had now become a rout and a *sauve qui peut* swept over. Many of the 32nd laid down to die, and it was not

till the afternoon that the remnant headed by Henry Lawrence wringing his hands and wailing 'My God, my God, have I brought them to this?' staggered into the Residency. The bheesties had deserted and the wounded were left behind, while the mutineers now 'at the top of their form' closed in on the fugitives and only the volunteer cavalry could show a front and save a massacre. Lawrence himself was prostrate from the heat, but just alive enough to give some orders for the occupation of the alarm posts by the garrison remaining. Within all was confusion. The labourers on the defences and many of the servants fled, and to add to it all the enemy's guns were now firing into the Residency itself. From that afternoon the actual investment commenced. It was such a day of horror and humiliation, as a British force under arms has rarely to experience. Some of the guns were lost and what was far worse 115 men of the 32nd were left on the field, many of them wounded. Such a loss to a battalion already attenuated was enormous, especially as it of necessity included some of the best of the officers and non-commissioned officers as well as the rank and file and involved a loss of prestige beyond compute. Among other follies the chief commissariat officer of the garrison was allowed to go with the column and get severely wounded, which upset all the rationing arrangements. It was all a stupendous tragedy, rendered harder to bear by the reflection that most of the trouble was the result of bad leading, bad staff work, and bad soldiering. Well may Rice Holmes say 'History has dealt very tenderly with Henry Lawrence in this matter, because he was Henry Lawrence . . . because his services have been invaluable and everybody loved him.' Nevertheless the fact remains that the disaster of Chinhât should not have occurred, and it is not unreasonable to say that had the troops not been defeated through bad handling, the siege of the Residency might never have taken place. Poor Sir Henry in his state of health, for all his wisdom, ought not to have gone in command.

It was apparently some little time, before the mutineers and the leaders of rebellion so far as there were any, evolved any

definite plans of action. No one wanted to be involved too soon, and it was only when Government failed to take Delhi and restore affairs at Cawnpore that some form of revolutionary government was evolved. For some time such concerted action as there was came from the instance of a succession of risaldars and subadars of the revolted regiments. An ambitious wife of the ex-king, usually referred to as the *Begum* took a leading part and her colourless son Brijais Kudr was proclaimed King of Oudh, with an administration drawn from some of the officials of the former régime. It cannot be said to have been effective, as a civil or military machine, but for several months it formed the kernel of that revolution into which the mutiny of the troops gradually swelled.


The Investment of the Residency

The night of June 30th was now spent in sorting out the defenders and getting the various commanding points occupied and the garrison organized. The next day Lawrence saw that he was too weak after his losses, to hold the Machi Bhawan and that he must concentrate. The night of the 1st, Colonel Palmer managed to bring all his garrison safely into the Baillie Guard, but had to abandon all his provisions and most of the walled artillery. He was able to blow up his ammunition.

But tragedy untold was still to come. On the morning of the 1st a shell had burst in Lawrence's room, happily without hurting him. His staff begged him to move, and he at first refused saying that no artilleryman could ever put two shells in the same place – he was an artilleryman born – but next day promised to change. That evening, having worked during the daytime in his old room, he was lying resting when another shell came in and burst, and when the smoke and dust had cleared away his A.D.C. found him dying. There was nothing to do for him, but under opiate, he lived till the morning of the 4th, handing over the military command to Inglis, and the Chief Commissioner-ship to Major Bankes. As the carrying party bore



GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM
whom Sir Charles Napier called the
'Bayard of India'



SIR HENRY LAWRENCE
of Lucknow

*From pictures in the possession of the East India United Service Club,
who have kindly given permission for their publication*

him to his grave, one and all, soldiers of the 32nd, lifted the blanket that covered him to kiss his face.

Brigadier Inglis, to whom the command had been assigned was an experienced and sound regimental officer, and though not the senior all recognized the suitability of the appointment. Mr. Gubbins indeed protested against his supersession as Chief Commissioner, but though admired as the leader of the ginger group and as a man of brilliant courage, no one was prepared to accept so difficult a character over them. When a little later Major Bankes was killed, Brigadier Inglis refused to permit anyone to assume the position until orders from higher authority were received.

The story of that defence prolonged till the end of September, by the dwindling numbers of the 32nd and the loyal sepoys, the civilian volunteers and the enthusiastic boys of the Martinière school, is too well known among the nation's epics to be related again here. Suffice it to say, that to Lucknow as to Delhi in the north, were attracted all the mutineers in Oudh and the contiguous provinces, while eventually too, to assist, came the retainers of most of the big landowners. Nevertheless pound they the battered group of Residency buildings and bastions never so fiercely, it came to push of pike on but three occasions. The sepoys were good behind walls, but had too great a respect for the prowess of the masters to try more than a few great attacks. It is on record that most of the fiercer attacks of swordsmen which did take place were carried out by Afghans, the Ghilzais or Pawindahs, who coming down each winter to labour and trade as they still do, tarried over the summer in anticipation of the trouble which was known to be brewing. The outcaste tribe of *Passis* famous for their digging capacity were suborned to work at the war of mining into which the siege eventually developed. And all the while death was busy among officer and soldier, and amid women and children. The bullet and disease took daily tally of combatant and non-combatant, of high and low, of European and loyal Indian, till the garrison was in sore straits to carry out the daily and nightly duties of watch and ward. The rising at Allahabad and

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the fall of Cawnpore had cut off most of the earlier messages of cheer from the first assembly of the reinforcements on the Ganges, and it was not till July 21st that the faithful pensioner Ungud passed through the investing lines and told the joyful news of Havelock's triumphant engagements and his presence in Cawnpore. It was some weeks before he could get through again and then only with the damping intelligence that Havelock could not possibly work forward for several weeks yet. Then it was that the garrison and the women tightened their mental belts and bowed themselves in the old dogged British way, of waiting and telling no man. The defences were in two circles the inner and the outer consisting of batteries, defended walls, a loopholed house, barricades and *trous de loup*, with the small detachment of the 84th that the self-sacrifice of Wheeler had sent them in general reserve. And so it wore on till the end of September, and the days when if not actually, most certainly in a general sense, Jennie the girl in the sunken quarters, heard the pipes of the 78th a-skirling as they passed the Kaiser Bagh and the Tara Kothi. And so we will leave them to that long story of mine and counter-mine, and see how equally brave men in the North were concerned to place the Union Jack once more on the walls of Delhi.

APPENDIX

European portion of the Garrison of the Residency

32nd Foot	532
84th Foot	50
Bengal Artillery	89
Officers	133
Eurasian Drummers	51
Civilians capable of bearing arms	153
Total European combatants	<u>1,008</u>

Loyal Indian Troops 712

Noncombatants

Women and Children	600
Noncombatant Males	680

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMPASSE AT DELHI

The British position on the Ridge – The impasse – General Wilson takes command – The long-drawn wait on the Ridge – Within the guilty city – Events in the Punjab – Trimmu Ghat

The British Position on the Ridge

IN the first phase of the Mutiny, that of the immediate action taken by the various authorities in the different theatres of the rebellion, we left the Delhi Field Force, the Army of Retribution as it was called, just as it had defeated the mutineers at Badli-ka-Sarai, and had swept them triumphantly from the Ridge. It had then taken up its position on the old cantonment ground, after somewhat foolishly burning the native troops lines which might have afforded it some shelter.

However, in the highest spirits, it set itself down to occupy the Ridge with a series of strong piquets, establishing a stronghold to be held by the 60th Rifles and the Sirmoor Battalion, on the commanding point on which was built the substantial residence of one Hindu Rao, a Maratha worthy recently deceased. Posts were established at the sites which still stand out on the Ridge, the Observatory, the old Pathan Mosque and the Flagstaff Tower, so lately the scene of the agonized collection of ladies and children in the cantonment. Hard by was found, where its driver had left it on June 11th, the bullock cart with the remains of four officers of the 54th shot that same day at the Kashmir gate. On the 9th the Guides swung in under Major Daly, after their astounding march down the Punjab from Mardan, 500 miles in 27 days – 3 troops of horse and 6 companies of foot – a noble accession.

From the Ridge the avengers now looked down through the

haze and dust to the minarets of the guilty city, the rose-red turrets of the Lahore gate of the Palace, and the great dome of the Jama Masjid.

The actual combined force as it lay behind the Ridge was but 600 cavalry 2,300 infantry, twenty-two field guns principally nine prs. and the light siege train. The actual troops were:

The Carabiniers (2 Squadrons).
 9th Lancers.
 60th Rifles (6 Companies).
 75th Foot.
 1st Bengal Fusiliers.
 2nd Bengal Fusiliers (6 Companies).
 Sirmoor Battalion.
 Bengal Sappers and Miners (150).
 Money's troop of Horse Artillery 2nd of 3rd Bde.
 Turner's " " " 3rd "
 Tombs' " " " 2nd of 1st Bde.
 Scott's Light Field Battery 14th (3rd co. 3rd Battn.)

The light siege train

8, 18 pr. guns	} manned by 40 gunners of the 4th Company, 6th Battalion Bengal Artillery and 100 gunner recruits from the Meerut Depot.
4, 8in. howitzers	
4, 8in. mortars	
12, 5½in. mortars	

The total of the mutineers in Delhi at that time was far less than when contingent after contingent of sepoy corps had marched in from Rohilkhand, from Nimach, from Nasirabad, from Jullundur and many another station within reach of Delhi, but it was still formidable enough, consisting so far as could be known, then of the 3rd Lt. Cavalry, the 11th and 20th N.I. from Meerut, the 5th Light Field Battery, the 38th, 54th and 74th from Delhi, the best portion of the 9th from Aligarh, the Hurrianah Light Infantry from Hansi, the 45th from Ferozepore, some of the Sappers and Miners and a few more. But as many of the Moslems in the army came from round Delhi there were probably a good many furlough men who had joined the units there, while the King of Delhi's infantry and artillery were

available, and a large number of police, *chaprassis*, etc. The Delhi arsenal would have provided plenty of arms and equipment for those who had not got them. The mutineers had mounted a large number of guns on the bastions, and never seemed to lack gunners nor ammunition, despite the blowing up of the 'magazine'!

The right rear of the British position was to be greatly harassed from the Sabzi Mandi¹ and adjacent orchards, and to this day can be seen the loopholed garden walls which our piquets on this flank held against them. The force at Hindu Rao's was further constantly harassed from Kishenganj, another suburb which made an admirable alley-way for parties sortie-ing from the city.

Happily, behind the camp ran the deep drain which led off the surplus water from the Najafghar *jheel*.² Normally this would have been dry in summer, but the prolonged rains of 1856 had so swollen the lake and extended its area that during the siege ample clear and pure water ran past the camp in which also the men could bathe. The drain with its steep abrupt banks was in itself a tactical protection of great value. Not only in the matter of the rains of 1856 was nature fighting on the British side, but '57 itself was an abnormally cool year. A blanket in Delhi was needed o' nights³ and at Ferozepore in the middle of June it was quite cool in tents.⁴ Further, the actual rains came on sooner than usual.

So though it was hot enough it was nothing like so hot as might have been expected and the early rain made life trying but bearable. But in its own opinion, the Army of Retribution had not come down from the hills and up from Meerut, to sit playing at long bowls or outpost fireworks with the mutinous troops within the walls, and every one was agog to storm the city. Intense bitterness at the details of the massacres, fed by the tales brought by the refugees from Delhi, and the troops from Meerut, ran riot in men's minds, and nothing was more keenly

¹ The Green Suburb.

² *Jheel*=swamp.

³ Mr. Greathead's Diaries.

⁴ *Life and opinions of Sir Charles McGregor*.

looked for than to wipe out the whole murderous crew. The staff of the Army, neither that of headquarters nor that of the Ambala division which formed the Delhi Field Force, did not appear to have been well trained or of commanding spirit. Sir Henry Barnard now confided to an eager young field engineer, Wilberforce Greathed and another, associated with William Hodson, the task of preparing a scheme for the assault, having apparently no staff fit to do it themselves. A plan for a storming, probably the work of the more experienced mind of Hodson, was drawn up and accepted by Sir Henry, accepted probably because of the eagerness of the young officers who framed it. There seems to have been little serious discussion at this stage as to whether the 2,400 infantry available could storm the gates by dint of petard, defeat the several thousand trained soldiers inside, known to be at their best behind walls, and the several thousand auxiliaries to a number as yet unknown, that must be with them. Success for the moment was probable, but what after that? With casualties the British might be down to 1,400 at the end of it, and India in arms before them. Taking courage by the forearm, however, Sir Henry issued the necessary orders for the assault at daybreak on June 13th, but the staff mechanism seems to have been extraordinarily bad. Brigadier Graves was in command of piquets and outposts that day, and apparently had not been taken into the General's confidence nor had the orders been explained to him. It was not possible for the assault to take place unless all the British piquets on the Ridge, to the number of several hundred were withdrawn to form the assaulting columns. Early in the morning Graves received a verbal order to bring all the piquets away to some rendezvous. Not knowing what it all meant, he was not going to abandon the whole of the front from Metcalfe House to the Ridge without more precise orders, so he galloped down to headquarters for confirmation. It was then obvious that these troops, essential to the operations could not arrive till the sun stood high in the heavens, and any concealed advance of the powder parties to the gates was out of the question. The assault was therefore countermanded. Loud were the

complaints against the brigadier, and young officers talked of pistolling him. But there is no doubt that there was no one to blame except the staff concerned. If the young engineers who outlined the plan, were also responsible for implementing it with the necessary detailed instructions, they were obviously incompetent to do so.

To leave Brigadier Graves who had just been in command of the place out of the discussion, was to miss all the best information as to locality. When he galloped down to see what the orders meant, he at once expressed his views most strongly that though the walls might be captured, it would be impossible to hold the city, and this confirmed Sir Henry in his decision to counter-order the assault already too long delayed.

Young Greathed however still pressed his scheme with modifications, and that absurdity a council of war, the refuge of the ineffective commander was summoned to consider it.¹

Those in favour of an assault pointed out that the mutineers had received two swishing defeats in the open field and had made four ineffective attacks on the outposts before the plan was drawn up and must be suffering from lowered morale, that British prestige was now so high that an assault would so demoralize them that there would be no question of their fighting in the great streets of Delhi. To this the reply was made that so far from being downhearted they had sortied again and attacked us on the 12th. It was all gallant talk, but the older heads, the commonsense if feeble General Reed who was the Commander-in-Chief in Northern India, and Brigadier Wilson, spoke very strongly against assault, although Commissioner Greathed urged rightly enough that the political situation rendered the capture of Delhi the one thing in India

¹ It is of course possible that the civilian historians of the day persist in using an inaccurate expression. A Commander may well summon a conference to elicit information and to discuss detail, without having the least intention of relying on anything but his own decision and judgment. To the modern soldier it seems incomprehensible that the Chief of the Staff in the Crimea should have summoned a council to make up his mind for him. At Benares the Commissioner asked Colonel Neill when 'the council of war was to be held,' and he was very properly bitten for his pains. Neill was not the sort of man to summon councils of war, whatever the phrase may mean.

that mattered. Nevertheless the mass of responsible opinion would have none of it, and so the force sat down disappointed enough, to await what might befall.

Now opinion may differ for all time, as to whether or no Delhi could have been carried, or what would have resulted from a successful lodgement in the walls and gates. Every one could see the importance of success, but many wise heads saw also that the results of failure would be more dangerous to the cause than the results of success would have been advantageous. None of the three leading personages, Reed, Barnard or Wilson had reputations to conjure with, but such great authorities as Roberts¹ and Norman¹ have thought that the staff failure, which upset the plans for the assault of June 13th, was singularly fortunate.

A great deal of the impatience at the delay in the Punjab and in Calcutta, was due to a misapprehension as to the true state of Delhi as a fortress. The walls of the city were seven miles in circumference, with seven bastioned gates, and thirty bastions, pierced and embrasured. The walls were protected for more than half their height by a somewhat steep glacis, with deep ditch, scarp and counter-scarp the whole structure being in reasonable repair. The walls had been thoroughly overhauled by British engineers and strengthened after the siege by Holkar in 1804, and had been kept in repair ever since. They were not the sort of walls and glacis that would hold out for a day against such an army and such a siege train as Lord Combermere had taken against Bhurtpur in 1826, but they were very adequate to repel the small force and light siege train which was all that could as yet be brought to bear. As has been explained the rebels had an inexhaustible gun park from which to arm their bastions.

The Impasse

But whether or no the gambler's throw of assault was wise, when it was rejected the Field Force settled down to a dogged

¹ Both took part in the siege, the latter from the beginning, and became field marshals.

life of fierce ineffective fighting, that was to last through July and August and well into September. Immense reinforcements were to pour into the city, whole brigades of horse and foot with colours flying and bands a-playing, and as John Lawrence and his noble band of administrators strengthened their grip on the disaffected, and took to their hearts in splendid camaraderie those who were not, reinforcements flowed down to the force without the walls. But as they came, death, disease, the almost daily casualties – for each accession of mutineers felt itself compelled to show its quality by attacking the British, even to their own undoing – were continually putting the position ‘as you were,’ till Lawrence and General Gowan thought they were filling a bottomless pit.

Nor was the defence of the Ridge which did not face more than half a mile of that seven-mile girt city, well organized. Troops were not told off to sections and reliefs. If the sepoys attacked as they constantly did, the whole force got under arms, whether it was necessary or whether it was not. When the enemy was attacked in the positions to which he had sallied, no one seemed to take control, the regiments and the brigades fought under anyone who would command. When the great book of staff sins of the British Army comes to be written, the page that deals with ‘Staff at Delhi, inefficiency of,’ will be very stiff reading. And all the while the army when off duty and not repelling sepoy attacks was riotously happy, cricket being especially the order of the day, for the eternal football had not then come to content the hearts of unemployed men.

The doctoring was unusually good. The senior medical officers were more competent than the staff, and the hospitals were well manned and well organized, despite the wounds cholera and malaria, that helped fill the old cantonment burial ground, and sent the long sick convoys off to the Simla hills. Mr. Commissioner Barnes of Ambala had succeeded by astounding exertions and personal influence especially with the chief of Patiala, in keeping the country between Delhi and the Simla hills quiet and open. Supplies now poured into the force. The splendid Punjab Chiefs, Patiala, Nabha and Jhind,

sent their troops to keep the road open. The Naseree Battalion¹ from Jutogh came down to help keep the road open. This battalion had rioted – not mutinied – just after the Chief had left Simla, and the hill station lost its nerve and head.²

Simla, Kasauli, Sabathu and Dagshai remained as the great concentration centre for refugees and the convalescent depot for the force at Delhi, and without the air and accommodation in the hills the force at Delhi would probably have gone under. From the hill depots drafts of sick and wounded constantly came back to the ranks.

On June 12th, 13th, and 15th the rebels made determined attacks on Hindu Rao's house, at times to the very point of the defenders' bayonets, repelled again and again by the men of Reid's Gurkhas and the 60th Rifles now caste brothers in life and in death.³ On the 17th came the British turn to sally forth and destroy a battery destined to enfilade the Ridge. After this came a lull for a week and then on the 23rd, the hundredth anniversary of Clive's victory of Plassy, on which day the astrologers had predicted the downfall of the British, the rebels swarmed from the Lahore gate to attack Hindu Rao's once again, and to find their way to our rear. On the 19th the enemy attempted to get in rear of the camp but were chased off with ignominy, and then the British destroyed the bridges over the Najafgarh canal, which made access to our rear far more difficult.

Next day came Neville Chamberlain to take over the Adjutant-Generalship of the army, which in those days also meant the chief of the fighting staff. His arrival was hailed as likely to bring vigour into the councils, and sound commonsense and knowledge of the situation.

¹ This was an Irregular 'extra' battalion of Gurkhas raised when the original Naseree Battalion was taken into the line as the 66th in place of the regiment of that number that refused to go to Sind, in Sir Charles Napier's time.

² A most ridiculous *sauve qui peut* to the jungles round had taken place, due perhaps to delay in promulgating arrangements for assembly and protection in case of alarm. The station time-gun at Boileau-ganj was crammed with blank and copper coin and planted down the road that led to the Gurkha lines to the huge amusement of the little men, and that was all.

³ A regimental affinity which lasts to this day.

Another accession of strength was Lieutenant-Colonel Baird Smith the Principal of the great Engineering College at Roorkee, who came to take the place of the chief engineer who was invalided.¹ Behind him were all the resources of that institution, and he brought marching after him a labour corps which he had equipped and organized, and was, of course, invaluable. Organized labour corps at this period of army development, were not recognized essentials of an army in the field, and it needed a trained intellect like Baird Smith to realize it.

Towards the end of June another considerable batch of reinforcements from the Punjab marched in, consisting of a wing of the 8th Foot and a wing of the 61st Foot, from Jullundur and Ferozepore respectively, with Coke's rifles (1st P.I.) and a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and some European and Sikh artillerymen, the latter beaten up by Lawrence from among the old gunners of the Khalsa army. These artillery drafts were in great request, for the gunners in the siege batteries under Brind, at present in battery on the Ridge for repelling assaults, were terribly short-handed.

The question of assault had been revived on their arrival, and Baird Smith like all newcomers was eager for it to take place. The commanders however were not to be persuaded, for indeed losses since the subject was first discussed, had neutralized the effect of reinforcements.

There were within camp, corps not yet disarmed but which were looked on with suspicion, the 4th and 9th Irregulars and 450 Hindustani Infantry. There was no time to disarm them, and Barnard was not prepared to leave the camp to their mercy while the reliable troops assaulted the city. On July 1st and 2nd the numerous Rohilkhand mutineers marched into the city with colours flying and bands playing, clad in their scarlet coats, and the opportunity was over. This rebel increment consisted of the 18th, 28th, 29th and 68th Infantry the 8th Light Cavalry the 15th Field Battery² and a couple of post guns.

¹ Major Laughton from the Ambala Division. He had married a Persian lady whom for some unexplained reason he was allowed to bring into camp with him, encumbering the road with numerous vehicles of baggage.

² 6/8.

On July 5th Sir Henry Barnard who was worn to a shadow was smitten with cholera and died the same night. Deeply mourned by all who were in touch with him and regretted by the troops, for he was always among them and spared himself not at all, he died a martyr to his personal exertions and the trials of the astounding situation in which he had found himself a few weeks after his first arrival in India. General Reed with Chamberlain behind him now took actual command of the Field Force as well as the Army, though little fitted by health to do so.

A week later occurred one of the famous minor incidents of the siege. A party of the 8th Irregular Cavalry from Bareilly galloped into the camp from the Sabzi Mandi and were at first taken for our own irregulars, and allowed to get near the Carabinier piquet with which were two horse artillery guns under Lieutenant Hills. The piquet was surprised, and bolted, and Lieutenant Hills became engaged in a desperate encounter with the rebels near the old brick kiln known as the general's mound; into them he charged alone, while his guns got into action, was unhorsed and only rescued by Captain Tombs who came up to find him hard pressed. The rebels then galloped into the cavalry camp calling on Renny's native troop of horse artillery to join them. Renny's gunners surprised before they could get to their guns, called on the next troop, a European one to fire through them, and ere long the rebels were driven out after creating immense excitement and alarm by their daring exploit.¹

The conduct of the 9th Irregulars was under some suspicion. But they had been Neville Chamberlain's regiment, and he apparently reluctant like so many officers to believe that their own corps could be tainted, succeeded in having them marched to the frontier instead of being disarmed. They marched right through the Punjab and the Sind Saugor Doab, mutinying at last near the Indus. Here a sensational duel described by Sir Evelyn Wood took place between their wardi-major² and the

¹ Hills and Tombs received the Victoria Cross for their gallant deeds.

² Native adjutant. *Vide* Sir Evelyn's memoirs.

risaldar of a troop of loyal Multani Horse. The rebel being killed, his men were attacked by the Multanis, near Mianwali on the Indus, and dispersed.

The raid of the rebel cavalry just described resulted in the severe total of some 200 casualties, and a few days later was to occur a very serious loss indeed. On July 14th the mutineers turned out once more to attack Hindu Rao's horse, and any part of our defences as usable from the Sabzi Mandi. All day long the garrison of the posts held their own, and as the afternoon drew on, Neville Chamberlain took out a column to counter-attack the invaders, calling on Reid to take part. Brigadier Showers led forth the 75th, Coke's Rifles and Hodson's Horse with six horse artillery guns under Turner and Murray. Handsomely were the enemy chased back from the suburbs to the walls of Delhi, and just at the end Neville Chamberlain finding some men hesitating before a low wall held by sepoys, jumped his horse over it calling on them to follow. As he did so he was struck by a musket ball which broke his arm below the shoulder.¹ And that was the end of his active part in the siege, though his mind was soon clear enough to be of value as a councillor, both to the commander and to the staff.

This week alone had resulted in a loss of 25 officers and over 400 men, while a fortnight of the heat and strain was enough for General Reed who, at last, could but do his work from his bed, and agreed on July 17th that he too must be invalided. Before he went, after discussion with Neville Chamberlain he agreed that Brigadier Wilson, though not the senior officer in camp, was the only possible selection to the command. His seniority was secured by the local rank of Brigadier-General being conferred under Reed's authority, which was afterwards enhanced to that of Major-General by the Governor-General.²


¹ So Kaye's careful narrative. Chamberlain writing to his sister merely states that he was hit. In Reed's prostrate state Chamberlain was the real commander of the Force.

² Two officers of Army Headquarters were unsoldierly enough to betake themselves to Simla in chagrin at being superseded and also one of the brigadiers. It may be remarked here, that 'brigadier' and 'brigadier-general' were separate ranks, the latter the higher.

General Wilson takes Command

As Wilson's character and efficiency have often been the subject of controversy and criticism it may be well to review it, especially as, since histories were written we have his own intimate letters to his wife, which give us the clearest idea of his conception of the position and throw genuine light on his real character.

As described in Chapter II in the account of the outbreak at Meerut, Wilson who was commandant of the Bengal Artillery and as such the commandant of the station, was looked upon as somewhat above the average regimental officer of his age. His artillery knowledge was probably the best in India. He had but returned to the heat from the hills the day before the Meerut outbreak after convalescing from an attack of small-pox, in itself but a poor preparation for a hot weather campaign for a man over sixty, who had spent the best part of forty years in the East. The other brigadiers were stout fighting men, but little more than brigadiers, while with a siege to be faced an artilleryman in command was obviously an asset. Seriously wounded as he was, Neville Chamberlain could not take actual command, but with him at his elbow Archdale Wilson was the best appointment possible. In the Punjab there was no one available. Wilson without any preparation by the nature of his career, in the planning or making of war, was a trained and disciplined officer of experience, and had, like all artillerymen, a developed sense of system and organization. His hand on the helm was immediately noticeable by a great improvement in the staff organization. Troops were told off in reliefs so that only those necessary should stand to arms during the daily alarms. Forces attacking the enemy were properly commanded and every one knew who was in command, while the costly habit of following the retreating sepoys up to the walls which always involved needless casualties was forbidden. In fact the force became what it had hitherto so strangely failed to be, an Army 'in being' that knew exactly what it was about. The instinct of the trained gunner was readily evident. When that has been



BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEILL
who brought up the first reinforcements



GENERAL SIR ARCHDALE WILSON
who retook Delhi

said there was little more to say, except to point out that from his private letters, Wilson was fully aware of his own shortcomings, fully prepared to do all possible so far as knowledge and health would let him, was also fully and very properly aware of the magnitude of his task. Like Barnard he too, realized how little those at a distance knew what the real problem was. His letters to Lawrence and the Governor-General are clear and manly letters, and if in face of the growing strength of the mutineers, and the drain on his own force which nearly equalled the intake of reinforcements, he at one time thought of withdrawing for a while till the reinforcing columns swept up the country, he was not the only one. Indeed as we know, John Lawrence himself was prepared to give up Peshawar if need be.

Within the force there were naturally 'ginger groups,' and their friends in days to come writing their lives, have attributed to this and that energetic and determined young soldier, the credit of having gingered Wilson to this and that action. Wilson kept his force well managed, well found, disciplined, and in good heart, and when the final reinforcements arrived under the dynamic John Nicholson, agreed as heartily as his shattered nerves and weakened constitution would let him, in the plans for the storming which were ultimately successful. We may leave it at that, and agree that Wilson was a very gallant officer who did his duty to the best of his lights and qualities. He could not, even if the ablest and most forceful of men, have assaulted Delhi before the middle of September. The gravamen of those criticisms levelled against him in the literature of the period, lies in his anxiety when the time for the storming had come, and his fears when the first storming was successful and he himself was prostrate from the heat and strain, that after his heavy losses and loss of morale due to liquor, he could not hold what he had taken. He gained his object handsomely in the end and deserved well the kudos that came to him.¹

¹ The opinions of Colonel Keith Young, the Judge Advocate General of the Army at this distance of time are not uninteresting. He refers to General
MR

The Long-drawn Wait on the Ridge

The latter half of July dragged on much as before, the troops however benefiting greatly by Wilson's improved system. On the 18th the Rohilkhand mutineers endeavoured to intercept a big convoy and failed and on the 23rd the sepoy made an attack in force on the British left and the Metcalfe House group of piquets, through Ludlow Castle, being driven off by a force under Brigadier Showers. And all the while the high spirits in camp were maintained, and the games flourished. The officers' messes well-tented were centres of hospitality, especially that of the Meerut gunners, with the well stocked godowns of the Meerut Mess behind them. In fact supplies of 'Europe' stores as well as rations were fairly plentiful, for the countryside other than the unruly Goojar villages now properly chastised, was not in the least hostile. Keith Young tells of vast supplies of bottled beer being brought into camp to the huge delight of the troops. Apart from the daily fighting and stern work on the Ridge with its ceaseless toll of casualties that exhausted reinforcements as fast as they arrived, the camp was in great heart and spirits. The plague of flies which military sanitary science had not learnt to abate was the worst trouble. Bad enough in the tents it was unbearable in the otherwise well found hospitals, which also, while reasonably well off for anæsthetics, were running short of antiseptics.

As soon as Wilson had taken stock of his position he had written at length to Sir John Lawrence on the situation, and Lawrence, now realizing that no help could come from below, till Lucknow had been relieved, determined that as soon as the Punjab had been cleaned up, he would scrape the country once more and send even the Movable Column itself to Delhi. John Nicholson had long been impatient for such orders, and all had realized that the unhealthy season in the middle of September at Delhi must be avoided and that the Column

Barnard as about as fit to command as the Pope of Rome, and that General Reed was fit to command the Simla Militia, recording however his belief that had he been fit in health it might have been otherwise. He was a 'Peninsula veteran,' a class who came under some obloquy in the Crimeal

would just about furnish sufficient troops for the storming. From Lawrence's point of view things were now improving. The Movable Column was disarming all doubtful troops, and the communications with the sea via Sind and the Indus flotilla were daily developing. Sir Bartle Frere, Chief Commissioner there, readily understood the difficulties at Delhi, and was active in supplying aid, sending up both the Belooch battalion and a battalion of the Bombay Fusiliers, which released more troops for Delhi.

By now every sort of rumour and 'shave' to use the slang of the period, was prevalent in camp, which was not in telegraphic communication with Calcutta by any route. Pat Grant was at Cawnpore with six battalions of Europeans! Sir Hugh Wheeler had been destroyed! Sir Hugh Wheeler was marching on Agra! Lawrence had been killed! He had been seen alive but wounded! and so forth. Even when the news of Cawnpore came through, people hoped against hope, till at last Havelock himself sent the true story, saying also that as soon as Lucknow had been relieved it was hoped to march up country, none even then suspecting that it would be late September before he would get into Lucknow, let alone get out.

It was at Simla perhaps, full to overflowing with anxious and widowed women and thronged with wounded and convalescent officers that gossip and rumour ran riot, but husbands at Delhi did their best to write cheerfully, knowing how hundreds hung on their reports. The various hill barracks vacated by the troops were now properly organized as hospitals convalescent and detail depots, etc. and not only was there a steady stream of returning drafts towards Delhi but there would be big efforts to get as many as possible down in time for the September 'push' to use a more modern phrase. It has not been realized that this wonderful group of hills and valleys on the way to Simla was practically the base of the Delhi force, with its organized line of communications, thanks to Mr. Commissioner Barnes, very well stocked with transport and supplies. Indeed it was largely on the Ambala district and to a lesser extent on Meerut that the Force relied. At Meerut,

General Hewitt had been removed and a Company's officer from a Gurkha regiment, Major-General Penny was in command. It is the custom of the historians to reflect on the large number of reliable troops the former had held up at Meerut all this while, but with the usual want of military sense that characterizes them, they do not realize that Delhi was perfectly competent to order what it thought necessary. Probably the importance of Meerut as a supply centre in addition to its well equipped hospitals, made it appear worth while to hold it strongly, as a support to Delhi, as well as on account of the number of families sheltering there.

Within the Guilty City

It is now perhaps time to look at the other side of the screen and to try and understand what was actually going on within the city of Delhi and the palace of Shah Jahan. That drama is psychologically, perhaps one of the most interesting studies of the whole of the period, and while of transcending interest, has been but little studied save in the inimitable fiction of Mrs. Steel.

In the first place we must realize that for a whole month the Palace and the first batches of mutineers lived in a delightful fools' paradise. The 'hell-doomed ones' had been wiped from the face of the earth, the House of Timur had been restored, and the army was all powerful and was going to do as it liked! For four weeks the English gave no sign. The old cry of India:

<i>Khalk-i-Khuda</i>	} Mankind belongs to God
<i>Mulk-i-Sirkar</i>	
<i>o Hukm-i-Sahiban Alishan</i>	

had given way to

<i>Mulk-i-Badshah</i>	} The country to the Emperor
<i>o Hukm-i-sipayan</i>	

and very fine it sounded, till it began to be borne in on the royal entourage that that way buttered no parsnips.

And then one fine day four weeks after the massacres there

came the demand note from their creditors, in the shape of the Union Jack once again a-flying on the Ridge.

And indeed the sight thereof was a terrible shock, and a warning that whatever the harvest it would have to be fought for. The aged King had for a short while been happy with his bands a-playing, his elephant rides abroad and the congratulatory addresses often forged by his entourage, that came to him in the little embroidered bags. But the quarrels of his sons and the army officers, the unruly demands of the soldiery for pay and the like soon made life only too burdensome and the glamour, like the comfortable Government pension, soon passed. When more and more troops marched in, the clamour grew but greater, varied now and again as some odd European or Christian was available for the slaughter. No master-mind as military leader was thrown up from among the forces or chiefs in Delhi, and not only was there no commander but there was no machinery to make command effective. Nevertheless as we have seen, time after time each successive wave of incoming mutineers seemed to have to earn their spurs by attacking the 'hell-doomed' ones, often with bravery sometimes with skill. That the effete seniority system of the Bengal Army should throw up no leader was not surprising, but in the Irregular Cavalry there should certainly have been some soldier of commanding character. Mirza Mogul the King's eldest son, who had assumed the rôle of Commander-in-Chief had neither knowledge nor prestige, and ere long by apparently general consent, Subadar Bakht Khan of the 15th Horsed Battery from Bareilly was raised to the office of *Sipah Salar*.¹ A very stout man of over sixty and a bad rider, he had some considerable ability and at any rate knowledge of routine. A little later when the Nimach mutineers marched in there appeared a rival in one Ghaus Khan, a cavalryman and at last they were appointed each to a wing. The incoming mutineers for all their bands and their scarlet coatees and British medals, brought little cash, for even when they had decided to bring the captured treasure to the 'Padishah'² it had always melted away

¹ *Sipah Salar*='Lord of troops.'

² *Padishah* or *Badshah*='King.'

a good deal en route. In the city the bankers had closed their offices and refused to function, while the shop-keepers could but wring their hands and bury their valuables. But still the regiments and the brigades marched in triumphantly, or now and again slunk in without their arms, when deserting after having been disarmed. And all the while the heart of many grew cold and sick that they were on the wrong side and fighting the *Sahibs* who had so often led them to triumphant, well-fed, and punctually paid victory. Ahsanullah the King's minister alone knew perhaps the full bitterness of the difficulties that made his fanatical dream go so badly awry.

Before long Hodson with the help of Rajab Ali, an agent sent him by John Lawrence, had succeeded in establishing an admirable intelligence and spy service so that most of the doings in the city were duly chronicled on the Ridge. As soon as the dream began to fade the principal actors at the King's court including the Begum began to send out feelers as to their own position, and Hodson was ere long in touch with most of them. Further, with the corps of irregular horse that General Anson had commissioned him to raise, now in a state of wild efficiency, he had dominated the whole country round Delhi for miles, entirely restoring prestige, hampering the rebel supplies and improving our own, and extending his sources of information in every quarter.

Events in the Punjab

The rallying of the Punjab to the side of Government, the disheartening of the subversive element owing to the firmness and activity shown, and the coming of the reinforcements from the Bombay side, combined to put Sir John in a strong position. The drain of Delhi and the impasse on the Ganges it is true induced him to put forward his plan of handing back Peshawar to Dost Muhammad. To the vigorous expostulations of his advisers came a peremptory order from the Governor-General that Peshawar was not to be abandoned. Then Sir John set himself down to reinforcing Delhi in grim earnest. His only

troubles were some unrest in the hills near Murree due to unruliness, and a rising which broke out later among the wild grazier tribes of the Gogaira in the Multan direction. But all the disarmament plans did not go so well as those at Lahore and Peshawar. At Jhelum, close to Rawalpindi was the 14th N.I. known to be disaffected. General Gowan ordered Colonel Ellice with several companies of H.M. 24th, some horse artillery guns and Lind's Multani Horse to march there from Pindi, and carry out disarmament. They arrived on the morning of July 7th to find the regiment drilling. Seeing the Europeans approach the sepoy's threw themselves into the lines, and outhouses and commenced firing. The Europeans apparently none too well handled, attacked and met with heavy loss. The fight continued with no success and this sepoy corps had the credit of sustaining all day a severe attack from a force of all arms. Colonel Ellice himself was mortally wounded and the troops bivouacked round the sepoy's to find by the morning that they had fled. It was not a creditable performance, and had the direst effect at the comparatively adjacent Sialkot. Sialkot a popular well built station, commanding a magnificent view of the snows of the Pir Panjal, had a considerable garrison, consisting of the 52nd Foot, the 9th Light Cavalry, the 46th Native Infantry, Dawes' troop and Bouchier's battery. A good number of Europeans and families resided there; Sialkot had in fact taken the place of the first cantonment at Wazirabad on the Chenab which had proved so unhealthy.

For some reason much criticised at the time, Lawrence and Gowan had withdrawn the whole of the 52nd and the European batteries for the Movable Column, leaving the station to the mercy of the 46th and a wing of the 9th, the other wing being also with the column. It is probable that the proximity of the Jammu frontier may have made authority unwilling to disarm, but the alternatives were to leave sufficient reliable troops or to have the tragedy that occurred. On the 8th the troops received the news of the British failure at Jhelum, probably described as an unprovoked attack on the sepoy's by Europeans. Early on the 9th the troops broke into mutiny and apparently surrounded

the European quarter with piquets headed by the cavalry, usually the first to break out. The officers hurried to the lines, those of the 46th eventually escaping towards Gogranwallah after two seniors had been offered employment under the Padishah coupled with a guarantee of summer leave to the hills! The residents and officers tried to make their way to the old fort near the city hunted by cavalry troopers and the rabble, who at once poured into the bungalow area. The old brigadier, Fred Brind of the Artillery was shot by a trooper and died that night, a Scottish missionary and his family were killed driving to the fort, and several others. Then the mutineers made off towards Delhi, via the Trimmu Ghat on the Ravi river, taking with them the station time-gun, which was on a field carriage.

Before they went, aided by their friends the rabble, they looted the treasury, destroyed the *cutchery*,¹ blew up the magazines, and gutted the bungalows. Curiously enough, contrary to the usual faithful service, the domestic servants appeared in some cases to have aided the rebels, the brigadier's bearer taking the caps from off his pistols that lay by his bed and his *khansaman* installing himself as leader of the gun crew. Curiously enough too, church and chapel alone were untouched.

But nemesis in its most complete form was awaiting the mutineers.

The Movable Column after proceeding to Jullundur and Phillaur as already related, marched back up the Grand Trunk Road, and took up a position at the central station of Amritsar. Here it was well enough placed to cope with the march south of the Sialkot mutineers.

As soon as news came of the failure at Jhelum, Nicholson very reluctantly disarmed the 59th² at Amritsar, a corps of which nothing but good was known or reported. Nevertheless no risks could now be run, and the reports from Sialkot next day but confirmed the wisdom of the action, which took place after an execution parade.

Gowan and Sir John then disarmed at the same time the 58th and two detached companies of the 14th at Rawalpindi, but not

¹ *Cutchery*=The Courthouse.

² *Vide* Appendix II.

without the native troops bolting from parade and being with difficulty brought to hand without contretemps. Up at the Peshawar outposts the same fate was meted out to the 24th for the same reasons.

Trimmu Ghat

The column itself was soon to be on the move as news came in of the Sialkot tragedy, followed by a report from an escaped musician of the 46th, who had ridden in with a note from a civil officer written at 6.30 a.m. on July 9th, actually calling for the column. The bandsman, a lad named McDouglas, had escaped from the parade ground on a small pony, and commandeering a succession of *tats*¹, finished his eighty mile ride into Amritsar just as the mail cart brought in the news from Lahore, no mean effort on his part. With the column was a wing of the 9th Cavalry which Nicholson now did not hesitate to disarm, an act he had hitherto held up for fear of precipitating trouble at Sialkot. Nicholson expected that the mutineers would march via Gurdaspur, Nurpur and Hoshiarpur towards Jullundur carrying with them various outlying corps en route, and he determined to head them off if possible at the crossing of the Ravi. Commandeering all the horsed vehicles he could lay his hands on for his infantry, Nicholson started off on the 43 miles to Gurdaspur, accompanied by the civil officers of the division. Enough carriage for all his footsoldiers had not been procurable, and by daybreak they had made but 25 miles of the way. He then learnt that the mutineers were still a march the other side of the Ravi, and as all his men were not up till late on the 11th, he decided to lie quiet till he received more news, in the hope that the mutineers were marching towards him. His hopes were justified, and at 9 next morning he learnt that they were crossing the river at the Trimmu Ghat. Thereon he set forth in the blazing sun. By noon he had discovered that a long line of scarlet was drawn up on his front and ahead of it the blue grey uniforms of the light cavalry vedettes. The sepoy right lay on

¹ *Tat*=pony of the countryside.

a village and their left on a ruined mud fort. Nicholson hurried up his guns masked by parties of mounted police. Thereon the rebel cavalry charged, with the result that the heels of the police could not be seen for the dust. However, the guns were now in action at effective range, as the infantry jogged up in their conveyances. It was a fight between two portions of the same brigade and the native drivers of the artillery might well have jibbed. Cowed or staunch however, they did their duty, and batteries and Enfield rifles were too much for Brown Bess and the station time-gun, which the brigadier's *khansaman* handled remarkably well. Leaving close on four hundred of their number dead or wounded on the field the mutineers now fled to an island in the Ravi, not however, before they had stayed almost to cross bayonets with their former comrades of Sialkot. Leaving some Punjabi Infantry to watch the ford and ferry, Nicholson now took his exhausted force back to Gurdaspur, having captured the whole of the rebel baggage and their wagon-loads of Sialkot loot.

The river rose in the night; the civil authorities had secured all the boats for many miles and the remnant of the mutineers were hopelessly cut off. On the morning of the 16th after three days' rest, Nicholson moved out his men and landed on the island by ferry boat unknown to the mutineers and a mile and a half from them, while his guns faced them from the opposite bank, quite unable however to silence the *khansaman* and his gun which was hidden in the grass. As the doomed and desperate rebels realized that the 52nd were advancing against them, they endeavoured to form front to their flank and even switched round their old time-piece. But the time had come to pay in full the penalty of their mad act, whether born of cruel hysteria or undue panic. The British advanced with the bayonet and every mutinous wretch died stoutly, or was drowned in the Ravi, save a few who escaped to be brought in later to their doom by the villagers. It was the first fight that the Movable Column had had and it fully justified its leader's reputation for energy and resolution. The sepoy menace in the Punjab was over.

On the 21st Nicholson hurried to Lahore to meet Sir John Lawrence and General Gowan, and then the great policy that was to settle the Delhi question, and steady India was decided on. Nicholson was to take the Column to Delhi at once with such other accretions as could be ready, arriving by August 15th while other Punjab troops to the grand total of 4,200 men, would be there by the end of August. It was a magnificent policy. With Nicholson himself were to go the following:

H.M. 52nd (600 bayonets).

Multani Horse (200 sabres).

Bourchier's Horsed Battery (9 prs.).

The Kumaon Battalion of Gurkhas (400) was already on the way.

The subsequent additions would be:

Wing of H.M.'s 61st (400).

Wing of Beloochis (400).

2nd Punjab Infantry (200).

4th Punjab Infantry (600).

4th Sikhs (100).

H.M. 8th (200).

Those who know the Indian army will note that with Coke's Rifles, already with the army at Delhi, there were three Frontier Force Battalions, with a detachment of another and a detachment of Cavalry (1st P.C.) which took part in the capture of the city,¹ as well as the Guides.

Nicholson was back with his column at Gurdaspur on the 24th and next day had started on the welcome road to Delhi.

In addition every effort was being made to equip, man, and transport the medium siege train at Ferozepore arsenal, that General Wilson had asked for, the original light improvised train from Phillaur being little more than heavier field artillery.

¹ The author went round the Ridge with a party of the survivors of Coke's Rifles at the time of the Royal Durbar in 1911 – by which date the survivors of Delhi and of those who had been to the 'Baillie Guard' were few enough.

CHAPTER IX


THE STORMING OF THE CITY

The arrival of John Nicholson – The battering of the walls – The assault of Delhi – The death of Nicholson – The clearing of the city – The end of the House of Timur – The story of Agia

The Arrival of John Nicholson

BEFORE Nicholson left, Sir John had certain bones to pick with him as to his overmasterful ways and his neglect to send even the briefest explanation of some of his more unusual doings, while he had had a most severe wiggling from the General commanding in the Punjab for moving troops not under his orders without reference. That is always a military crime that stirs commanders to wrath, but in this case it should have been arranged for by making Nicholson the representative of the General wherever he passed, with authority from that commander to do anything that emergency seemed to call for, explaining briefly what he had done. But the John Nicholsons of the world are *sui generis*. So late as August 6th Lawrence wrote to him in half chaffing guise, at his last offence to General Gowan, pointing out how easy it was to carry folk with him rather than to run counter to their views and wishes: to which Nicholson replied in great surprise at the idea that he could ever be thought difficult.

At General Wilson's request he had pushed on to Delhi in advance of the Column, arriving there on August 7th, but three weeks after the former's accession to the command; very soon the rumour of his arrival spread through camp, and loud was the approval expressed thereat. Very soon too was his figure to be seen at the batteries and outposts seeing for himself, questioning officers, at times giving offence by his imperious



JOHN NICHOLSON
'The 'northern hurricane'

From a picture in the possession of the East India United Service Club, who have kindly given permission for its publication



By H. A. Wilson

GENERAL SIR HENRY HAVELOCK
who relieved Lucknow

manner, but impressing himself on all as a great leader with his tall figure, his commanding mien and his heavy beard.¹

For some little time the rebels had established a galling battery below the ridge at Ludlow Castle. A secret raid was made early on the 12th by Brigadier Showers with a party of Fusiliers and Coke's Rifles which was completely successful, the Fusiliers themselves bringing the captured guns with their teams into camp amid the cheers of the army. Unfortunately both Showers and Coke were severely wounded. The next day Nicholson rode out to lead in his own force, and on August 14th in they swung, in the finest of fettle and wildest of spirits amid the acclamations of the long tried Field Force. Every one now felt that the turning point had been reached, while behind the Column was rumbling down the great siege train, with its mighty elephants and powerful bullocks. To man this General Gowan, himself an artilleryman, was sending every gunner British and Indian that the Punjab could spare.

The rebel force now swelled by the accessions of the Nimach brigade, the Nasirabad mutineers, some of the Gwalior Contingent and many an odd corps, was at its strongest and by no means devoid of a certain amount of initiative. They had sent a large force out to threaten the road from Karnal and intercept the siege train, and to deal with this sally, Nicholson led forth on August 25th a picked force, in a pouring downfall of monsoon rain.

He found the enemy near the village of Najafgarh and holding a serai in the vicinity. Floundering through the mud with their guns staggering and sticking, the British advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, an attack to which the sepoys of the Nimach Brigade who furnished the bulk of the enemy in this part of the field, stood up bravely enough. There was no holding the avenging troops however, and despite the mud and swamps they struggled to cross bayonets with the rebels to such

¹ In those days beards were much worn by officers of both services in India, especially the Indian Army. In fact till well on in the eighties it was rather the mark of an Indian officer. Especially was it encouraged in the irregular cavalry, where the wilder men of the North thought more of men who wore beards than of those who didn't. A point which still obtains.

purpose that the sepoys fled after losing 13 of their guns and some 800 of their men, while the victors without food or shelter sat down to bivouac happily if hungry, on the soaked ground that they had won. It was a brilliant little victory not gained without considerable loss of lives that could ill be spared. It was the Nimach Brigade only that he had defeated, for Nicholson found later to his disgust, that the Bareilly Brigade were at a village a mile or so further on. He complained bitterly that he had neither information nor guides, but that must have been the fault of his own staff.

The Battering of the Walls

The victors from Najafgarh, the first victory in the open since the battle of Badli-ka-serai, trailed into camp at Delhi on August 26th too late and too tired for the ovation that the army wanted to give them. But they were soon enough restored, and the whole force was stimulated to prepare for the final scene which after nearly three months of waiting could not be far off.

September 4th saw the siege train rumble in, and sappers and gunners were hard at work drawing up their plans. During this time was evident the want of a trained chief of the staff or the guiding hand even of so commanding a soldier as Neville Chamberlain, who was still in bed. A somewhat unseemly discussion as to what was to be done broke out at times between Baird Smith the Chief Engineer, and General Wilson. Baird Smith was kept going only by his indomitable spirit, fortified by brandy and opium against the dysentery that would not leave him. Wilson was still, in his own ill-health, doubtful of the success of an assault and still spoke of waiting for more help from below in view of the huge accessions of strength within the city. The advice of Chamberlain the stimulus of John Nicholson and the directness of Baird Smith removed all doubts, and Wilson decided to risk what was to him a gambler's throw. At a conference at this time Nicholson attended with the firm intention of proposing the supersession of Wilson had



BENGAL FUSILIERS ON THE MARCH
FROM THE SIMLA HILLS ON
NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK



ADVANCE OF THE SIEGE TRAIN TO DELHI

the plan of the assault not been continued with.¹ He intended to propose Campbell of the 52nd for the command, under whom he was prepared to serve. Happily so strong a step was not required. Wilson made the decision that all were waiting for. And all the while convalescent officers were scampering down from the hills, and long convoys of elephants and bullock carts brought down enthusiastic rank and file who had recovered from their wounds and sickness in the depots in the Simla hills.

Mention has already been made of the fact that the Ridge and our position thereon did not face the city, and only the bastioned post on the height by Hindu Rao's House came at all near thereto. But the throwing up of our out-post line to the Metcalfe House on the Jumna Bank, did bring our front parallel to, if some distance from, the city wall. It was decided to attack that part of the city which was opposite our front thus formed, from the Water Bastion on the Jumna Bank as far round as the Kabul Gate. This had the advantage of excellent covered approach through the thick gardens round Ludlow Castle, and of the roads leading from the cantonments on which to assemble the troops. For a long time the engineers had been hard at work constructing fascines, gabions and other siege material. It was now necessary to settle on the sites for the battering batteries at some points well in advance of the outpost line and as near to the walls as possible. Baird Smith was far too weak to do more than furnish the headwork but fortunately there was a sapper officer of enduring renown to perform the active duties and arrange the tracing and construction of the batteries, in the person of Captain Alex Taylor who had been engaged on that monumental work of civilization, the bringing of the Grand Trunk Road through the Punjab to Peshawar.

The troops now available, which were the last that could come from Upper India, numbered some 4,500 men (exclusive of the Kashmir Contingent) the last to swing in being the 60th Rifles and artillery details from Meerut, and Wilde's Rifles (4th P.I.) from the frontier, followed by the Dogra troops of

¹ See *Forty-one Years in India* (Lord Roberts), chap. xvii.

the Maharajah of Kashmir over 3,000 strong; these latter modelled and trained by the French and other officers with the Sikh Durbar, came in charge of Captain Richard Lawrence, dressed in the trappings of Europe, the cavalry wearing French dragoon helmets, and brought with them 4 guns. Their leading however was not good enough to produce any very serious results.

The batteries to be set against the city were to be four in number and were to batter selected points on a front of close on a mile long, from the Water Bastion to the Mori Bastion at which point the city walls began to circle away from the sight and ken of the position at Hindu Rao's. The first battery was to be in two parts, 700 yards from the Mori Bastion and halfway between Hindu Rao's and the city. Its business would be to tackle the heavy guns in the former and prevent them interfering with the breaching batteries, a duty which in modern parlance would be called 'counter battery' work. No. 2 battery was to be in front of Ludlow Castle, to batter the Kashmir Bastion, to silence the guns therein, and to make a breach in the curtain between that bastion and the Water Bastion. No. 3 battery was to be erected only 160 yards from the walls, behind the ruined Mogul Custom House, between the Kudsia Bagh and the walls, to breach the Water Bastion, while a fourth battery of mortars to play on the same curtain was to be in the Bagh itself.

On September 7th General Wilson issued a stirring order to the troops forecasting the coming effort, and that night No. 1 battery was commenced and armed. All night long camels carrying material jammed and groaned on the road to the battery, but the enemy did not take alarm. After the camels came the artillery carts of ammunition, and then the siege guns drawn by twenty yoke of oxen apiece, five 18-prs. and an 8" mortar for the right half, four 24-prs. for the left. As the guns were being hauled into battery, day was beginning to dawn amid a wild jam of bellowing oxen, furious drivers, guns, sappers, pioneers, escort, ammunition dumps, and working parties feverishly endeavouring to complete the emplacements. The

sepoys in the Mori Bastion now awoke to what was in progress and began to send roundshot crashing into the confusion. The mortar was already in battery and with this Major Brind who was in command opened fire while the gunners fearlessly dragged the rest of the armament into position. At last all was ready despite the enemy fire, and the great message of vengeance went forth. Crash went the 18-prs. followed by the roar of the 24's and the masonry of the bastion leapt and crumbled. By the afternoon the great guns therein replied no more.

It was not till the British occupied Ludlow Castle and the Kudsia Bagh that the enemy seemed to realize that the attack would come near the river. No. 2 battery, like No. 1 was to consist of two parts and was now got under way. It was to be a more powerful one than the first, having seven heavy howitzers and two 18-prs. in the right half and a huge battery of nine 24-prs. in the left. By 8 a.m. on the 11th this too was ready and opened suddenly with a vast roar, under Majors Kaye and Campbell. Hammered by this great array of guns, huge blocks of masonry crashed down the scarp from the Kashmir Gate and curtain. Under cover thereof the third battery was got up, under the sepoys' very noses at the Customs House, and the mortar battery in the Kudsia Bagh, the former with six 18-prs. and nine 5½" mortars under Major Scot, and the last (No. 4), with 10 heavy mortars under Major Tombs. The sappers however had proved too optimistic in their estimates of the time required to complete the batteries, and the Water Bastion actually was bombarded for only 24 hours. Many of the officers and men from the mobile artillery with details from the cavalry were now helping to man the siege batteries, so that day and night the great guns battered the walls which melted and crumbled. At last, on the night of the 13th the arrangements for the assault were promulgated.

Five columns were formed for the purpose, five weak columns – for the avengers were few enough and 327 casualties had occurred between September 7th and 14th in that week of intensive battering. The first three were to assault the front

between the Water Bastion and the Kashmir gate under Nicholson's command, who would himself lead No. 1, ascending by the breaches and blowing in the gate, the fourth was to carry the Kishanganj suburb, covering thereby the right of the assaulting columns, and then enter by the Kabul gate when opened for them, while the cavalry brigade covered the camp from the Sabzi Mandi direction and waited till required. The Fifth Column was to remain in reserve near Ludlow Castle.

The following is their detail:

1st Column, Brigadier General Nicholson.

75th Foot	300 Rifles	} 1,000 Rifles
1st Bengal Fusiliers	250 "	
2nd Punjab Infantry	450 "	

To storm the breach near the Kashmir Bastion.

No. 2. Column, Brigadier Jones (61st).

8th Foot	250 Rifles	} 850 Rifles.
2nd Bengal Fusiliers	250 "	
4th Sikhs	350 "	

To storm the Water Bastion breach.

No. 3 Column, Colonel Campbell (52nd).

52nd Foot	200 Rifles	} 950 Rifles.
Kumaon Battalion	250 "	
1st Punjab Infantry	300 "	

To enter the Kashmir gate when the gate had been blown in.

No. 4 Column, Major Reid (Sirmur Battalion).

Sirmur Battalion	850, plus 1,000 men of	} the Kashmir Contingent,
Guides Infantry	in reserve.	
Collected Piquets		

No. 5 Column, Brigadier Longfield (8th).

61st Foot	250 Rifles	} 1,000 Rifles.
4th Punjab Infantry	450 "	
Wing Belooch Battalion	300 "	


Each column had a party of engineer officers, and a detachment of gunners to serve captured guns.

The Assault of Delhi

Despite the fact that the Water Bastion had only been battered for twenty-four hours, a daring reconnaissance by young engineer officers on the evening of the 13th, in which Captain Medley actually got to the foot of the Kashmir Bastion, showed the breaches to be sufficiently practicable. The assault was therefore ordered for the next morning as arranged, the columns parading on the roads near Ludlow Castle and moving down near the walls. Unfortunately, the delay in getting in the piquets, and the necessity for battering down the repairs in the breaches made during the night, was responsible for some delay, and the sun was high in the heavens before Nicholson, putting his arm round Brigadier Jones' shoulder asked if he was ready. On receiving that gallant officer's cheery affirmative, Nicholson gave the signal and the 60th Rifles swept forward to the glacis and opened fire, covering the front of all three columns which now emerged from the shelter of the Kudsia Bagh. The sepoys responded with heavy musketry fire under which many of the ladder men leading the columns were swept away. Nevertheless the leading files led by their officers climbed or scrambled down the counterscarp, and rushed up the rubbled breaches, No. 1 with Nicholson actually leading, up the breach in the Kashmir curtain and followed by No. 2 at the Water Bastion. Once the top of the rubble debris was gained the enemy fled with a wail and the first two columns poured down into the space between the Kashmir gate and the Church. As these columns were heading for the breaches the famous explosion party consisting of Lieutenants Home and Salkeld with eight European and Indian sappers carrying powder and sandbags approached the bridge leading to the Kashmir gate. With them was Bugler Hawthorne of the 52nd to sound the 'advance' as soon as the gate should be down. This most famous deed was performed by two detachments, first the powder party with the explosives, who were to drop into the ditch as soon as the charge was laid, then close behind them the firing party with detonator and fuze. Lieutenant Home,

at first unmolested by the surprised defenders, succeeded in placing the bags, but ere he had finished a heavy fire broke out from the open wicket and loopholed gates. Sergeant Carmichael fell dead and Havildar Mahdoo was wounded, the rest of the party slipping into the ditch as the firing party under Salkeld took their place: Salkeld fell hit in arm and leg before he could light the fuze, but was able to hand the slow-match to Corporal Burgess. The corporal of Engineers performed his task faithfully, but to fall mortally wounded, as he set the fuze alight. With a sputter and then a roar the charge exploded, and the great gates rocked and fell in. Bugler Hawthorne now sounded the advance, and then again, but the noise and din prevented Colonel Campbell from hearing. However, after giving the party what he thought was enough time he led his men on, to find the gates down and sufficient roadway left on the bridge for his men to file over. As the leading files struggled through the debris, they found many of the defenders lying killed and scorched by the explosion and the rest gone, while on the bastion above and scrambling down below were the men of the first column. Within the open space of the Main Guard and in the churchyard was a wild scene of enthusiasm and confusion. The cheering masses of the three columns proceeded to assemble and mingle as they jumped and scrambled down from the wall, their officers endeavouring to form front against such musketry fire as came from the adjacent houses. Nos. 1 and 2 Columns were now to turn right and sweep along the walls to the Kabul gate, where Reid's Column was to be admitted, and thence on to the great Burn Bastion, while No. 3 was to push on towards the Jama Musjid. Nicholson himself led Campbell's Column off in this direction to ensure it being rightly started, while Brigadier Jones took on Nos. 1 and 2, it being some time before Nicholson rejoined No. 1.

General Wilson from his command centre at Hindu Rao's, where also the barely convalescent Chamberlain had joined him to take command of the Ridge and camp, had watched the storming, and rode down through the Kashmir gate with his staff as soon as the result of the assault was reported.



THE STORMING OF DELHI
Bengal Fusiliers in the narrow streets

Unfortunately Reid's Column was not so successful, being foiled in its attempt to secure Kishanganj, though the Jammu and Kashmir Contingent, had been able at first actually to attack the distant Idgah on the extension of the Ridge beyond the gap of Kishanganj, where it lost four guns.

That suburb proved to be very heavily fortified, and the enemy present in great strength. Reid and several officers were wounded early in the attempt to storm it and there was doubt who was to take command. Such was the loss and confusion for a while that it seemed possible that the enemy might even break into our camp or move against the flank of the storming columns. Then Hope Grant stepped into the breach. His cavalry brigade was half in support of the storming columns, and he at once led it out into the broken ground between the Kishanganj and the Mori Bastion, sending his horse artillery into action at some 300 yards from the suburb. Here behind his guns, he held his men mounted under a heavy fire from the Mori Bastion and Kishanganj for many hours, unable to act mounted because of the ground, but holding in check the masses in the latter and those who might sally from the Mori gate. It was a long and terrible ordeal for patient men and horses, but achieved an important result, though the brigade sustained heavy casualties in the most trying of all situations that soldiers could be in.

The Death of Nicholson

When Brigadier Jones got to the Kabul gate there was no Reid to be admitted, but he swept on round the walls both on the parapets and the roadway inside, driving the defenders before him. His leading men even got to the Burn Bastion where the defenders rallied and drove them back. The failure of Reid's Column enabled many of the enemy to return to the city and a heavy fire was opened from the adjacent houses and ramparts of the bastion. General Nicholson now rejoined his own column near the Kabul gate, on which the British flag had been hoisted, to find progress at an end. Aware that any

check would allow the sepoys to recover from the dismay which had seized them at our amazing appearance within the defences, he ordered a fresh attack. The route to advance by, was but 200 yards of narrow lane between the rampart wall and a street of flat-topped houses admirably suited to musketry. Again and again the Bengal Fusiliers attempted it, their officers leading. Major Jacob was mortally wounded and most of his officers fell, as again and again the men recoiled before rifle and grapeshot fire. At last Nicholson himself exasperated at the failures, not realizing that the men for the moment were foundered, sprang forward and called on the Fusiliers to follow him. Alas victory cannot always be to the strong, and the great leader was instantly shot through the chest. That was the end of it. The troops made good their present position, and the mortally wounded general was carried away. Lord Roberts tells us how a little later while on some mission (he was on General Wilson's staff, but had been Nicholson's staff officer with the Movable Column), he found the General in a dooly abandoned by its bearers near the Kashmir gate. Getting fresh bearers he sent the General to the field hospital under charge of a sergeant, and never saw him again.¹

No. 4 Column had now been sufficiently rallied to protect the camp and Hindu Rao's, but the Jammu men had been driven from the Idgah with the loss of their guns.

In the centre of the city, Colonel Campbell's Column guided by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, the former city magistrate, penetrated easily enough to the vicinity of the Jama Masjid where it waited half an hour in the hope that some other column would come to its support. These weak columns now reduced by numerous casualties were but streaks in the labyrinth of the city, and the Commander of No. 3, without powder bags to blow in the gates of the great Masjid and by now wounded himself, withdrew his force slowly and in orderly fashion to the vicinity of the church, where it met the reserve

¹ A few years ago the author accompanied the Countess Roberts on a quest along the walls from the Kashmir gate, to try and locate the place where her father had found the abandoned dooly with the dying General. The spot where he was hit near the Kabul gate is marked by a tablet.

column. Brigadier Longfield however, had already parted with most of his men to reinforce the other columns.

General Wilson's headquarters were now established in the church, where he, poor man, greatly fatigued had but to listen to a series of disconcerting reports; Nicholson dying, Reid wounded and his column unsuccessful, heavy casualties everywhere, his force apparently lost in the intricacies of the city! These combined to depress him greatly so that he even contemplated withdrawing from what he had gained. He got little support from his staff, the stricken Baird Smith at his side, Chamberlain from Hindu Rao's, the dying Nicholson in camp, all furiously protested that withdrawing was unthinkable, and the General hardened his heart, and directed the columns to consolidate what they had gained. There was much to be cleaned up, and while, had he been stronger in numbers, the scared sepoys could probably have been hustled right out of the city, with his weary and scattered force a halt to consolidate was imperative, to be followed by a steady and systematic advance to a graded plan.

Now however, ensued similar scenes to those already enacted by the troops who had re-taken Cawnpore. Close to the Kashmir gate were immense stores of European liquor, not, as the historians try and explain, placed there by the craft of the defenders, but there because that area was then as it is to this day, the quarter of the merchants who imported European goods. The cellars of these shops undisturbed by the mutineers were now happened on by the weary soldiery while occupying the houses in their front. For two days a sorrowful orgy kept the force quite out of hand. It is a scene that would not probably happen to-day, when the army, like the population from whence it is drawn, is strikingly sober. The army of 1857, like many of the populace of these isles was given to drink. Add this to devastating sun, thirst, fatigue and nerve strain, the result is not hard to imagine. For some time the heroes of the siege were out of action.

The night of the 14th was a peaceful one for the weary troops, who now held a mile and a half of the crust of the city

and little else, headquarters being established in the well-known Skinner's House near the Kashmir gate, but it was not till the 16th that any serious advance was possible. The lull allowed the staff to straighten out a complicated situation, and prepare for a systematic penetration into the city.

The Clearing of the City

On the 16th Neville Chamberlain came down to let Wilson have a day's rest and again on the 18th. A scientific advance was planned, and all the liquor stores had now been destroyed, to put further temptation out of the way of the troops. The advance through the streets, at first very costly, was soon conducted in comparative safety by breaking a covered way through from house to house, the inhabitants having nearly all fled. On the 19th the fatal Burn Bastion was captured and the troops had worked up to the gates of the fortress-palace, and across the Chandni Chowk to the Jama Masjid. On the 20th the Lahore gate of the palace was blown in, and the troops followed the storming party in a wild rush of all ranks eager to seize the person of the King. The palace to-day is a very different place from then. Between the Lahore gate and the Naubat Khana where now are green lawns and the barrack square of to-day was such a warren of buildings as resembled old London before the fire. Pouring up the great domed bazaar from the gateway, the troops found not a soul, one solitary sepoy being slain at the gate; here and there was an odd soldier or follower. The whole place was empty and the Host of Timur with all its worm-eaten followers and decadent parasites had fled. Through the labyrinths and down the royal gardens the eager troops rushed. The royal premises were also vacant. In the courts were piled strange collections of loot of all kinds, carriages, palanquins and an immense collection of junk from the European quarters of upper India, with here and there some ornamented and presentation cannon. The sensational but blank entry to the Fort and its palace was the climax to the systematic working through the houses that had gained the Chandni Chowk, and

the principal places referred to. The soldier element in the garrison though it had been melting away for some days had nevertheless, together with the fighting portion of the Delhi mob put up a steady resistance, but by the 20th when the fort was seized the city was clear, seven days after the storming. The losses of the little force had been heavy, but now it was possible to take complete stock and reorganize while General Wilson took up his quarters in the palace within the fort. On the 21st was fired the salute that formally announced the capture of Delhi.

The heroic Nicholson passed away early on the 23rd in a staff-sergeant's quarters, which still remains on the right of the line of the bells of arms in the old cantonment, to which quieter spot Neville Chamberlain had removed him from the busy field hospital,¹ and his dying hours knew that success had crowned his efforts.

Among the tents outside the Turkoman gate of the city where the major portion of the rebel corps had pitched their camps, was found alive a British sergeant-major of one of the regiments of the Bareilly Brigade. Apparently an object of regard to the men, they had brought him with them. Indignation ran riot against him, but it was proved that he had been but a prisoner among them, and he was not brought to trial.²

Other stories of renegades in the mutineer ranks are not reliable. There is a strange allusion in Norman's letters from Delhi to one of the Directors of the East India Company, of a European woman 'hung at Meerut for her share in the Mutiny there' to which no clue is available.

The End of the House of Timur

It was soon found that the King and the *Begam* with all his following were at the magnificent tomb and *serai* of the Emperor Humayun some six miles from Delhi, and thither Rajab Ali went with a message from Hodson offering the old man his

¹ Letter to Edwardes from Chamberlain, published in *Field-Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain*.

² Maisey's (D.J.A.G.) Diaries.

life. The trembling old creature gave himself up and arriving near the city met Hodson who brought him in in triumph, a miserable enough object clutching his sword in his aged fingers. Hodson then ascertained that the princes, the guilty parties in the cruel murders of the women and children in the palace were at a tomb close to that of Humayun. Obtaining Wilson's sanction Hodson himself, with Lieutenant MacDowell led out a party of his Horse, and found that the princes were in the tomb, and surrounded by a horde of retainers, of whom the less effete offered to die sword in hand if the princes would lead. After prolonged discussions it was announced that the princes would surrender unconditionally, and Hodson sent in ten troopers to escort them. Soon they appeared in a small bullock cart with crimson curtains, of the type so often to be seen to this day round Delhi. Slowly the cart proceeded and Hodson then placed his party between them and the murmuring crowd who numbered several thousand. At last, according to his own account, the crowd followed so closely that he thought there would be a successful attempt at rescue. Thereon he shot them with his own hand, on which the mob fell away and the bodies were brought in, Hodson causing them to be thrown out outside the Kotwali where the bodies of many murdered Europeans had been exposed on the 11th of May. So ended the House of Timur.

The whole force loudly applauded Hodson's action, but the opinions of level-headed men in cooler moments regretted that he himself should have turned executioner. To this however it may be said that by so doing he saved many of his men from the possibility of a blood-feud which might have had aftermath for several generations, from sources deeply devoted to the Mogul tradition. The whole life of this daring partisan soldier whose services to his country at this period were so great, has been the subject of prolonged controversy which does not in the least affect the story of the Mutiny nor detract from the reputation that at this crisis he so gallantly acquired.¹

¹ If there were two sides to this remarkable man's character the best aspect of his cultured nature is revealed in his private letters published in the memoir written by his brother.

The death of the princes was in due course followed by the trial of the King, at which the whole story of the Mutiny and rebellion at Delhi was elicited. He eventually spent the few years remaining to him as a state prisoner in Burma.

The force soon recovered from its strain in the pleasant atmosphere of victory and the day after the completed occupation of the city, it was decided to equip a column to relieve the semi leaguer of isolated Agra and thence to move on Cawnpore. This column under Brigadier Greathed consisting of 750 British and 1,900 native ranks, actually marched out of Delhi on the 24th, no mean feat. The units employed were Remington's and Blunt's troops of horse artillery, the 9th Lancers (300) the remnant of the 8th and 75th (450 rifles between them) a composite cavalry corps formed from three cavalry corps of the Punjab Irregular Force, a detachment of Hodson's Horse (180), and the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry each about 600 strong.

These were the pick of the troops in physical fitness. Those remaining in Delhi needed rest and refitting before they too could take the marching road, and sally forth to quiet the districts round.

The Story of Agra

The story of Agra, the Mogul stronghold, 160 miles further down the Jumna, that was greater than Delhi, belongs to a strange little pocket by itself outside both the phases and areas of the general happening of the Mutiny. It has already been explained that it was the headquarters of the provincial government to which belonged both Meerut and Delhi. It had a garrison of the 3rd Bengal Fusiliers, a newly raised battalion of young soldiers of whom several were away in the hills, a battery of European artillery, with bullock draft, and two Native Infantry battalions disarmed successfully by Brigadier Polwhele, on the 31st of May. Gradually with the mutiny of outlying detachments the administration of the district fell away, in spite of heroic attempts to maintain order, by the civil officers many of whom had to come in. Saharanpur was a brilliant

example and at Meerut the ineffective Hewitt at last acquiesced in the raising of a famous corps of volunteer horse known as the 'Khaki Risala' under Robert Dunlop the civilian, and Williams, the police officer, in which clerks and refugee officers, merchants etc. served. This corps soon brought the district into fair order.

The same thing was started somewhat later in the day at Agra. Public opinion wanted the vast and commodious fortress palace, not as at Delhi full of the remnant of a court, made available as a safe place of residence. There was ample room within to receive all Christian folk and store all their valuables. Had a commandant and storekeeper been appointed, the whole place could have been properly organized since no place in India was better suited for the purpose.

Colvin commenced to store rations in a desultory way, but was hampered by the contrary opinion of his subordinates. Towards the end of June came a report that the mutineers from Rajputana were advancing on Agra, and Colvin alarmed, ordered the fort to be occupied, but for want of proper preparation it was done badly enough, and for some little time great disregard of a sanitary system which the presence of some 6,000 souls required, endangered the whole community. It was not till the military authorities took over the control that order and system prevailed.

A contingent from the Rajah of Kotah was left to guard the station, aided by some horse raised by a local magnate; these however in due course joined the mutineers. Before long the Rajputana force was reported to be at Fatehpur Sikri twenty miles away, and then to have advanced to Sacheta, a village five miles distant. There the brigadier decided to attack them, which with the force at his disposal was perfectly feasible. With no intelligence worthy of the name there followed a second Chinhat. Badly managed the Fusiliers attacked the enemy in a mud village, when all the ammunition with D'Oyley's guns had been fired away, the attack failed and a retreat commenced, followed up by the well trained rebels and their guns of the Nasirabad brigade. The retreat was not such a '*sauve qui peut*' as

Chinhat, nevertheless it was bad enough and the arrival of wounded survivors caused immense alarm. The battery commander had been mortally wounded, and many valuable lives were lost, all from bad handling.

The city now broke out and the civil station and cantonments were burnt and looted, with great loss, owing to the failure to store property in the fort.

Thenceforward the British remained, with such dissension as may be imagined, within the vast fortress, in which however as related, proper routine and administration were eventually introduced, and there they all remained until after the fall of Delhi, and the arrival of Greathed's flying column.

On September 9th John Colvin passed away, worn out by the strange trials of a situation which was not in his line to handle and which would have puzzled any man. He was the only Lieutenant-Governor in the Mutiny in the position of being powerless at the centre of a province which had fallen into disorder.

The ineffectiveness of Agra was however still to dog its reputation. As Greathed came swinging down the road past Aligarh a succession of letters written in every language living and dead, poured in from Agra, beseeching him to hasten at utmost speed to succour that place.¹

Agra was apparently threatened by a large party of sepoys, so the column to whom Pandies and Mata Deens, to use the Punjabi nickname for the Bengal sepoy, were nothing but a joke, swept on, cavalry and artillery in advance, infantry by forced marches, to see what was the matter, and arrived on October 11th in some amusement, heightened by the sight of European soldiers in red coats and white cap covers, with pink faces peering at them over the fort walls. The men of the 8th and 75th in rough khaki and beards seemed to the ladies in Agra to be something unknown; 'I suppose those dreadful looking men are Afghans' said one.

But pride goeth before a fall, and the column being foolish enough to listen to the Commandant at Agra's report that the

¹ Rice Holmes.

enemy had crossed the river, 'let itself be surprised.' Just as it was settling down into camp on the parade ground a mile and a half from the fort to which the brigadier had gone, some on-lookers who had been allowed to come into the camp drew swords and rushed at the nearest Europeans while at the same time a party of horse charged into camp from some neighbouring cover, followed by a heavy artillery fire from biggish guns.

Old hands like the column however, soon seized their arms and formed rallying squares; whilst the gunners got to their guns. Greathed, who had gone to the fort, arrived in time to take command and turn on the enemy assisted by the Agra garrison under Colonel Cotton anxious enough to avenge Sacheta. The rebels, in reality equally surprised at the presence of the column were finally routed and pursued for many miles, losing all their guns and baggage, but the British casualties could ill be spared. After halting three days to rest, the column moved on towards Cawnpore and Hope Grant shortly afterwards came down to assume command. After this it was possible to re-assert authority in the districts round Agra, which gladly returned to ordered government.

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CHAPTER X

THE TWO RELIEFS AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW

Outram takes command – Havelock's relief of Lucknow – Outram decides to remain – The coming of Sir Colin Campbell – The second relief of Lucknow – The withdrawal of the garrison – Tantia Topi at Cawnpore – Sir Colin Campbell's long wait – Outram and the rebel forces – The big campaign in Oudh – The capture of Lucknow

Outram takes Command

It is now time to turn back to that other impasse, at Cawnpore, where Havelock's attenuated force was able to do little more than hold the mutinous troops in the west from closing in on the Ganges. Preparation and pacification however were going on apace and soon came the news that Major-General Sir John Outram had been appointed to command all the troops above Dinapore. As Outram was known to be following Havelock from Persia, this was not unexpected, and with his position and knowledge as the late Chief Commissioner in Oudh, to which position he was likely to return. The unnecessary ploy made over the 'supersession' of Havelock and Outram, as there had been of Neill's 'supersession' by Havelock, both occurring in the ordinary routine of the arrival of more permanent forces has been already referred to. Havelock had at present but commanded a brigade with intense devotion and zeal, and was almost prostrate in the process. To refer to him as a great commander is merely to mis-describe the circumstances. His tactics of necessity were but those of the simplest commander, which entirely met the case.

Given his European troops and the stimulant due to circumstances all that they wanted was a leader, and Havelock led them, a soldier to his finger tips.

192 RELIEF AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW

On August 6th, Outram left Calcutta, and proceeded to see to the maintenance of order down the line, which was seriously threatened by the various mutinies at the small stations along the long river route and in Bihar. By September 5th he had left Allahabad and arrived on the 15th at Cawnpore. Along the road he was able to realize the gallantry of Havelock's little force, and on arrival at Cawnpore was to hear more of the frustrated attempts to reach Lucknow.

He then proceeded to issue his famous order of abnegation, a quite unnecessary and illegal act. He announced that he would not assume the command of the force till Lucknow was relieved, and that Havelock should lead it in, while he merely accompanied it as Chief Commissioner. To salve Havelock's feelings was a kindly act well in harmony with the motives so well known to actuate Outram. But unless he had orders from Government that he was not to assume military command, by no real manner of means could he divest himself of his authority and responsibility. Every error of Havelock's and every undue loss became his responsibility. The function of command cannot thus be shuffled off. Even if he, in his position as the commander of the force, was to accompany Havelock, in the way that a corps commander might march with a division of his command, while not interfering tactically, responsibility for command must still in such a case remain. This is what really happened. Outram acted not as a volunteer but as a higher commander, accompanying one of his formations, for he interfered with Havelock when he wanted to advance across the Gumti, but against his better judgment omitted to insist on his advice being taken, when in the middle of the suburbs, he allowed Havelock to adopt a route which brought unnecessary and pitiful loss.

These points have been referred to because of the unmilitary talk of the historians and because it is important to remember that legal and moral responsibility cannot be divested and assumed at will.

Outram had originally turned his attention to the possibility of an advance from Allahabad up the Gogra from below

Benares, but soon agreed that the Ganges and Cawnpore was the best route in the circumstances.

It is well to remember that Outram was not a trained and practised soldier. He had been a political officer for many years and as such had served in the First Afghan War, where he had led irregulars. He had been with Sir Charles Napier and seen that veteran handle troops in hand to hand warfare in Sind, but he had not been employed in a military capacity, and remained in political employ. He had been as related, sent to be the first Chief Commissioner in newly annexed Oudh, and then while on sick leave had been somewhat irregularly selected to command the expedition to Persia. His reputation, apart from the personal chivalry of his character lay in his common sense, his decision, and his knowledge of affairs. He was therefore, eminently at the moment, the man that was required. The advance into Oudh required courage and decision, but the amount of skilled leading required in the higher sense would be trivial. Havelock on the contrary, was a man who had studied war, seen a good deal of it as both staff and regimental soldier, and, given health, might have been a commander as well as a leader. But, alas ! the two brigades now preparing were the largest force that he was ever to handle.

Havelock's Relief of Lucknow


The last accession of strength that could be expected for some weeks had now arrived, and by September 20th all was ready. The troops consisted of Havelock's original force the 64th, 78th, 84th, the Madras Fusiliers and Brazier's Sikhs increased by the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th Light Infantry with Maude's, W. Olphert's and Eyre's batteries, the first being Royal and the last two being Bengal Horse, numbering 3,179 in all. These were divided into two brigades commanded by Neill and Hamilton respectively. The original Volunteer Cavalry had been slightly augmented and a few irregular cavalry, mostly Sikhs, had been collected.

The 19th and 20th were passed in crossing the Ganges,
OR

when the pensioner Ungud brought them reports from the Residency of the incessant attacks experienced and of the shortage of food. On the 21st the actual advance commenced and it was found that the familiar walls of Mangalwar were still held, although the enemy were soon driven therefrom and the cavalry, led by Outram in person, cut up many. The first halt in Oudh was at Bisharatganj from which the enemy had disappeared, and it was not till the 23rd that Havelock came across the mutineers strongly posted in front of the Alambagh the 'Garden of the World.' The infantry advanced doggedly to turn the sepoy right, across the heavy flooded fields of the monsoon, rain still was falling, and the guns dashed forward to close range, the 5th Fusiliers finally storming the garden itself while Outram vented his energies in leading the small body of cavalry and capturing five of the rebel guns.

The force now faced the city of Lucknow, which lay two miles ahead across a wide canal, looking north-east. On the far side of the right half of the city lay the Residency, and away on the right the Gumti river which flowed down past the city. In a great bend between the junction of the canal with the river, lay a host of gardens and palaces through which the Residency could be reached. Havelock wished to throw off well to his right across the Gumti, and come into the Residency from the east. Outram insisted on the abandonment of this project largely on the grounds that the sodden ground would not bear the heavier guns. Havelock reluctantly acquiesced, and Outram's self-assumed position as a volunteer had disappeared. In his opinion, and of course he knew the ground better than any one else in the force, the only possible course was to advance on the city, seize the Charbagh bridge over the canal, and thence wheel right along the road towards the Residency under the walls of the city. On the evening of the 23rd the force withdrew somewhat from the position gained and halted on the 24th while the enemy's position was reconnoitred. On the early morning of the 25th the force advanced accordingly, leaving their baggage with 300 men in the Alambagh. Soon after eight on the bright cool morning of the 25th,

*The
City and Suburbs
of Lucknow
in 1857.*



General Havelocks Relief.

Sir Colin Campbells Relief.

The line of attack at the capture of Lucknow is omitted for the sake of clearness.

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he 1st Brigade under Neill, led by Outram himself, advanced to attack the bridge, the 5th on the right the 84th on the left, supported by Maude's guns. The firing from houses was very heavy and Maude's gunners and cattle suffered heavily. To relieve them Neill led forward his Fusiliers up the avenued road now strewn with the branches felled by the rebel roundshot, who charged with superb serenity and captured two guns that were sweeping the road. The bridge over the canal was now in British hands and it was but necessary to protect the left while the main force swung round to the right and followed the road under the walls into the more open ground that led to the palaces and the Residency. With Neill who led the advance was Outram, while Havelock crossed the bridge with the 2nd Brigade, leaving the 78th to cover the left and bring up the rear. The advance here was unmolested for two or three miles, the leading troops halting now and again for the heavy guns to close up, swung out into the park-like country near the Gumti practically unmolested. Then they turned sharp to the left towards the 'Baillie Guard' and came under fire from the 32nd Mess-house, from guns on the far side of the Gumti, and from more guns in the Kaiserbagh on their left. It was important to get in to the Residency by day-light and the force pushed on without attacking the palaces and gardens right and left that fired on them, merely now and again dropping a gun to reply. The 78th and Brazier's Sikhs closing up in rear had not followed the leading troops into the open but had turned to their left a mile earlier and had made their way up a road that led past buildings and under the walls of the Kaiserbagh towards the Residency. The leading troops were now turning in from the open and from other lanes into the same route to find that their rear had now become their advance, so that it was Highlanders and Sikhs that led. Fighting now became fast and involved. It was already dusk and the firing and confusion was considerable. Outram's wish was to halt, rest and close up, Havelock's was to get in that night. What was almost an altercation had ensued a little earlier between Outram and Havelock as to the best route in, Outram reluctantly allowing Havelock to



THE 93RD HIGHLANDERS AT LUCKNOW

have his way (which he much regretted afterwards). The Highlanders and Sikhs to whom the Madras Fusiliers had been added, actually fought their way in with the two generals at their head under heavy fire, arriving at the last moment almost unexpected. When their arrival was realized, such wild scenes of enthusiasm as can well be imagined broke out, and all the weary days and loss to the relieving force seemed worth while a hundred times. But alas ! a mile back Neill with the 1st Brigade separated from his 'lambs' had fallen mortally wounded shot by a sepoy on a roof, and was carried dead to his goal next morning while all the world mourned. The major portion of the force bivouacked where they were and it was not till the morning of Saturday September 26th that the whole force was within the defences.

Outram decides to Remain

With the arrival within the Residency area Harelock's nominal and glorious command ended. Outram resumed command, leaving Harelock with his division of two brigades. The former had hoped to get the garrison and non-combatants away at once, but on surveying his resources in transport found that it was quite impossible. Further, more of Sir Henry Lawrence's supplies had been found, for he had filled the great swimming bath below the Residency unknown to the commissariat officers and it was quite possible to subsist his force. Losses too had been so heavy both in killed and wounded that ambulance transport also would be greatly in defect.

The first thing to do was to take into the defence a largely increased area without the original enceinte, and this was done, the Farid Baksh and Chatter Manzil palaces and their enclosures being occupied by Harelock's force. Then Outram, Harelock and Inglis sat them down to wait till Sir Colin Campbell should be able to remove them. With such an increase of strength however, and such stout hearts the position became very different. The enemy were attacked and driven from any spot from which they inconvenienced the garrison, and the

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investment though close enough, was never of the crucial nature as in the last few weeks before Havelock's arrival.

The actual remaining of the force indeed appeared but as an act of defiance, a daily reminder that the British Raj was there and had every intention of remaining. The garrison indeed as the weather grew cooler, improved in health and enterprise, all save the gallant Havelock, whose trials had worn him past recovery. Outram also managed to strengthen and supply the detachment left in the Alambagh with the baggage, and incredible as it may seem, this detachment (350 strong) remained there till Colin Campbell's relief arrived, two months later.

The Coming of Sir Colin Campbell

It has been related how Sir Colin Campbell with his chief staff officer, Colonel Mansfield, arrived in Calcutta on August 13th a fortnight after Outram, and how the new Chief had sent Outram up the line while he remained in Calcutta. It was essential indeed to complete the arrangements set in hand by Sir Patrick Grant, for a new army headquarters and a new supply system, to equip and maintain the large European forces now on their way, forces far larger than ever yet seen in India. There were many things still to provide for. Horses for European cavalry hardly existed in India and certainly none for artillery. The provision of horses for these two categories of soldiers, had from time immemorial taxed the Company's resources and had caused them to search the stables of Central Asia, of Persia and of the Cape, while now of late years New South Wales was beginning to produce sizable horses that could stand the East.

The crying want of the avenging armies was to be horse flesh. Large forces of rebel cavalry brilliantly mounted from the Company's studs were in the field, and hardly a horseman south of Meerut to tackle them. Fortunately the separate army system of the Presidencies provided machinery for collecting both ordnance stores and ammunition, and the powder factories of the Bengal Army had not fallen into rebel hands.



SIR COLIN CAMPBELL
the Commander-in-Chief who quelled the rebellion,
afterwards Lord Clyde

Gradually the mechanism that Pat Grant had called forth, was getting ready to answer the helm of the new Commander-in-Chief. Flour however, was a difficulty; the part of India in which wheat was grown lay cut off by the Mutiny from the troops arriving, and it had to be sent for from the Cape. Horses were slowly being got together for a few of the new batteries, but gun-bullocks as of yore would alone be forthcoming for anything except the horse artillery. When the old 'F' troop arrived from the Crimea, there were fortunately horses of some native horse artillery existing which enabled it to take the field in fair style. Later some horses were made available by dismounting ostensibly faithful, but doubtful irregular cavalry.

Sending off Outram as we have seen, Sir Colin sat himself down at the administrative centre to watch his troops arrive and his 'Services' develop. Indeed between Calcutta and Allahabad there was still much to do. The hasty passing of Neill and Havelock had not coped with the tide of rebellion in Bihar and on the Ganges, and so the roads were infested with mutineers and local wild tribes who had to be coped with.

It was not till the news came that Havelock and Outram had both been absorbed into the Lucknow vortex when there was no other British force of manœuvre in being on the Ganges between Delhi and Calcutta, that Sir Colin decided to hurry up himself, pick up the Delhi Column that was moving down and add to it such reinforcements as were yet available. He had it is to be remembered, no commander to his hand. Havelock and Outram locked up, John Nicholson dead, no one of repute coming down from Delhi save Hope Grant, it was obvious that he must get to the scene himself.

On October 27th a month after Outram's disappearance into the defences of Lucknow, Sir Colin and Mansfield left Calcutta, and by November 3rd were in Cawnpore, to which place the chief had also despatched the newly arrived 'Redan' Windham, whose experience of India was nil, but who had a reputation as a fighting general. Ahead of him, the 53rd Foot and the 93rd Highlanders had been collecting at Cawnpore, and here also was Hope Grant with the 9th Lancers, Hodson's

Horse, the 8th and 75th Foot and the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry.

The 'War-bred Sir Colin' was now in his element and in a milieu that he thoroughly understood: no favourite of fortune, of humble Highland origin, Sir Colin had gained his way and made his career at the cannon's mouth. The Peninsula, San Sebastian, the American War of 1814, China, the Sikh Wars and the Afridi border and then the Crimea, were the schools and colleges that had taught him his job. Forty-nine years had he worn the sword and held the Commissions of three Kings and a Queen, and was fair old for so arduous a campaign. Nevertheless he had the confidence of the whole army for judgment, even if the reputation for dash had passed with the years. No one in India or in the Royal Army, had anything like the same experience of war or so successful a record, and it was with keen excitement that the troops assembled at Cawnpore, the war-worn veterans of Delhi with the newly come 53rd and the 93rd, paraded for his inspection. The small neat weather-beaten face and figure at once appealed to them, but it was not till he reached the 93rd, the thin red line of Balaclava heights, that the wild cheering that broke out told them how the old soldier bulked with those whom he had led.

The problems to be faced were numerous. To the west lay the great gathering of mutineers now focused round the Gwalior Contingent at Kalpi on the Jumna, to the east the leaguered forces at Lucknow. Outram wrote that he could hold out and urged the Chief to deal with the Gwalior lot first. Sir Colin preferred, despite the risk, to re-unite all his forces and relieve himself of the incubus of the women, children and sick from Lucknow before starting on the enterprise of reconquest. There were arguments of importance on both sides, and Sir Colin though successful did run some considerable risk. The force at his disposal after garrisoning Cawnpore exiguously was but 3,400 all told of sabres and bayonets.

The Second Relief of Lucknow

The Commander-in-Chief lost no time in setting about the second relief. On the 11th he reviewed the 3,400 men whom he was to lead to Lucknow on the Oudh Bank of the Ganges, leaving Windham to hold Cawnpore with but 500 European and 500 men of a Madras Infantry regiment (27th). Before he started he was reinforced by 1,500 more men from below including the famous heavy guns under Captain William Peel, R.N.

He was anxious to have with him some European from Lucknow who could explain the position in person, although to leave that closely leaguered spot in disguise that would be effective, and run the gauntlet for many miles, was no small proposition, and one that few men had the qualifications to carry out. But as so often happens the hour of need found the man. Mr. Kavanagh, a clerk in one of the civil offices offered to go through in disguise accompanied by a native spy. This intrepid task he safely achieved, arriving in Sir Colin's camps after many escapes, and receiving eventually a well earned Victoria Cross for his services. Sir Colin was now equipped for an advance and by the 14th, brushing aside some slight opposition, was at the Alambagh. From here the chief engineer had proposed that the relievers should proceed by the route originally suggested by Havelock, of crossing the Gumti and entering the Residency by the Iron Bridge from the east, an area, as already explained, abandoned by the latter on account of the state of the ground in wet September.

Sir Colin however, was not prepared to adopt this, preferring a suggestion sent by Outram that he should work across to the Dilkusha, the 'Heartsease' Park, some five miles east of the Alambagh across the canal near the Martinière, and thence via the Sikandrabad and the gardens close to the Gumti, avoiding altogether the route nearer the city with the narrow streets in which Havelock's force had lost so heavily.

Next day the 14th, Sir Colin occupied the Dilkusha and the Martinière almost without opposition; halting on the 15th he signalled to Outram, that he would advance next day,

whereon the latter prepared to open out his defences and advance to his assistance. Early on the morning of the 16th Sir Colin crossed the canal without opposition. Then was to occur one of the most desperate and memorable of the occurrences of this campaign. The Sikandrabadh was soon found to be strongly held by regular mutineers of the Bengal regiments. It was a great walled enclosure loopholed and closed by heavy gates. Outside a crowd of mutineers opened fire on the attackers now penned in a narrow lane. These were driven away by a company of the 53rd, and Blunt galloping his guns at a high bank cleared it and unlimbered in an open space whence he could bombard the wall of the Sikandrabadh the 'Garden of Alexander.'¹ After an hour a great hole appeared and the 4th Punjabis with the 93rd advanced to the storming. A desperate fight now occurred before the Sikhs and Highlanders forced their way in over their own dead, only to find an immense body of scarlet clad sepoys before them. It would have gone hard with them had not more of the storming party appeared by wall and doorway, and commenced to pour volleys into the masses before them. Then the slaughter of vengeance began, the corners of the enclosure being secured by the attackers, and the double-storied massive summer houses stormed. The sepoys recognizing that the hour of vengeance had come, set themselves to sell their lives as dearly as they could. Cawnpore and Fatehgarh, Delhi, Allahabad, and many another holocaust of Christian women and children cried too loud for any ruth. There was no way out and the troops before them glowed fierce with vengeance. Bayonet rang on bayonet, and rifle butt beat down tulwar for an hour or more, and when it was over eighteen hundred sepoys lay dead in Her Majesty's scarlet coats and wearing thereon Her Majesty's silver medals. A pity, a tragedy, and a necessity, just such a vengeance as the best soldiers wanted against those who had added to their mutiny such ruthless massacres of the helpless. And those who knew, sorrowed that Rajput heart should have been so hypnotized, and brought to such an end.

¹ Also 'the fortunate garden.'

From the Sikandrabad fresh troops pushed on to drive more sepoys from the Shah Najif, against which Peel's heavy guns now thundered, and the 93rd stormed, and then there remained but the 32nd Mess-house and the Moti Mahal, the 'Palace of Pearls.'

From the Residency side, the defenders had advanced and carried the Farid Baksh, the Harn-Khana and other out-houses and now lay waiting, but it was late to meet that night and Sir Colin must fain sleep where he stood. Early next morning the guns were brought to bear on the Moti Mahal and the massive Mess-house, which by three in the afternoon were ready for the storming. The latter fell and after it the Moti Mahal and now nothing but a few hundred yards of open ground separated the two forces. Disregarding the fire from the Kaiserbagh the defenders hurried forward and along the palaces. Then occurred the famous meeting recorded in the well known picture . . . the war-worn Sir Colin, the old hero Havelock and the intrepid Outram . . . a great scene long treasured and well portrayed.

That was the end of it, and Sir Colin's losses though serious were not devastating. The original garrison's strain had been over many weeks and the enthusiasm of the troops at their rescue could not quite reach the level of Havelock's entry, but content as well as pride in achievement was universal.

The Withdrawal of the Garrison

Sir Colin at once decided regretfully that the flag could not be kept flying, and that as soon as the helpless ones were removed the garrison should leave the unhealthy congested Residency area, but that Outram with 4,000 men should garrison the Alambagh and from there show that the British were but biding their time.

On November 19th the long train of the helpless started forth, through a carefully guarded alley-way of troops, to their first halt in the Dilkusha grounds, a movement notable for the want of all organized preparation and control, which

happily had no worse results than discomfort and confusion. Within the Residency and its neighbourhood, the attention of the mutineers had been distracted by three days' heavy fire from Peel's naval guns, and at midnight on the 22nd the force moved out, destroying before it went large quantities of Henry Lawrence's supplies, the total of which was not fully known even to Outram's commissariat officers. For they as well as the original garrison had believed themselves near the end of their store of commodities.¹

In vain had Outram and Havelock implored the Chief to attack Lucknow, for which they believed the combined force ample. In vain did the army voice great discontent at turning their backs on the rebel stronghold. Fortunately the old soldier stuck to his intention, of returning at once, for Cawnpore was in serious danger and he knew it, though no news had come from Windham for several days. Before the great convoy marched from the Dilkusha the gallant soul of Havelock left its earthly tenement, worn out by the heat and exposure of his hot weather campaign and wracked with dysentery. It was in the park of 'Heartsease' when all the drama of Lucknow was ending, that the dissolution came. Amid a sorrowing group of generals and soldiers he was laid to his rest below the shade of the 'Garden of the World,' whence Outram and his four thousand were to watch the guilty city, a fitting companion to Henry Lawrence in the Baillie Guard. Then it was that for a while the Union Jack flew no more on the Residency flagstaff for a short space, to be hauled up again before many months, and then alone of the flags of the Empire, never to be hauled down by day or by night, in calm and in storm, to this day, save only for moments of replacement.

Tantia Topi at Cawnpore

It was not till the 27th that the convoy and the troops from the Residency were concentrated at the Alambagh and ready to move onward. The whole mass, less Outram's garrison for

¹ Cf. Townsend's failure to take stock of his resources in Kut, which resulted in premature attempts to relieve him.

the Alambagh, then started for Cawnpore, Sir Colin anxious enough at no news from Windham who had already reported that Tantia Topi with 1,400 regular troops and several thousand of the Nana's and other levies was advancing. He had received permission to retain further arrivals instead of sending them up to Sir Colin and this brought his force up to a mixed, a very mixed, body of 1,700 men. Tantia now pressed forward from Kalpi and Windham who had had no news, good or bad, from Sir Colin, was more than apprehensive, as well he might be. He had been tied by very definite orders for the defence of his post, orders that needed modification, and he had sought permission to use his own judgment. At last receiving none he sallied forth several miles and actually fell on one of the enemy detachments, taking three guns. He then drew back on Cawnpore hoping that his success would check the enemy. Tantia's forces however were so numerous and advancing on so many different roads that a check on one was not sufficient. Windham now endeavoured to cover Cawnpore city, knowing it to be the manufacturing base for Sir Colin's army, holding a series of positions in brick-kilns and the like round the exterior. His troops which included, as has been said, some hundreds of Madras Native Infantry and heterogeneous detachments, many of them young soldiers, were none too well suited for so difficult a task. One of his commanders evacuated a key position unauthorized and without great pressure, and Windham by the 27th found himself driven back on his bridgehead, his young soldiers in great indiscipline and disorder, breaking into stores and quite out of hand, and to add to his difficulties the enemy had brought heavy guns from the upstream side to bear on his bridge of boats. It was a most disconcerting and distressing situation, Windham alone being calm and undismayed in the midst of it.

Sir Colin hearing the firing on his arrival on the 27th at Bani, now pushed forward to the Ganges with his cavalry and joined Windham,¹ ordering on the rest with the utmost speed

¹ The state of confusion he found even at bridgehead is clearly related by Russell, *My Diary in India*.

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possible, bringing Peel's heavy guns lumbering along at the best pace to which the forty yoke of oxen and the elephants could be goaded. It was not a pleasant situation with the great convoy of women and sick behind him. Happily Outram at the Alambagh covered the rear.

On the morning of the 28th, Peel's guns swung into action on the Oudh side of the river and soon disposed of the guns on the north, while the enemy near the bridge were driven off. That same day the whole force crossed and the family convoy was got in. Sufficient offing was now made to allow of it being organized for its move to Allahabad, and on December 3rd it was safely got away. Then was Sir Colin free to deal with Tantia Topi, and two days of battle ensued in which the two forces north and south of the city were driven off with heavy loss. The enemy in the city were more involved but owing to a cavalry fault they were not cut off and destroyed. Nevertheless Hope Grant eventually fell on the northern portion and drove them over and into the Ganges with heavy loss, while Tantia withdrew precipitately to Kalpi.

Sir Colin was no doubt congratulating himself that he had not listened to Outram's plea for an attack on Lucknow and also realized that he had got off very lightly for having decided to relieve the Residency before dealing with the forces threatening Cawnpore. An outstanding point to note here in the framework of the war as already explained was the importance of the line of the Ganges as the main artery of recovery and operation.

Thus ended the clearing up of the various predicaments into which our isolated forces and people were driven by the first outbreaks. The next stage, that of re-conquest and pacification, had to be undertaken, and the bulk and centre of that was Oudh, into which the remnant of the Bengal Army still in being was concentrated together with the forces of the people now in open rebellion. With the exception of Afghan Rohilkhand, where the drum of Islam beat fiercely, the rest of administered India was slipping back happily enough to its contented routine now that the sepoy element had disappeared.

Sir Colin Campbell's Long Wait

With the despatch down river of the families from Lucknow, and Delhi captured, it might seem that the finishing off of the rebellion would be an easy matter. But there are several important factors to be borne in mind. First of all in importance was the fact that the huge warlike province of Oudh was now in arms, and that it appeared that every talukhdar with his armed following had joined in the rebellion. A second factor was the rate at which reinforcements could arrive from Great Britain. Hitherto the forces available had been the corps within hail as it were, the China Expedition troops, units from Burma, Ceylon, and Mauritius and those on the sea from the Persian Gulf. It is well that we should realize the state that the British Army outside India as a whole was in. The units from the Crimea had not long been Home and had not recovered from the demobilization. The large number of short term enlistments entered on during the war were in process of being discharged. All units were exceedingly unready for war. There were plenty of seasoned men who had been in the ranks, but none of them were reservists as we understand the word to-day. The corps that were actually on colonial stations were units in being, but the despatch of the China force had taken all the zip out of most of the others. The corps in England had to be recruited up to establishment and got into a state of reasonable efficiency. It is a pity that no accessible story of how this was done remains.¹

Press criticism was levelled at authority for not sending the reinforcing units over land. Our ally France would have permitted it, and also Turkey across her province of Egypt. When however you come to face the details of such a despatch, the difficulty of finding troopships for the Suez end – if they were to be sent from Home they had better come round full – the extensive medical arrangements needed in Egypt, the manifest

¹ It had to be done on a similar but far larger scale in 1919, when the whole of the regular Army had to be re-raised, and the Indian and Black Sea and other post war garrisons found. That will be an even more enthralling story when properly told.

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opportunities for cholera, and other diseases that the breaking of bulk would afford, it cannot be said that any other course than that adopted was feasible. Single officers and details could and did come over land, but the troops came round the Cape. It is, of course, true that certain units did move over land from India to the Crimea, including a hussar regiment with its horses. But the experience thus obtained showed how complex were the arrangements required, while the question of France did not arise in this case.

While waiting for the necessary troops to arrive for the reconquest of Oudh, the Commander-in-Chief proceeded on a series of moves that would clear the Doab, as the tract between the Ganges and Jumna was termed. This was an essential step to the re-opening of communication with the Punjab, for the march of troops from Delhi after the siege had merely cleared a way, the country behind them remaining in insurrection. The mere possession of Allahabad, Agra and Delhi did not give us the line of the Jumna, as witness the hornets' nest at Kalpi, and on the Ganges we held no points above Cawnpore. So Brigadier Seaton brought from Delhi, more of the now fully restored besiegers, with some more of the new Punjabi levies, and Walpole¹ moved up to meet him at Beawar. Sir Colin himself moved out on the 24th to deal with the rebel Nawab of Farrukhabad, and re-occupy Fatehgarh, and the carriage factory, the scene of the miniature Cawnpore already described. Seaton had several affairs with rebels, and Sir Colin had a serious stand-up fight with the Nawab and other forces at the Kala Naddi, a few miles from Fatehgarh. They were severely defeated, losing all their guns, colours, baggage, and ammunition, and fled, with Hope Grant at their heels.

The Commander-in-Chief now proposed to enter Rohilkhand, where bands of Rohilla rebels were holding high revel since the mutiny at Bareilly. The Governor-General however, insisted that Oudh must be attacked first and that Rohilkhand

¹ The new names of commanders and corps now appearing, unless otherwise stated, are new arrivals in the country.

was little more than an affair of policy compared with the huge rebel army still in being at Lucknow. He realized that the forces available were not yet sufficient, but directed that Sir Colin should return to Cawnpore and wait till he could start into Oudh, requesting that enough troops should be left in the Doab to keep open the road north, and permit of administration being restored.¹

Campbell now framed his plans accordingly, leaving sufficient troops to furnish flying columns and hold Fatehgarh permanently, from which place a road ran to Lucknow, and where a force would to some extent, act as a moral support to Outram in the Alambagh. It would also cover from any move by the insurgents at Bareilly, the march of the siege train which, refitted after the fall of Delhi was to move down to take part in the capture of Lucknow.

By this time many general officers were arriving from England by the overland route, but we find Sir Colin explaining to the Horse Guards, that he could not put them in important commands, in view of their want of Indian experience. They eventually took over smaller forces down country, and thus acquired in less important operations, the necessary local colour. The great march of Sir Hugh Rose was now in progress, and the Kalpi gathering would be subjected to pressure from that quarter.²

Outram and the Rebel Forces

We have seen how Outram, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh was left in the Alambagh a few miles south of the city in observation. As Oudh now claimed with some show of truth to be an Eastern Government with huge forces at its disposal, Outram's position in the air was an extraordinary one. He held it from the end of November 1857 till the end of February 1858 during which he was attacked in strength six times. His force

¹ Lord Roberts has recorded that in his opinion Lord Canning was absolutely right. Sir Colin had not realized that the hot weather was near, and that Lucknow must be tackled before it commenced.

² *Vide* the next chapter.

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consisted of some 4,400 men and 27 guns of whom 2,000 were needed to hold the Alambagh itself, the remainder being echeloned in rear in camps covered by canals and swamp. Though he received drafts regularly and his road to Cawnpore was generally open, his drafts but covered his casualties. The second attack which took place on January 12th was made by 30,000 men and was of a very serious nature though repulsed by the heavy and rapid fire of artillery which the British gunners brought to bear. A fourth, led by the Moulvi, established itself and held on for some time in close proximity to the British. By the time the fifth attack on February 21st had been made, Outram had been reinforced with cavalry and was able to fall on the enemy's outer flanks with effect. The sixth attack made on February 25th was strongest of all, and fiercely developed, but still more reinforcements had arrived and Outram was able to attack his attackers in rear. The story of this prolonged holding of this strange outpost is one that has had little written of it, yet many officers and men were involved.

Outram had hoped that he would be able to exercise influence on many of the Oudh notables from his proximity, but matters had not yet gone far enough for that, so big a head had the rebellion made, and so doubtful was the issue.

From the time of the disaster of Chinhat, the Moslem Oudh throne had been nominally resuscitated by the rebels, though that could not have appealed except by precedent and tradition to the Hindu portion of the talukhdars and landowners who were greatly in excess in the province, while the people themselves were almost all Hindu.

The rebel forces now numbered 120,000 men. These included 37 regular battalions of the Bengal Army, 26 cavalry corps regular and irregular, 106 irregular corps, and contingent units, 14 newly re-raised Nawabi corps, and an immense number of talukhdars' retainers. The sepoy units were of course under establishment, both from furlough, casualties and desertion, and the strength per regular battalion were not perhaps more than 500 men, though on the other hand many

pensioners in Oudh had rejoined their old corps. It is noticeable that even after Lucknow had fallen there were very few leaders from among the Hindu folk. The talukhdars with a few exceptions were not at the head of their own men and it was the Moslem leaders of the old Oudh régime that gave coherence to the rebellion.

The Big Campaign in Oudh

By February the forces were assembled to carry out the reconquest of Oudh, and what is more, sufficient bullock and camel transport was ready, and sufficient ammunition for the large siege train, without which it would be impossible to face the heavily armed and much developed defences of Lucknow. From the west Sir Hugh Rose was bringing a strong force across Central India to Oudh to cope with Tantia Topi and thus protect Cawnpore.

The campaign itself was not to enhance Sir Colin's reputation, but in fact it was very doubtful if there was a staff in India sufficiently trained to handle successfully operations of the size now in progress on one line. The force with which the Commander-in-Chief was now going to enter Oudh was the largest that the British had ever had in the field on one line since Waterloo, and it was cursed and hampered by the old Mogul system of supply and transport, and the incompetence of the Indian authorities to see that scales of baggage were moderate and adhered to. The Mogul system, akin to '*le système D*' of French satire, consisted in every unit providing for itself, with a horde of private transport, which so long as it conformed to the orders of the chief baggage master might be almost of any size. Countless followers with their families, sutlers and artisans followed the army too. The army bazaar contained almost anything that man could need and was laid out each day on a well-known plan. In Lord Lake's armies half a century earlier, only the outposts drew rations. Every one else was fed and their gear repaired in the marching bazaars. The armies of those days destroyed the countryside like a

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flock of locusts and any control over sanitation was impossible. The attempt to enter barren Afghanistan on the same lines was largely responsible for the failures that occurred. Sir Colin's army resembled the great 'mother' columns of the South African War magnified a hundredfold, and, while perhaps unavoidable till Lucknow was taken, the system as continued, made the columns a laughing stock to the younger soldiers and leaders who wanted to move fast and hit hard, and a source of great embarrassment.

The contingents to weave into this army of re-conquest were the forces brought back from Lucknow, those left with Outram in the Alambagh, additional troops from the Punjab and reinforcements from Calcutta, a force under General Franks assembling east of Benares with which were some Nepal troops, a Nepalese Contingent coming down under Jang Bahadur and the siege train equipped from Delhi and Agra.

The plan adopted followed instructions from Lord Canning who wished the rebels to take to the open and there be manœuvred against. Lucknow was to be attacked from the east, to be blockaded from the south, enveloped on the north, i.e. from trans-Gumti and the west was to be left open. Such a plan postulated large forces of mounted and lightly equipped troops, ready to pursue, waiting close to cover. These forces were now taking final shape. For some time Brigadier-General Franks had been operating from Benares in an endeavour to quiet the country between the Gogra and the Himalaya. To him were given the Nepalese troops referred to, and he was to advance up the Gogra and then come to Lucknow via Fyzabad.

At Cawnpore whence the main advance was to be made, there were to be three divisions under Outram, Lugard and Walpole with a cavalry division under Hope Grant, the total British and Nepalese numbering 31,000 of whom the latter contributed 9,000.

This force was made up of seventeen battalions of infantry, 28 squadrons and 134 guns and mortars. The late comers from home who had arrived during the winter were in their scarlet and blue, the Highlanders still wore their feather bonnets, and

the Bays had their brass helmets, no bad shelter from the sun, whose rays the shining metal reflected, as did the bright helmets of the Bengal Horse Artillery also.¹

The troops from Delhi and up-country were in the khaki drill in which they had come down, which was eventually to become the universal fighting dress of the Army.²

Sir Colin stayed at Fatehgarh, where happily the rebels had not damaged the gun-carriage factory, till February 1st while discussing his future plans, mystifying the enemy as to the route by which he would advance on Lucknow, and keeping quiet by his presence the Doab. On the 1st he went to Allahabad to meet the Governor-General who had now taken up his residence there, returning to Cawnpore on the 9th and remaining till his force was complete, a subject for criticism by the press correspondents who now thronged the land, and of some misgivings by the army who wanted to get on with the campaign. 'Hurry no man's cattle' is an Indian saying more suitable to India than anywhere else, but the glorious cold weather of the upper provinces was passing fast.

At last the various component forces were moved across the Ganges and Franks brought across the Gogra, and by March 2nd Sir Colin himself left Cawnpore the divisions moving up to their rendezvous about the Dilkusha between the Alambagh and the Gumti.

The enemy had been convinced, rightly enough, that we would attack the city from the side on which both Havelock and Campbell had appeared before, and had repaired a stupendous position with three lines of defence. The outer line ran along the canal which covered the southern edge of the city and then turned north-east towards the Gumti. The defences stopped at the river, the defenders relying on movable

¹ General Light once told the author that he marched out of Meerut on May 27th, 1857 for Delhi with Tombs' troop of Horse Artillery in brass helmets, dress jackets and white leathers with knee boots. A mile out Tombs halted the troops told his men to get out their jack-knives and rip off the high red collars of their jackets. The quartermaster-sergeant had a fit. Ere long however the whole Delhi force was in khaki-dyed drill.

² But not even in India till after the second Afghan War. *Khaki* - dust coloured was known in the Punjab as 'Multani matti,' or earth.

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forces on the north side of Gumti. The second and third lines included various of the massive buildings which had so hampered the earlier reliefs. The rebels were well supplied with artillery including the resources of the Cawnpore ordnance depot, the variety of calibre presenting far less difficulty in the supply of ammunition than would be the case to-day.

On March 5th the whole force was concentrated including Franks' column which had fought its way across from the Gogra via Fyzabad, save Jang Bahadur's Contingent which had arrived at that river and crossed it on February 25th and was not far off.

The plan of attack had been drawn up for Sir Colin by Colonel Napier, and consisted of an attack on the front between the city and the Gumti by two of the divisions while a force of a division and a cavalry brigade was to be sent to operate across the Gumti, equipped with heavy guns, and thus enfilade the first and second lines of defence and bombard the Kaiserbagh which was the rebel *pièce de résistance*. The Commander-in-Chief now re-arranged somewhat the grouping of his troops, placing Outram in command of the trans-Gumti force consisting of Walpole's division and Hope Grant's headquarters with one brigade of the cavalry division. Lugard's division supported by Franks' was to attack the main position cis-Gumti.¹ On the 6th Outram led his force over the river by two pontoon bridges, cleared out some enemy on his side and advanced to Chinhat, placing his heavy battery in a commanding position on the Kokrail stream.

The Capture of Lucknow

By March 10th Outram's force was sufficiently far forward and his batteries armed, for Sir Colin to loose the main attack, which was opened on the British right by taking the Martinière the rebel advanced post in front of the canal, which was too much affected by Outram's flanking fire to make great

¹ *Vide* Appendix II for order of battle of Sir Colin Campbell's Force at the capture of Lucknow.

resistance. During the night the whole line of the canal defences were carried. Next morning the 11th, Outram pushed forward on the far side of the Gumti to both the Iron and Stone Bridges whence he could enfilade the rebel defence cis-Gumti. Holding these with detachments he sent his troops back to their camp. On the main front, Bank's House near the canal was now carried and there heavy batteries were established to fire on the massive stronghold of the Begam Kothi, while Outram poured shot and shell into the Hazrat Ganj and the Kaiserbagh.

The afternoon of the 11th was well advanced before a breach had been made in a corner of the Begam Kothi, and Adrian Hope's Highland Brigade was ordered to storm the building. It was much as the taking of the Sikandrabadh in the second relief. The 93rd and the 4th Punjab Rifles, the Highlanders leading, made for the breach and forced their way in, and once more proceeded to destroy the defenders who could not get out. More mutinous soldiery here met the fate of mutineers. The famous Hodson, who had accompanied the 93rd, fell shot as he was exploring a dark room in the palace, to which his zeal had brought him, and his loss dimmed and saddened the successes of the day. The Sikandrabadh, the Shaf Najif and the Kaddam Rasul, had also fallen, and the main attack was now up against the short inner line of defences in front of the 32nd Mess-house and the Kaiserbagh which also ran to the Gumti. During the 12th, further advance was made and Outram erected more batteries for the final attack on the main position of the Kaiserbagh. On the 13th, Franks' division relieved Lugard's and as Jang Bahadur's force had now marched in, the piece of front near the river was confided to his Gurkhas who were eager for the fray.

The advance had now become a matter for engineers and heavy guns, the former busily piercing walls and parapets to allow the latter to bear, the great guns with elephant and bullock draft being dragged with difficulty through the streets and gardens covered in fallen masonry, to some point from which they could bear on a defiladed but important point. On the 14th

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the brunt of the storming was carried out by Brazier's Sikhs and the 10th and 90th Foot, the great citadel being steadily approached by sap and alleyway. Before it could be got at it was necessary to capture the Imambara, and Brazier and young Havelock succeeded in penetrating on the Lucknow side the second line of defences. Still pressing on they succeeded also in turning the third line though at times in great danger from a body of several thousand sepoys who were endeavouring to escape from the area nearer the river.

The progress made during the 14th had been far greater than the Commander-in-Chief had expected, and then occurred an incident which undoubtedly prolonged the war and was responsible for the dispersion of the enemy all over Oudh. Outram had asked leave to cross over into the Residency area by the two bridges in his hands before the attackers on the city side had got abreast of him. This would have effectively cut off large masses of the defenders still holding the great buildings. Mansfield had replied on behalf of Sir Colin with the unintelligible instruction 'not if it would cost him a single man,' which Outram apparently accepted as final. With the west side of the city left open and the pursuing forces not sufficient by far out in the field, that reply settled the question as to whether the victory was to be decisive or not. The enemy were free to make off as and when they liked.

It was not intended to go beyond the Imambara, but with the Mess-house, the Moti Mahal and the Tara Kothi in our hands and the enemy on the run, Franks finding himself in possession of a palace overlooking the Kaiserbagh actually forced an entrance. Reinforcements were brought up, and the excited exultant troops poured into the wonderful palace of gold and crystal. The bonds of discipline in excited men could not stand the sight, and for hours the chasing of sepoys alternated with astounding scenes of pillage and destruction. Glass, china, chandeliers were broken for the fun of it, everything that could be broken open in search of plunder, was forced, the frontier and Punjabi soldiery soon showing the simpler Atkins the way to get to work.

But plunder or no plunder, disorder or no, the whole of the rebel holdings with the exception of the Residency area, the Machi Bhawan and a few adjacent sites were now in Sir Colin's hands. Next day, the 15th, was spent in measures to secure them, and Hope Grant's two cavalry brigades were ordered out on the Sitapur and Sandila roads. Outram moved against the Residency leaving Walpole holding the river.

Then occurred the great break-through, largely the result of the order that prevented Outram crossing the river on the 14th. A vast mass of sepoys and other troops in the Residency area, circled round behind the Machi Bhawan, while a smaller force escaped through Walpole's piquets and another tried to get out of the Sikandrabad, with less success. The larger forces crossing higher up and coming round again on the Fyzabad road got clean away, while the cavalry were kicking their heels elsewhere. On the 17th Outram finished his occupation of the various big buildings and defended sites above the Machi Bhawan to find that in front of him in the Musa Bagh west of the city were still some 9,000 enemy. In an endeavour to capture them Campbell's cavalry brigade was sent to block their escape while Outram attacked, but the matter was mishandled by the former, Hope Grant being left helpless with his other brigade far across on the other side of the Gumti where no enemy at this stage could possibly be. Campbell's inadequacy added this 9,000 more to the large numbers escaping into the open, and the great capture of Lucknow was over. The failure to secure or smash so large a portion of the forces was to keep the war on for twelve months more and to cause the loss of 1,000 British lives from sunstroke alone, during the hot weather that was about to begin. On the other hand nothing could have been finer than the work of the assaulting troops British and Indian, nor the efficiency of the engineers and artillery while the actual losses to the rebel army in the defences were heavy, and many a mutinous corps was never heard of in being again.

The Moulvi of Fyzabad held out till the 21st in a strong position within the city, in assaulting which considerable losses

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were incurred, that arch-rebel himself escaping. Hope Grant proceeded with the cavalry to the north-east on the 22nd having severe fighting with a large force of sepoys who showed an admirable front and though severely handled, gave as good as they got.

Sir Colin now established a sufficient force in Lucknow which was a battered wreck of its former gorgeous self, and from which the citizens had fled save a few scavengers and marauders. The remainder of the force was broken up into various parties to proceed with the campaign of pacification, some indeed to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose whose dramatic campaign must now be described.

Before quitting Lucknow it is however important to realize the long time involved in the successive operations connected with the Reliefs and capture. Thus:

Havelock's first attempt at relief, July 25 - Aug. 13th, 1857.

Havelock's long wait for reinforcements, Aug. 14th - Sept. 20th.

Havelock and Outram reinforce Lucknow, Sept. 27th.

The wait for reinforcements, Sept. 28th to Nov. 12th.

Colin Campbell relieves Lucknow and evacuates the Residency area, Nov. 19th.

Colin Campbell recaptures Lucknow, March 15-21st, 1858.

CHAPTER XI

THE PRESIDENCIES AND CENTRAL INDIA

Events in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies – Central India – Indore and Mhow – Sir Hugh Rose – The commencement of the Central India campaign – Jhansi – Kunch and Kalpi – Gwalior

Events in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies

THE tempest surging in the Bengal Presidency and Territories served by the Bengal Army, had naturally some repercussions in Bombay and Madras. But the armies of these presidencies largely organized on a different system and recruited from races different from the swollen legions of Bengal, did not re-act to the same causes. In proof of the contention that the rebellion was primarily a military one it will be observed that where the army did not set an example of ill doing, the countryside remained peaceful enough. It was said and possibly with some truth, that the system whereby the Madras regiments kept their families in their lines, and the lines thereby were a military village, conduced to the steadiness of the men. This possible advantage did to some extent counter the obvious military objections to the arrangement. The men while content enough to leave their families in lines to Government care, when on active service would be reluctant to bring trouble to their homes by a cantonment mutiny. Therefore, though emissaries from Hindustan were not absent, and the corps with Moslems in their ranks were to some extent interested, there were few untoward signs in the old 'Coast Army,' while some Madras units actually served with Sir Colin Campbell's forces.

In Bombay the anxiety was greater because Bombay troops were more in touch with those of Bengal, and at Nasirabad

a Bombay cavalry corps was somewhat tainted by contact, moreover the Bombay officers were attracted by the martial appearance of the Oudh men and inclined to enlist them in that army. Further in the Bombay Army the fighting efficiency of the units was much improved by the system of selection, which governed the promotion of the native officers, with the result that they were younger and more efficient than their seniority-bred compeers of the Bengal Army, and much more likely to throw up efficient leaders of mutineers. Happily in most cases conditions prevailing and the precautions taken sufficed, although at some stations notably in Bombay itself, where the energies of Mr. Forgett of the Bombay police unearthed and countered widespread machinations, mutinous plans were in progress. An exception must be made in the southern Maratha country,¹ not long recovered from a prolonged and serious campaign (1844) against rebellious and discontented Marathas. Here both mutiny and rebellion occurred, satisfactorily countered and eventually settled by operations under the famous Brigadier John Jacob of Sind. The principal anxiety in the Dekkan was the policy and behaviour not only of the Nizam of Hyderabad but of the crack Hyderabad Contingent, officered by officers of the Company's Army. There had been mutiny and ill conduct in one of the cavalry corps a few years before when the brigadier, the distinguished Colin MacKenzie was cut down.² The rank and file of this contingent were even more in touch with Hindustan than the Bombay Army and indeed enlisted some of the Oudh men. The Nizam of Hyderabad however, had a long record of alliance and confidence with the British; almost our earliest ally, from the days of the great *coup d'état* which disbanded his French contingent, he had never been in serious opposition to Britain, a standing example to this day to the advantages of treaties that are abided by. Descended from the mighty Asaf Jah the Mogul king-maker, a restored dynasty of Timur was not likely to appeal to him, and guided by the wise Salar Jang, his minister, his influence was thrown into the scales, and the

¹ The seat of rebellion in 1930.

² *Vide* note at end of chapter.

Hyderabad Contingent took a memorable part in the suppression of what in Central India was more of a rebellion than a mutiny.

At Hyderabad however and also at Poona, the Wahabi and other fanatical Moslems gave trouble. At the former place always a refuge of a fanatical Moslem group as well as of Afghans, and also frequented by Arab mercenaries, all the good offices of the Nizam and his ministers were threatened with failure by a rush of fanatics to attack the Residency. Fortunately a native troop of the Madras Horse Artillery had been posted there, and opened with its guns, blowing away thereby all desire to revolt.

Central India

While the main result of the disaffection of the Bengal Army was working itself out along the line of the Ganges and the Jumna, and the concentration of Sir Colin's army from the United Kingdom was being organized on the great rivers of Bengal, a special and difficult campaign of another type was being prepared from the Bombay side. Where the cantonments of the Bengal Army extended, there the leaven of revolt was at work, and there it was able to influence all who were disaffected or restless. If the line Delhi to Allahabad be taken as a base, a distance of some 500 miles, and an equilateral triangle be described on it, the apex will lie about Indore the capital of the chief who is known by the Maratha cognomen of Holkar, the descendant of the moss trooper of the village of Hol, who carved for himself a kingdom. Within this triangle lay most of the country of Central India disturbed by the epidemic on the Ganges. It included the southern states of Rajputana and the mass of territories ruled by Indian chiefs known as Malwa, containing those of Holkar, of Sindia Maharajah of Gwalior, of the Begum of Bhopal, and many another, some Hindu some Moslem. Malwa itself lies principally between the rivers Chambal and Narbada, the former a tributary

of the Jumna, which it joins some eighty miles below Agra, while the latter runs in the opposite direction to the Indian Ocean. North of the latter river lies the administered districts of Bundelkhand, jutting out into the chief's territories from the Jumna. Malwa is fringed on the south by a series of cantonments, Jubbulpore, Saugor and Nagod, while on the north within the Rajputana agency lay the cantonments of Nimach and Nasirabad and far away on the apex of the triangle described, that of Mhow close to Indore. All the regular troops were of the Bengal Army, while there were a few local and irregular corps. The only Europeans were a company of artillery with horsed draft at Mhow. It has already been related how the Nimach and the Nasirabad brigades revolted and were swept into the Delhi vortex, the former to gain a reputation for good soldiering but to be destroyed by Nicholson at Najafghar. Between the Chambal and the Narbada ran another river the Betwa, famous in the annals of the retributory campaign in Central India, which like the Chambal joined the Ganges not far from Kalpi. On the Betwa is Jhansi, the small Maratha state annexed by Lord Dalhousie by right of lapse, where the peculiarly cruel massacres, already described, were carried out by the mutineers at the instance of the ex-Rani of Jhansi. Several garrisons in this territory were furnished by the Gwalior Contingent whose main body mutinied at Morar and Sipri as already related, the outlying corps being equally unreliable.

Indore and Mhow

The Bengal troops in the somewhat isolated cantonments in Malwa and the Narbada Territories, were late in yielding to the prevailing disease.

The first incidents of mutiny in the apex of this triangle, far from Delhi, appeared at Indore. There Colonel Marion Durand who was much distinguished in the First Afghan War, first as one of the young sapper officers who had blown in the gate of Ghazni and secondly as one of the more effective

political officers, was officiating as Agent to the Governor-General, in place of Sir Robert Hamilton, who was absent on furlough. It was peculiarly unfortunate that at a crisis such as that of 1857 a powerful chief should not have had at his elbow as representing the Supreme Government, a man whom he knew and liked. Confidence in such cases is bred of mutual acquaintance and friendship of long standing. Colonel Durand was a newcomer and the equation of each was unfamiliar one to another. The conduct and attitude of Holkar was a matter of considerable controversy and much was written thereon. Loyal or not at heart, he was unable to control his contingent and followers.

Colonel Durand was concerned not only with preserving the situation in his agency but with cutting off any tide of rebellion which might threaten the Bombay districts. It was known to him that the troops of the state, some of whom were Maratha, were hostile and he had summoned to his support the troops of the friendly Moslem state of Bhopal, and also the local Bhil Corps. At Mhow the 23rd Bengal Infantry were known to be uncertain. Four weeks after the outbreak of the Mutiny a force under Major-General Woodburn, commanding the Poona Division had marched out of Poona with the 14th Hussars lately back from Persia, the 25th Bombay N.I., Woolcombe's European field battery and a pontoon train, for Ahmadnagar en route to Malwa, and on this force Colonel Durand had counted to restore confidence in Malwa. Woodburn on his arrival at Ahmadnagar however, was not only met by demands for assistance from many quarters but the 1st Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent who were to have joined him, were in open mutiny at their cantonment of Aurangabad. This compelled him to turn aside to drive out the corps from Aurangabad, and Durand had to depend on his own resources.

On July 1st Holkar's troops attacked the Residency at Indore, Holkar sending word that he was powerless in the hands of his followers. The Bhil and Bhopal troops cowed by the mutineers would not act effectively, and Durand bombarded by Holkar's cannon was obliged to leave his indefensible site before

Hungerford's battery which he had summoned from Mhow and which was marching post haste, could arrive.

Taking the loyal but dumb-cowed troops with him, Durand withdrew as many families¹ as could be collected, and his officers, towards Mandleshwar where he hoped to join Woodburn. As the Bhopal troops would only go to Bhopal, thither Durand took his charges, eventually joining Woodburn's column, now commanded by Brigadier Stuart, at the fortress of Asirgarh. The subsequent events are not always easy to follow, for the two columns which eventually moved into Central India were each commanded by a brigadier of this name, Stuart of the Bombay Army and Steuart of the 14th Light Dragoon respectively. At Mhow the 23rd and a wing of the 1st Bengal Light Cavalry, broke into mutiny on July 1st, killing their colonel and several officers. Prevented by Hungerford from doing more harm, they vanished into the district, while Hungerford occupied the fort as a place of refuge for all Europeans and Christians. As Durand had disappeared the resourceful Hungerford assumed, so far as local effort went, the roll of Agent.² The 52nd at Jubbulpore did not mutiny till September 18th, and the famous loyal and model 50th at Nagod also stood staunch, like the 52nd, till after the fall of Delhi, when presumably the herd instinct took them off, without however destroying their officers. The 52nd was attacked by the Madras troops of the Kampti garrison and suffered considerable loss, establishing themselves in a hill fort. The 50th joined the Nawab of Banda who had rebelled.

The revolt in this part of India now tended to centre in the hands of Prince Feroz Shah of the Delhi family who showed more force of character than his decadent relatives at Delhi itself. The rebels in arms were now proving to be forces and contingents of the smaller chiefs, among whom were a number of Arab and Mokrani mercenaries, a class from time immemorial

¹ Over 20 souls chiefly Eurasian were massacred.

² This gave offence to Durand, but Hungerford was a man of character and action, and his conduct as the only effective authority on the spot was entirely correct and commendable.

accustomed to serve with the Malwa chiefs and usually known as *Willayat*is or foreigners (or more literally provincials). They were also a prominent feature at the time of the Pindari Wars (1817-19).

The mutinous troops beside the Gwalior Contingents corps, in this theatre were as follows:

- 1st Light Cavalry (wing) from Mhow.
- 3rd Irregular Cavalry from Saugor.
- 14th Irregular Cavalry from Jhansi and Nowgong.
- 12th N.I. from Jhansi and Nowgong.
- 23rd N.I. from Mhow.
- 42nd N.I. from Saugor.
- 50th N.I. from Nagod.
- 52nd N.I. from Jubbulpore.

Sir Hugh Rose

As events took definite shape, it was necessary to put a bigger force in the field than Brigadier Stuart's Poona column, and it was originally proposed that Brigadier John Jacob should have the command of the retributory force. Events in Persia, the result of the urgent recall of Outram to Calcutta delayed him, and it was arranged with Sir Henry Somerset the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay that Major-General Sir Hugh Rose who had arrived at Bombay to take over the Poona Division on September 19th should take command. It was some time, however, before the necessary troops and transport could be collected, nor was it possible to undertake serious operations in black cotton soil and with the rivers of Central India swollen, till the rainy season was over. Colonel Durand therefore as representing Government was concerned till the rains were over, in conjunction with Brigadier Stuart, in keeping and maintaining the position in the highlands of Mhow and in quieting Malwa. Asirgarh the impregnable mountain fortress threatened by a rebel regiment had been secured by the activities of a Bhil Corps and two young British officers, before Woodburn's column could get there, and now acted as a base from which on July 24th a start was made for the relief of Hungerford

in Mhow. At Simrole, the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry joined the column, and by August 2nd Mhow was reached where a wing of the 86th Foot from Malegaon in Khandesh joined the force. Until the rain ceased, the force could do little more than watch the rebels at Indore, and as soon as the fine weather returned, the rest of the troops destined for the Central Indian Field Force began to assemble, including the 3rd Bombay Fusiliers and the larger part of the Hyderabad Contingent. Fortunately no other corps of this force appeared to have any wish to follow the example of the 1st Cavalry at Aurangabad.

As Sir Hugh Rose was not to come up for some time, being ordered to wait till a force of Madras troops under General Whitlock commanding the troops at Bangalore, was ready to advance from Kampti, Durand and Stuart proceeded to clear up the situation near Mhow and in Malwa and to relieve Nimach. At that station, those who escaped from the mutiny of the Bengal troops had succeeded in securing themselves in the fort with the help of a few loyal troops. En route took place the well known fight at Dhar and subsequent siege and capture of the fort, after which several hill forts were occupied. The rebels were severely handled by the Hyderabad Cavalry on the site of the British victory over Holkar at Mahidpur forty years earlier. Further victories over a large body of *Willayat*is at Mandasor and Goharia opened the way for the relief of Nimach, and then the force circled back to Indore where Hamilton had arrived with Sir Hugh Rose on December 16th and had taken over the reins of the Agency from Durand. This little campaign in Malwa brief though it was soon strengthened any wavering spirits in Rajputana, and steadied men's minds as to the ultimate result.

The Commencement of the Central India Campaign

The famous Central India Campaign was now about to commence; a series of operations that were to end with the siege and capture of Jhansi and the victory of Kalpi on the Jumna over a very large force of insurgents under Tantia Topi. Sir

Hugh Rose's task was no less than an advance across India to the Jumna, and it is a story which has not lost in the telling. It is the usual impression that the campaign was one carried through in ghastly heat and that the commander and his troops were often prostrate and overcome by the climate. As a matter of fact the first portion was a cold weather operation in the pleasant uplands of Central India and it was only at Kalpi and in the days at Jhansi and Gwalior that the exhausting conditions did actually obtain, conditions that were in truth most trying and fatal, and in which astounding exertions were called for. The conditions were worse than in Sir Colin's own hot weather campaign which were bad enough. Nevertheless the somewhat spectacular nature of the march across the Peninsula and the dash of the commander, gaining in contrast with the more precise and less effective combinations of Sir Colin Campbell at which the troops were beginning to chafe, have combined to make Sir Hugh Rose's operations something of a myth. Commanders and troops in those days as in these, indulged in a little human jealousy and pride, and Sir Hugh probably enjoyed greatly the somewhat exaggerated prestige accorded to his operations. Sir Hugh Rose was an officer of varied military and diplomatic experience, a noted sportsman and a man of verve and activity, likely to appeal to the spirits of the considerable mounted force with which he was provided, and which was to be augmented by various new levies of horse. These were being raised from loyal remnants of contingents, Rajahs' retainers, and the like, among which were the various regiments which later became the Central India Horse. His operations therefore both from his own character and that of his troops had all the conditions which make for promptness.

His force was now ranged in two brigades, numbered 1 and 2 under Brigadiers Stuart and Steuart respectively, the former as related, assembling at Mhow after its campaign in Malwa, the latter at Sehore in Bhopal.¹

This force was to advance north-west to the Jumna, right

¹To these columns came also a column from the Hyderabad contingent commanded by Major Orr of the Artillery. It was distributed at times among the two columns, at others it worked separately.

across the southern portion of Malwa, the Narbada territories, and Bundelkhand, clearing up all trouble en route, relieve beleaguered garrisons and places of refuge, capture Jhansi and dispose of the increasing nest of mutineers at Kalpi, who had so impeded Havelock and Colin Campbell. The force was constituted as follows:

Stuart's Brigade (No. 1):

14th Light Dragoons.
3rd Hyderabad Cavalry.
H.M. 86th Foot.
25th Bombay Infantry.
3rd Hyderabad Infantry (wing).
Three field batteries.¹

Steuart's Brigade (No. 2):

3rd Light Dragoons.
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Hyderabad Cavalry (part of 1st and 2nd).
24th Bombay Infantry.
5th Hyderabad Infantry (wing).
Three field batteries.¹

The 1st Brigade was not all assembled till February 8th when it started forth on the Agra road clearing the country as far as Guna, while the 2nd Brigade when ready would march parallel to but south-east of it.

Sir Hugh Rose himself joined the 2nd Brigade which had been waiting for the siege train, in the middle of January, and proceeded to the relief of Saugor Fort, where Brigadier Sage with a few European gunners supported by the loyal 31st Bengal Native Infantry had held the fort for many months, isolated from the outer world, but happily a place of refuge for all in danger for many miles round.

The march to Saugor was difficult enough over swollen streams and through rough hill roads, and the wisdom of bringing, despite the labour involved, a pontoon train for the rivers, and a battering train for the forts, was evident enough.

¹ The Artillery of these two columns consisted of Bombay Artillery, Royal Artillery and the Hyderabad Contingent Artillery.

The first fort of importance since Brigadier Stuart's force had reduced Dhar was the strong hill fort of Rahatgarh, which in the hands of mutinous troops and insurgent Bandelas and *Rajwara*¹ men was threatening the whole countryside. Rahatgarh stood on a rocky hill its slopes grown with thick and impenetrable jungles and broken by ravines which made complete investment impossible. An attempt to relieve it from outside was driven off, and then the garrison tried to effect its escape by a sortie before Sir Hugh Rose's artillery had battered a practicable breach and this too failed, but that night the threatened defenders succeeded in slipping out over a bastion and away by a jungle clad ravine. The force then marched on to Saugor unmolested, where they arrived on February 3rd to find the defenders and their charges in good heart, but dull. From Saugor it was necessary to make another diversion to take the vast and strong hill fort of Garhakota, whence rebels and mutineers were terrorizing the countryside.

As at Rahatgarh the vigour of the bombardment and threat of assault were too much for the garrison, who slipped out and dispersed.

Sir Hugh Rose was then fain to halt, for the summer was coming, and he wanted to equip his troops with loose cotton clothing and head protection, which would make it possible for them to endure the approaching heat in the open.

Before him on the road to Jhansi lay a strong line of hills, held by the 50th and various rebel chiefs and Bandelas, and before advancing Rose sent for Stuart's column to come up to his support and attack Chanderi. Starting on February 27th, and manœuvring through the passes, Rose successfully dealt with these rebels, while Stuart attacked Chanderi, and by March 17th, Rose with Stuart's column was on the Betwa.

Jhansi

The whole of Malwa and the Narbada territories had been crossed with pontoon and siege train, and Jhansi was actually in

¹ Rajwara=Retainers of local Rajahs.

sight. But the uplands of Central India were now things of the past and the approaching hot weather, at its fiercest in Jhansi, was drawing nigh; a windless day, and the heat even now would be terrific. Nevertheless four days after crossing the Betwa, Rose appeared before Jhansi, every man animated with a fierce desire to get to grips with those who had so ruthlessly done to death the Christians, men, women and children who had surrendered on the good faith of the Rani and her promises. While his troops rested by the road side, Sir Hugh Rose carried out a searching reconnaissance of the city in person, and forthwith decided that it must be completely invested if the enemy were not to slip from his hand as at Rahatgarh and Garhakota. This was carried out at once by Steuart, and the same night the mounted troops from No. 1 Brigade marched in, to be followed on the 25th, by their infantry. Within the city was the Rani herself and most of the Bundelkhand mutineers from Jhansi and Nowgong, said to number 11,000 men. She had serious qualms as to the wisdom of resisting, and spoke of throwing herself on British mercy, but the harder spirits prevailed and would stand a siege.

The Madras Column under General Whitlock which was supposed to advance on Rose's right from Jubbulpore, had made poor progress, and indeed was still at the latter place on February 6th, whence it advanced in leisurely fashion to Damoh and Saugor, where it still was, when Rose having taken Chanderi, was on the Betwa. It was thus too late to assist in the siege of Jhansi, but received peremptory orders from the Governor-General to carry out its instructions, advance towards Banda and co-operate with Sir Hugh.

Without the aid which it had been intended that Whitlock should give, Rose with his two brigades set about the taking of Jhansi, beginning the siege batteries on the 22nd, and commencing battering as soon as the first was completed and armed.

The city of Jhansi consisted of a citadel on a rocky hill, abutting on the city itself, which was also surrounded with massive stone walls and bastions in many parts thirty feet

high and more. Outside, a line of mounds served the purposes of the attackers while a large lake assisted in closing the investing lines.

Before the breaches were ready for the stormer, came news that Tantia Topi with 2,200 men of the Gwalior Contingent, and the Kalpi collection of mutineers, was advancing to raise the siege and was crossing the Betwa to the east. Sir Hugh Rose determined to advance against him with such force as he could spare from the investment, and drive him over the Betwa forthwith. It was on the story of this struggle in terrible heat and those to follow that the general belief in the trials of the whole campaign are founded. The battle now to be fought is famous for its disparity in numbers, the determination of the British, who all told were but 1,500 men, and the prostration from which the Europeans suffered while beating the enemy, even Sir Hugh and all his staff at one time being out of action from this cause.

The first intimation that Tantia Topi was across the Betwa was carried to the garrison as well as the besiegers, by the sight of a huge beacon fire ablaze on one of the hill tops between the city and the Betwa, at which the besieged raised mighty cheers. Sir Hugh's outposts also reported the same, and that general, who was in one of the siege batteries at the time, hurried off to send out Stuart's Brigade, which as yet he had not taken into action. Soon after sunset this brigade moved out to attack the right flank of what was believed to be the main rebel force but was in reality a detached party. The 2nd Brigade remained under arms in the camp and batteries, while all the night long yells and taunts were hurled from the walls. Tantia Topi had now occupied the hills between the city and the Betwa, and at half-past four in the morning drove in the British piquets and advanced on the 2nd Brigade. Sir Hugh who remained as yet with Steuart, at once moved out his horse artillery and a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, which charged the enemy's right, leading another squadron himself to attack their left. Both the hostile flanks gave way and then the British infantry who had been lying down, sprung to their feet, fired a volley

and moved forward with the bayonet. The whole of the Maratha's first line broke and fled, on to its second line. As they did so his detached force was driven in on to his right flank by the attack of the 1st Brigade. Tantia Topi saw that all was over and that he must get away as best he could.

That best included firing the jungle on the hill tops, and under the screen getting across the Betwa, leaving all his guns to the number of 28 in British hands. The cavalry actually crossed the river in the pursuit and cut up many, not returning to camp till dark.

That was the battle as distinct from the siege of Jhansi, a brilliant episode which sealed the fate of the city. During this diversion the heavy batteries had not relaxed their fire, and the great granite blocks from the bastions steadily rolled into the ditch beneath the pounding. The next day the main breach was reported just practicable, and Rose decided to try the issue at dawn. Two storming columns were detailed, the right column to escalate at two points on the walls, the left one to storm the great breach and to scale a bastion on the left. At three in the morning the storming columns marched to their rendezvous in a brilliant moonlight. In spite of the fact that some of the scaling ladders broke and others were too short, all the columns ere long were inside, the left columns leading, and face to face with a huge crowd of mutineer troops and irregular rebels, the former knowing too well that they fought with a halter round their necks. Long and fierce was the struggle, the Bombay Fusiliers and the County Down's¹ giving no quarter and expecting none, for the Cawnpore story was on their lips and in their minds. For several days the struggle in the city went on, and the last party was not destroyed or driven forth till April 6th. On the 4th, the Rani herself had slipped away and ridden for Kalpi.

Kunch and Kalpi

The first part of Sir Hugh Rose's task was now over with blood-stained Jhansi taken and punished. But the second part,

¹ The familiar name of the 86th.

the destruction of the rebel nest at Kalpi, was yet to do. The last stages of the advance, the battle with Tantia and the rigours of the siege were now producing their aftermath. The number of exhausted men was very great, and Sir Hugh had to wait for three weeks, resting and re-fitting. A brigade however, was now coming down from Rajputana to secure Jhansi, while he had sent out his cavalry to the fords of the Betwa, to prevent the Jhansi mutineers breaking away to the south. It was not till April 25th with the hot weather almost at its height, that Sir Hugh could advance on Kalpi, which he did with the major portion of both his sadly attenuated brigades. On May 1st he came up with his screen at Kunch commanded by Herbert Gall of the 14th. There he learnt that Tantia Topi with several chiefs and their retainers, 500 *Willayatis* under the Rani herself, as well as some mutineers, were at Kunch a town forty miles from Kalpi. Leaving the road some miles from Kunch Sir Hugh led his weary men a march of fourteen miles that placed them on the enemy's right opposite an undefended face of the town. While the men breakfasted the artillery opened on the rebels who fell back into the town. The 1st Brigade attacked, and the rebels losing their nerve fell back across the open plain on the Kalpi road. The infantry could follow no further but the cavalry managed to get up a charge which the enemy could barely resist, so overcome were both sides. The state of the victorious troops was terrible the men, overcome by the heat, which is a different matter from ordinary sunstroke, were a terrible sight as the doolies streamed into the field hospitals with their burdens of both European and Indians in a state of fierce delirium.¹

But exhausted as were all concerned from the commander downwards, Kalpi still remained as a rallying place and a nest of disturbance, which must be cleared out if Sir Colin Campbell's campaign in Oudh was to proceed without this continual threat to his base and communications. Whitlock's late start had

¹ This state of affairs, happily seldom seen, occurred also during one of General Maude's summer campaigns north of Bagdad. Doctors were aghast and nurses terror-stricken at the scenes they had to handle.

rendered his movements further south of little use to Sir Hugh. It was not till March 22nd that he actually got under weigh from Damoh close to Saugor and moved slowly in the direction of Banda to assist the loyal chiefs in Bundelkhand. By April 19th, when Sir Hugh was setting forth to Kunch, Whitlock's force appeared before Banda where the Nawab with some 9,000 men was posted behind a series of broken ravines. It was not till six or seven hours' fighting had ensued that the position was carried and Banda occupied. Whitlock then sat himself down to await reinforcements, which did not arrive till May 27th, so that avoidably or otherwise Sir Hugh Rose had to finish his task without any help from the Banda direction, but with the Banda rebels now joined to the Kalpi gathering to increase his troubles.

His task however had it not been for a quite unexpected move on the part of the rebel gathering would have been over very soon. The flying enemy from Kunch were full of recriminations one with another, and the resistance to be expected at Kalpi despite its strong position and defensible walls, its lofty fort and its tangled ravines on the Jumna bank, was not to be seriously apprehended. Tantia himself had made off to his home, and was much abused by his following for his pains. On the news that Sir Hugh was approaching Kalpi, they took to their heels again, but the Nawab of Banda now marched in with his own forces and a considerable body of mutineer cavalry. The Rao Sahib a nephew of the Nana's was still there, and the Rani of Jhansi as well. These with the Nawab's troops now set about so vigorous a show of defence that the fugitives returned, and when the British force appeared in sight there was every prospect of some severe fighting despite the heat.

The Central India Field Force had at last come within reach of the Commander-in-Chief's resources and operations, and Sir Colin detached a force under Colonel Maxwell to assist it. As the road between Kunch and Kalpi was now held by a strong force in an entrenched position, Sir Hugh struck off to the right to Golauli, a move which turned five prepared lines of

defence and practically effected a junction with Colonel Maxwell's force and, through him, with the Commander-in-Chief. The troops reached Golauli on May 15th terribly exhausted. Five times had Sir Hugh himself collapsed in the heat, and was only kept going by severe administration of drugs and remedies. It is said that the rebel commander well aware of the state the British were in, issued orders that they were never to be attacked before ten in the morning when the sun was high in the heavens; but this was a two-edged measure, since the Indians feel the actual heat as much as, and the concomitant languor even more than, the men of western blood. They harassed Sir Hugh's forces in a desultory manner for four days, while his main body rested. On the opposite bank of the Jumna, Maxwell was getting his guns into position from whence he could batter the fort and enfilade some of the defences of Kalpi.

The British position now rested with its right on the Jumna its left on the Kalpi road, facing a tangled mass of ravines held by the enemy. It was these ravines that Sir Hugh would attack, and he had already been strengthened by some of Maxwell's troops. But the enemy were about to forestall him, for on the 21st at 10 a.m. a large force appeared on the Kalpi road as if to attack the British left. On the front in the ravines all was quiet. Into them Sir Hugh sent a reconnaissance, and as he did so a wild rush came out of the ravines in front of his right, as guns and musketry opened to support a charge of fanatics, drugged and primed, supported by the grenadiers of the Gwalior Contingent, their bayonets at the charge. The swordsmen got into Stuart's guns and there was some danger of the artillery being smothered. Then the General himself brought up Maxwell's camel corps, dismounted them and led them to the counter-attack. This restored the situation, and the British who had held off the attack on the right, now drove the enemy back through the ravines and advanced on Kalpi. That was the end of it. The town and fort were carried and nothing to be found therein but corpses. Outside, Gall of the 14th, with the cavalry and horse artillery was pursuing the scattering rebels and inflicting considerable loss.

The capture of Kalpi was the apparent end of Tantia Topi's force, and the wasps' nest on the Jumna was broken up once and for all. Sir Hugh now only anxious for rest to recover, gave the orders for breaking up his force in accordance with instructions already received from the Commander-in-Chief.

Gwalior

Then occurred a most unexpected happening, the news of which caused surprise and a sensation, which has been described as second only to the outbreak of the Mutiny itself. It has been related how Gwalior territory, the state of the Maharajah Sindia the Patel, as his own folk call him, had been upset by the mutiny of the greater part of the grand Contingent that was looked on almost as the flower of the Bengal Army. Sindia himself after using his best endeavours to keep them faithful, men however not his subjects and whose families were outside the effect of his displeasure, did succeed in keeping the Contingent quiet in Gwalior for many weeks after they had shot and driven out their officers, thus preventing their joining the mutineers at Delhi, Cawnpore or Lucknow. Curiously enough it was not till after the fall of Delhi that they listened to the summons to join Tantia Topi at Kalpi and broke away from the restraining influence of Sindia and his minister Dinker Rao. Sindia was glad for his own sake, to have seen the last of them, and had it not been for the influence of Major MacPherson his Resident, now a refugee at Gwalior, he would gladly have seen them depart earlier. Without their disturbing influence, Sindia was able to rule his state, and the sudden turn that events were to take at the end of May 1858, came as much of a surprise and shock to him as to the British.

Driven out of Kalpi the Rani and the Rao Sahib had fled to Gopalpur, a town some 46 miles south-west of Gwalior. There they were joined by Tantia Topi. They then formed, possibly at the Rani's suggestion, the amazing plan of moving on to Gwalior, seizing Sindia and compelling him to join them, and subverting his troops; thence they would endeavour to rouse

the fervour of the Maratha race by raising the great Bhagwan Jhanda of Marathadom and proclaiming the Peishwa.¹ Those who know the history of the Marathas and how the confederacy was with difficulty brought within the British fold will realize the danger inherent in such a move and how, when the news filtered through India, the Governor-General as well as the military heads realized how serious was the position.

On May 30th Tantia Topi and his two coadjutors arrived before Gwalior with the remnant of their forces, now somewhat recovered from their defeat.

On June 1st Sindia led out his state forces, which were, be it remembered, quite distinct from the Contingent, many of whom were with Tantia Topi, to meet them. But the pass was sold. Before his guns had fired more than a round, they were captured and his whole force, save only his bodyguard, went over to the rebel forces. Sindia himself with the bodyguard, escaped to Agra.

Tantia Topi occupied Gwalior, seized the Treasury, occupied the great fortress and proclaimed the Nana as Peishwa, a Peishwa whose whereabouts were however, unknown.

The first inkling of the rebel intentions was brought to Sir Hugh by Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson, commanding a force that was searching for the fugitives, who reported they had taken the road to Gwalior. To Sir Robert Hamilton who was still with Sir Hugh Rose, the report seemed most improbable, but true enough it turned out to be, and the situation needed the promptest handling. Stuart was despatched at once to reinforce Robertson. The heat was now at its zenith as the date for the annual bursting of the monsoon drew near. Sir Hugh Rose resumed the command he had laid aside, summoned the garrison of Jhansi to his aid and was informed by the Commander-in-Chief that two forces, one under Brigadier Smith from Rajputana and another under Colonel Ridell would also join him, as well as Colonel Napier from the Oudh force.

¹ The Peishwa, originally the minister of the throne of Sivaji, eventually became head of the Maratha Confederacy. In 1817, the inability of Baji Rao, the then Peishwa, to keep faith, brought about the downfall of his state and office.

The Hyderabad Contingent which had already started for the south turned back of its own accord, as soon as the news of the capture of Gwalior reached their commander. To all his components Rose sent orders to join him. Marching by night from Kalpi his main force, picking up Stuart, appeared on the 16th within five miles of Morar, the cantonment that is five miles from Gwalior itself. The rebels were reported to be in position in front of the cantonment. Misled by a guide the British found themselves in front of a rebel battery, which turned out to be the centre of a line placed among tangled ravines. The British nevertheless attacked forthwith and carried the cantonments while the 14th hung on the rebel heels dealing death. Holding Morar, Sir Hugh now was in possession of the road to Agra. Next morning Brigadier Smith's column with whom was part of the 8th Hussars, brought up from the West to Rajputana, marching from that direction came within hail. This force converging on Gwalior by a defile to the southward, found themselves faced by rebels in position on a line of hills south of the city, through which the road and a deep canal passed. Among them were the cavalry of the Gwalior Contingent still in scarlet, who attempted to charge the deploying column. Repulsed by the infantry the retreating cavalry were charged by the 8th and among the riders slain was no less a person than the Rani of Jhansi, first struck by a carbine bullet and then cut down by a hussar.

Next day, Sir Hugh leaving Brigadier Napier in Morar moved down to join Smith, a march of ten sweltering miles. The rebels still held the hills south of Gwalior and as the British patrols looked out on the morning of June 18th they saw the whole force moving out of Gwalior to the attack. Abandoning his plans for a turning movement Sir Hugh had time to cross the canal and deploy on both sides of the defile. Then the brigades which consisted of European and Bombay Infantry, the 86th and 95th Foot with the 10th and 25th Bombay Infantry leading, carried the line of rocky hills and poured down on to the plain in front of the Lashkar,¹ closely followed

¹ The old name of the military quarters of the city.

by the cavalry eager to close. The rebels were hustled through the streets of the Lashkar, and the cantonments, and driven forth broken and routed, on the Agra road whence they made away across the Chambal and turned for the fastnesses of Rajputana, followed for a while by Brigadier Napier from Morar, who however could not overtake them.

The inclination to criticize the failures to pursue and destroy beaten forces after the first flight from the battlefield is natural enough. In this connection it is not out of place to quote from the great Duke writing from Spain in 1809 for the benefit of the 'gentlemen of England who sit at home at ease.'

'It is obvious that if an army throws away all its cannon equipments and baggage and everything which can strengthen it, and enable it to act together as a body . . . it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same sacrifice.'

That was the end of the great Maratha threat, which might have meant so much, and only one more incident remains to be recorded, one in which the daring spirit of the young British troop leaders is well portrayed. Fortress Gwalior had not yet fallen, and next morning as the troops were wondering whether or no they might expect some rest, the guns in the high battlements opened. Near the lower gate was a detachment of the 25th Bombay Rifles, and Lieutenant Rose asked his companion Lieutenant Waller, if he was prepared to join in an attempt to take the fortress. As Waller was more than willing the two, with a blacksmith at their side and their own men, approached the apparently unguarded outer gate. They broke the lock and entered the gateway unopposed. Above them lay five more, heavily studded and protected with anti-elephant spikes, at intervals along the causeway steps and rock, which gradually ascended to the top of the rock and the embattled cliffs. Gate after gate was unguarded, and five of them were burst open in succession. At last however, the alarm was given, a gun turned on them and a body of fanatics rushed out sword in hand, only to be destroyed, after a sharp struggle as Rose

led his men on. Resistance was over, but the gallant young leader fell mortally wounded, just as the historic stronghold was recovered by his enterprise.

That day Sindia, escorted by hussars and light dragoons, with Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Robert Hamilton, re-entered his capital, to the delight of its more peaceful citizens.

Having completed his unexpected task, Sir Hugh once more gave up his command and his forces were swept into the organization of the main army, while their leader covered with fame, was carried away to seek rest and health, and to enjoy in due season the career which his brilliant and indomitable leading had earned for him. Where energy and endurance receive due regard, there is the name of the Central India Field Force duly honoured and its performances kept green.

Tantia Topi had escaped his pursuers and was now to afford subject for a long and tedious chase by irregular horse, and by many columns through many hills and jungles, a chase in which he twice attempted to raise the Bhagwan Jhanda¹ of the Marathas at Indore, till at last he was caught and brought to trial. His share in the horrors of Cawnpore had put him outside all thought of mercy, and he was finally hung after presenting to posterity an account of his share in the Mutiny, which correct or not, threw great light on all the activities in which he had been concerned.

¹ The Holy Standard.

NOTE - Although it has been said in the text that the Madras Army stood staunch, there was to the great satisfaction of the Bengal Officers, one Madras Regiment, the 8th Lt. Cavalry, which refused to march for Bengal. It was dismounted, and its horses were taken to mount the Europeans of the Military Train, who nearly all ex-cavalry men were turned into a mounted corps.

CHAPTER XII

FINALE ATQUE VALE

The hot weather campaign of 1858 in Oudh – The campaign in Rohilkhand, 1858 – The eastern theatre – The pursuit of Tantia Topi – The smouldering embers – Retrospect – The Crown and the Company – The new Army – Reflections

The Hot Weather Campaign of 1858 in Oudh

BECAUSE Sir Colin Campbell and General Mansfield had between them let the major portion of the rebel force escape from Lucknow, and because again Brigadier Campbell had made such a failure of the cutting off of the mutineers at the Musa Bagh, there was still the devil loose in Oudh, when the mass of our troops should by right have been put under the shelter they had earned. Before the army could settle down to the hot weather, it was necessary to break up the larger combinations which loomed on the horizon. In addition it was necessary to send certain brigades to assist Sir Hugh Rose marching up from the West, to exterminate the Kalpi nest, as already related.

But there was another cause which conduced even more than the above failures to the situation which was to delay the re-conquest of Oudh by another year. As soon as Lucknow was taken, it pleased the Governor-General *without* consulting Outram or Sir Colin to issue a proclamation to the effect that all the land of those in rebellion would be considered forfeited, to be dealt with at the pleasure of the Supreme Government. It was obvious to everyone connected with the situation in Oudh, that such a proclamation must drive all the talukhdars and barons to despair, and obviate any chance of those not guilty of outrage treating for surrender. The chiefs of Oudh,

for the most part genuine rebels against an annexation they disliked, had only gone out at the last, and had done much to victual Sir Henry Lawrence. Few of them had any hand in the attack on the Residency, and it was only after Sir Colin had withdrawn to Cawnpore with the garrison of the Baillie Guard, that the majority of them had sent their retainers to join the forces of the Begum and her son. Few even of them had rallied to the Nawabi in person.

The proclamation was immediately repudiated in Britain, but was repudiated in the wrong way, that bid fair to diminish the Governor-General's prestige at a time when every effort to support it was essential. Lord Ellenborough the President of the Board of Control, was ill-advised enough to send a despatch denouncing the proclamation without the concurrence of the Cabinet or informing Her Majesty. Mr. Disraeli on behalf of Government had openly announced that it would be repudiated. While right in principle, this repudiation was entirely wrong in the method of action, and was blazoned throughout India by telegram. Fortunately the incident did not lead to Lord Canning's resignation and the ill considered proclamation was withdrawn, but not before its mischief had been done, for the forces in the field were both increased in number and sustained in their resolution thereby. These forces actually consisted of four different elements. These were:

1. The mutineer corps of the Army, regular and irregular, still in being.
2. The resuscitated force of the former Oudh throne often referred to as the Begum's troops.
3. The retainers of the various Oudh talukhdars and chiefs.
4. A mass of fanatical Moslem followers of the Moulvi of Fyzabad.

The first two categories had suffered severely, and always had the tendency to melt away. The proclamation that had at last been issued promising amnesty to sepoys, who had not been concerned in the murder of Europeans, still further emphasized this tendency. The Moulvi's force was augmented however, by the persistent roll of the drum ecclesiastic

among Muhammadan populations, and to him came irreconcilables and zealots hunted from other spots. It had become the centre of all Muhammadan activity connected with mutiny or rebellion.

The action of the chiefs' retainers, now swelled by almost all in consequence of the proclamation, was largely concerned in guerilla warfare against detachments and convoys and also in the outbreak of brigandage from which the whole countryside suffered. The various parties forming the enemy in Oudh were inclined to break into separate groups each having a threatening aspect.

The leaders remained much as before. The Begum and her son had taken the field, and there were the Moulvi, Mamu Khan, Jey Lall Singh, the Nana's brother, and officers of the army, who succeeded one another in quick succession, without any obtaining to any great success and prestige. Indeed by this time the zest was out of the enterprise and the gun and the gallows loomed on the horizon. It was for this reason that all the wise heads wanted proclamations to be widely circulated that would prevent despair.

It was against the big gathering described, that the hot weather campaign was necessary as well as against the rebels and mutineers still in Rohilkhand. Before moving against these groups, the Commander-in-Chief was concerned to make a strong fortified centre in Lucknow for the garrison and the administration. A considerable area from the Machi Bhawan to the Residency was thus prepared and a good deal of demolition on the city side carried out to give a field of fire.

By the time this was done the troops had recovered from the stress of the recent fighting, and the organization was straightened out. Rohilkhand however and the trouble in progress near Azamgarh in the eastern theatre between Benares and the Himalaya called for earlier action. Somewhat to the consternation of the Army, Walpole, whose efficiency as a detached leader was suspect, was despatched forthwith to sweep up the left bank of the Ganges. In a fortnight he reached Rhodamow and there burnt his fingers, so that Sir Colin himself found

it necessary to take the field. Near the latter place was the jungle fort of Roya in which was a talukhdar, one Narpatt Singh, with a strong force. The fort which was smaller and more compact than most, was surrounded by a deep ditch and impenetrable bamboo thicket. Apart from the battering by heavy artillery, the obvious mode of attacking such places is by searching for the weaker portions and there forcing entrance. Walpole apparently would listen to no advice, would make no reconnaissance, and would not give his fairly adequate heavy artillery a chance. He ordered the Highland brigade to attack forthwith, which they did, to be repulsed after several most gallant attempts with severe and unnecessary loss. In addition the brigadier, the gallant and distinguished Adrian Hope, spoken of as the 'ideal soldier,' was killed, in putting his brigade at an impossible task. The talukhdar evacuated the fort during the night, and Walpole proceeded on his way. The story of this repulse and losses, much magnified in the telling, echoed through the countryside and revived many dying embers of rebellion. Sir Colin leaving Hope Grant to command in Oudh, now took the field himself. On April 11th, Hope Grant led forth three thousand men to disperse a large gathering under the Moulvi, twenty-five miles to the north-west. The Moulvi himself tried to attack the British flank, but a charge of the 7th Hussars settled that matter. Grant then turned on the Begum's forces in the direction of the Gogra but she fled incontinently, on which the British joined in a sweep with Jang Bahadur's troops who were on their homeward march to Nepal. Returning to Lucknow a heavy threat from the south had now to be met. Here a large force was concentrated some eighteen miles off in the Fyzabad direction, under the alert and enterprising Beni Mahdeo. Hope Grant had a strongish force including about twelve squadrons of British and Indian cavalry. After a night march he surprised the main rebel force, broke it up and inflicted many casualties. The Rajwara or Talukhdari troops fought well, and Hodson's Horse came in for a towelling at their hands, in a gallant attempt to attack their vast numbers.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN
the frontier soldier who came to Delhi



GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT
the Cavalry Commander

The next step took Hope Grant to Sultanpur in the south-west of the province. One Maun Sing a Brahmin talukhdar after sitting on the fence, and even siding with the rebels for a while, decided to come down on the Government side of the fence. He was promptly attacked by his neighbours, in his stronghold at Shahganj. The General marched at once to his assistance, and then proceeded towards Sultanpur on the lower Gumti seventy odd miles south-east of Lucknow, against a large gathering. The enemy numbering many thousands were however on the far side of the river and Hope Grant's force was occupied during August 26th and 27th in crossing the river. On the 28th the rebels themselves opened the ball by assailing the British line, but after a prolonged engagement they were handsomely defeated and dispersed. With this effort the major episodes of the hot weather in Oudh came to an end, though movement was continually in progress to prepare bases of operations and stops in the drive, in readiness for the cold season's work which would be necessary before the country could be in any sense deemed pacified and ready for the restoration of civil and revenue administration.

The Campaign in Rohilkhand 1858

While Hope Grant was dealing with the larger gatherings in Oudh, Sir Colin set about the pacification of Rohilkhand in earnest. The province was full of *mafsids* or rebels. Not only was a considerable force of mutineers from Delhi living there at ease, but several different parties had united with them. The Rohillas or men of Afghan descent under Khan Bahadur Khan, the Nawab of Farrukhabad driven from the Doab by Sir Colin Campbell across the Ganges, and even the Moulvi of Fyzabad himself, had joined the combination. Sir Colin whose ruling vice was now over-precaution and had begun to be known as 'old *Khabardar*' 'Old Be Careful!' was not taking any chances. Four columns were to advance on Bareilly which was the rebel centre. Brigadier Coke of the Frontier Force with a column from Roorkee in the north, General Penny the

Meerut Commander with a force from Budaun, on the west, and the Commander-in-Chief himself with Walpole's force from Fatehgarh, which had been almost mutinous at the burial of Adrian Hope and the hundred Highlanders killed at Roya.

Crossing the Ganges and the Ramganga Sir Colin who had left Lucknow on April 17th, reached Shahjahanpur unmolested in the beginning of June. A day or two before however, came news that General Penny, who was accounted as a careful soldier, had fallen in a night skirmish, his horse having carried him among rebels, after a sudden outburst of fire in the dark, in which several officers and men were killed and wounded, from an ambuscade, into which he had marched. On May 3rd, Penny's column now commanded by Jones of the Carabiniers marched in, consisting chiefly of Delhi troops with detachments of Beloochis, Multani Horse and the 64th Foot, with a dozen guns. Sir Colin had found no one at Shahjahanpur and had left a small force in the fortified gaol. Reports now placed the rebels at Bareilly, with 30,000 foot, 6,000 horse and 40 guns, who were said to be posted athwart Sir Colin's line of march, reinforced by rebels who had fled from Brigadier Jones of the 60th Rifles, temporarily in command of the Roorkee Column vice Coke. Early on May 5th the Commander-in-Chief set his force of 8,000 men and 19 guns in motion and deployed against the ruined cantonment which was held by the enemy and which the Chief owing to faulty information, thought was the city where most of the rebels were said to be. There was some not very decisive fighting in intense heat, and a considerable force of rebel cavalry succeeded in charging into the immense hordes of baggage animals and camp followers, causing considerable loss. A force of Ghazis had also flung themselves on the bayonets of the 42nd and had been repulsed after hand to hand fighting. Next day the rebel army had gone, but the guns of the Roorkee Column, advancing from the north, could be heard. The troops were too exhausted for much more manœuvring, and the lamentable and unnecessary lack of intelligence had made the operation very indecisive, the main body of rebels being untouched. Had Sir Colin known the real

lie of the land he would have been able to make more effective dispositions. While this was in progress the Moulvi had doubled back on Shahjahanpur, and attacked fiercely Colonel Hale's detachment there. Sir Colin sent Jones' column to his relief. Crossing the Garra the Moulvi himself led his troops to the attack but quailed before the British guns. The force attacking the gaol was now driven off and Hale relieved, but Jones considered the enemy too numerous for him to attack further and sent to Sir Colin for orders.

In the meantime the Commander-in-Chief flattered himself that he had cleared Rohilkhand and re-established the civil administration, and on the 15th set off on his way to Fatehgarh to get in touch with Lord Canning. Hearing of Jones' situation he turned aside to Shahjahanpur. Arriving there after a terrible thunderstorm on the morning of the 18th, he too found that the Moulvi who had hordes of horse, was too strong to be tackled, and after a skirmish sent for more troops. These arrived on the 23rd after a most trying march in a blinding storm of hot wind and sand. The Moulvi did not wait for Jones and made off towards Pawayan declaring himself King of Hindustan, with a reward of 50,000 rupees on his head. The Rajah of Pawayan had declared for the British and had closed his gates against the Moulvi. The latter furious at such conduct, drove the elephant that he was riding against the massive door of the Rajah's fortified palace to crush an entrance. The Rajah's men fired at him from the loopholed battlements, and the Moulvi was shot dead. This unexpected end to the most relentless of Britain's enemies, did more for the pacification of Rohilkhand than all Sir Colin's heavy columns which but clave a momentary passage as a ship cleaves the sea.

There was now no figure animated by the combined fire of patriotism and misplaced religious hatred.

The Eastern Theatre

That Sir Colin's and Lord Canning's minds should be kept thoroughly stirred and chastened, fate had ordained that

trouble of a serious nature should break out in the hot weather of '58 on the line of the Ganges which had been denuded of some of the troops from England originally distributed thereon, to meet Sir Colin's needs higher up. Kunwar Singh recovered in due course, from the blow that Vincent Eyre had dealt him at Arrah and Jagdispur, and had attracted more of the mutineers from Bundelkhand to his forces, as well as more local rebels and had further stirred up the hill tribes of the Chutia Nagpur district. The 5th Irregulars under the brilliant Major Mackenzie had mutinied at Rohni near the Sonthal Hills, and also the Ranghar Light Infantry, an irregular corps; across the Ganges things were getting worse. At Azamgarh, the 17th, an indifferent regiment under an indifferent C.O. fared no better than the good regiments under good C.O.'s, and mutinied the day before the trouble at Benares. At Chittagong three companies of that bad regiment the 34th, had mutinied so late as November 1857, but had been destroyed by the Sylhet Light Infantry. The regular detachments at Dacca had mutinied, and at Sagauli the 12th Irregular Cavalry, also brilliantly commanded fared no better, though they had been moved about constantly in the cause of law and order by Major Holmes their commander, who in default of General Lloyd, had become the Commissioner of Patna's chief adviser.

Numerous bodies of troops, once Lucknow had been relieved, were halted on their way up, to take part in lesser operations, the relief of small out-stations and the like, and several of the senior officers from England whom Sir Colin did not immediately require were thus employed. But in April 1858 the bigger trouble came, and the example of Kunwar Singh found many imitators, so that western Bihar was in a state of anarchy as well as the hill tracts. For some extraordinary reason the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who was longer than most in grasping the inwardness of what was happening, removed Tayler the admirable Commissioner of Patna from his charge which, despite the feebleness of Lloyd at Dinapore he had kept in wonderful order. With his removal everything crashed, and Halliday who

had deplored and forbidden the proclamation of martial law, was compelled himself to extend it very widely.

But the real trouble came when Kunwar Singh crossed the Ganges in March 1858. Earlier in the cold season General Franks had kept the district between Benares and the Himalaya reasonably quiet, but on his marching off to join the Chief at Lucknow, the district had only a few troops left under Brigadiers Rowcroft and Southeby. Kunwar Singh's force of mutineers and rebels, a large one at the start, soon attracted most of the local *mafsids*, and he encountered a small force under Colonel Milman which he drove into Azamgarh and there beleaguered. At Allahabad the Governor-General had Lord Mark Ker with a portion of his regiment the 13th Foot. He sent Ker with his own men and various detachments to relieve or rather reinforce Milman. This was done successfully enough after some sharp fighting. The Chief then ordered Ker to stand fast till Sir Edward Lugard came down with a strong force of cavalry and guns. When Lugard arrived, Kunwar Singh and his rebels were harried and chased far and wide, Kunwar Singh displaying considerable military ability. A flying column under Douglas was now sent by Lugard to follow the old *thakur*,¹ who had recrossed the Ganges, to his former ground near Arrah, where he was reinforced by a strong body of armed peasantry led by his brother Ammar Singh. Next day he fell on a body of British troops who had moved against him from Arrah, and defeated them handsomely enough. Douglas was now approaching by forced marches in response to the appeal of local authority, but the old Rajput *thakur* had fought his last fight against the mighty English. He died on April 26th, and Ammar Singh led his forces into the jungles. Here Lugard succeeded by Douglas gave them no rest, and all through the sweltering summer and rains, the British troops and the loyal Indians with them, hewed paths in the jungles, swam rivers, and marched till they dropped. The Rajput rebels before them were broken, hopeless men for whom alone the gallows held prospects of peace.

¹ *Thakur*=baron.

Lyall who was then a young civilian with columns that were trampling out the embers, strikes the note of pathos well enough.

Sat twenty Rajpoot rebels,
Haggard and pale and thin,
Lazily chucking the pebbles
Into the foaming lynn.

Two had wounds from a sabre
And one from an Enfield ball,
But no one cared for his neighbour,
There was sickness or wounds on all.

But it was not till Her Majesty's proclamation dated November 1st 1858 announced that the Crown had taken over the direct rule of India that amnesty was offered to all, mutinous soldier or rebel Rajput, who were not definitely guilty of murder.

The Pursuit of Tantia Topi

All this time there was little known of the Nana, who after the fight at Bithur when, driven from his own stronghold, he had crossed the Ganges, was heard of as a myth and through a glass darkly. Time and again had his reputed presence with this or that body of the insurgents been the spur that set officers and men marching long and furiously. Against the Nana and the Nana above all others did fury rage in every European breast. Vengeance had fallen on so many of the other leaders, the Moulvi to whom all Moslems bowed was dead at the gate of a fort, the Delhi princes shot on a dunghill, Bahadur Shah dreaming out his last years in durance, the Rani shot like a rabbit in a ride, Kunwar Singh dead of fatigue, only Tantia Topi the Nana's accomplice remained. Tantia Topi was yet to run his race, and a fine race it was to be, but the Nana remained as elusive then as his fate is unknown now. Many stories have concentrated round him and many a day was the will o' the wisp of his whereabouts chased and dogged. He died no doubt, of

fear and fever in the jungles of the Terai at the base of the Himalaya. For years afterwards story and rumour brought him to light. It was said in the seventies that he was captured, but that Government had forbidden his identification. Even so late as 1891 the Senaputti, the aged Commander-in-Chief of the Himalayan State Manipur at the time of the strange outbreak and murder of Mr. Grimwood and Colonel Quentin, was said to be the Nana. The episode at the time seemed so strange that the idea of years of cherished revenge by a Dundoo Punt still living, seemed a possible explanation of the happening. The yarn had of course, no foundation in fact.

Reference has already been made to the failure of Tantia Topi's last great attempt to re-raise the Maratha legend, and how he then fled on a thousand-mile long chase, in which many flying columns and leaders of irregular horse took part. For many months in Malwa and Central India the game went on. The countryside was dotted with organized intelligence posts, which circulated to all concerned news of his movements, sometimes accurate, often magnified, and as often as not false, but nevertheless his movements were followed with sufficient accuracy to leave him no peace. It will be remembered that it was not till June 19th 1858 that Fortress Gwalior itself fell, and Brigadier Napier from Morar took up the pursuit. With between five and six hundred of the 14th Light Dragoons and Hyderabad Cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, Napier came up with Tantia Topi and the Rao Sahib, the Nana's brother at Jaora Alipur. There was little stand made and Tantia lost all his guns as he vanished into the horizon, and emerged again in Rajputana. He still had plenty of well mounted horsemen and a considerable treasure, and cherished some hopes of doing in Indore what he had failed to do in Gwalior, viz. to raise the Maratha standard. In Rajputana there were plenty of small foci of rebellion, and Tantia Topi now proceeded to make the round, chased from one state to another, from one jungle fastness to the next, from Jeypore in the far north to Asirgarh in the south, from the Aravalli gorges to the great recesses of the Vindhya mountains, as one pack of

hounds after another took up the hunt. Highlanders on fast running camels, artillerymen turned cavalry, infantry in two-wheeled carts, up and down the land, skirmish after skirmish, scamper upon scamper, over the Chambal, down the Narbada, across the Betwa from June 1858 till April 1859, the tally-ho continued, something as Chetu the cruel Pindari had been chased forty years before. At last shorn of his following in the successive actions the despairing rebel fell into the hands of one Man Singh, a Thakur, with a suit for forfeited land, who wanted Government favour, and who agreed to hand him over. 'Be the day short or be the day long at length it ringeth to even-song,' and Tantia Topi, the Nana's prime accomplice, only redeemed by his enthusiasm for the Maratha legend, was brought into Sipri and arraigned before a court martial to which there could be but one ending. After making a statement of his share in the rebellion, a statement which however inaccurate, threw much new light on the Nana's doings, and after declaring probably falsely, that he had no share in any of the murders done at the Nana's hands, Tantia met his end with dignity and courage.

And while his lieutenant harried a thousand miles of territory, his master flickered mysterious before those who sought him so assiduously, and never came to hand. For many years near Poona at the cave temple of Bamburda, a centre of great implacability, dwelt those who were thought to know the secret of the Nana, but whether they did or whether they did not, their secrets died with them.

The Smouldering Embers

In the Central Indian jungles and on the fringe of the Terai, it was long ere news of the amnesty filtered through, and gaunt and hungry outlaws who had now become dacoits were slowly hunted down. The Punjab whose fortunes since the taking of Delhi went smoothly in the main, had several lesser troubles of a different nature before all was quiet. In the Hazara Hills the trouble which at one time threatened the refuge of

Murree has been referred to, as also that in the wild Gogaira jungles near Multan where a rising of camel-grazing tribes was none too well handled and needed sharp work. At Mian Mir the disarmed sepoy obtained weapons, the 26th N.I. slew their colonel, and broke away for Delhi, only to be exterminated by various powers. The civil officer who handled this particular trouble in the districts near the Sutlej acted sternly and promptly, incurring some censure for his action, called forth however not so much for what he did, as for the exulting and heartless manner in which he recorded the retribution exacted.

The masses of disarmed soldiery in the Punjab cantonments had become a source of anxiety as the months rolled on, and though desertion met with the sternest fate, too many troops required elsewhere were locked up in watching them. At Multan where Crawford Chamberlain had carried out the bold and successful disarmament in May 1857, the disarmed troops broke out under the strain of their life under suspicion, and eventually the device was followed of sending disarmed troops to their homes by batches on furlough, after Delhi had fallen.

But except in the recesses of Central India the trouble was over by the hot season of 1859.

Retrospect

For two years had the great war in Northern India rolled backwards and forwards in the suppressing of the crop that the 'Devil's Wind' had raised, and in looking back it will be well to recall the phases into which, as already explained, the terror cast itself, as well as the various theatres in which the tempest raged. *The first phase* was the outbreak of the Mutiny and the immediate action taken by the local authorities.

We have seen how long it took both civil and military opinion to realize that the famous patient, but spoilt, Bengal Army had revolted. We have also seen that there were no reasons sufficient to account for the revolt, but only a series of happenings spread over a long time which had caused the psychological chain by which we held the army to snap.

The second phase was the critical one that resulted from the first, the taking of the stronghold of rebellion in the north, the rescue of that beleaguered garrison whose destruction was to be the test of the rebels' success in the centre.

The third and fourth phases were almost *pari passu*, the destruction of the great centre of rebellion at Lucknow and the sensational marching of a retributory force across Central India. These two may be said to be the actual wars of the period, the operations of armies in the open one against another.

The last phase resolved itself into one of despair and implacability on one side, on the other sheer bush-whacking under arduous conditions.

It will be as well also to glance once again at the areas, the almost separate areas involved, viz. the Punjab, Delhi and Rohilkhand, Oudh, Central India, and the country below Allahabad on both sides of the Ganges, and to remember that the presidencies of Bombay and Madras stood almost aloof and undisturbed.

The great question of whether it was a military mutiny or a rebellion, whether it was engineered by Muhammadan or Hindu, by people or by princes concerning which so much has been said, has been answered in some sense in this review. We have seen that the faithlessness of the Bengal soldiery generally, and the cruel massacres which they started, were redeemed by astounding staunchness of some corps and of individuals in almost all corps, and by the zeal with which the Punjab and the frontier hurried to our service. Further, to our hand and aid was the help of tens of thousands of transport attendants, menials, labourers, and merchants in every theatre, as well as the support which practically all the rulers of independent states gave us, even when their troops went sour, while many Indians saved British refugees at great danger to themselves. We have seen that with the exception of a few people and a few areas where some local grievance genuine or fancied had not queered the pitch, the people of all grades remained quiet and peaceful when not disturbed by the frenzy of the mutinous troops. Where they were so stirred or where

Moslem fanaticism was excited, the town mobs ruthlessly butchered all helpless Christians white or black, stirred as it were by that mass hysteria which in the troops has been termed the 'Devil's Wind.'

Sitting back in the armchairs of time, it is possible to reprobate and condemn the fierce reprisals which were taken against both rebel and mutineer, and there are British writers who like to say that no doubt Neill occupied the same place in the imagination and memory of many Indians as the Nana in ours. That is a style of argument which must be submitted to. There is always some one who will point out that some poor lion has no Christian to devour. In all the stories of reprisals it is the first to move, on whom blame must rest, and the historic saying on the abolition of the death sentence '*Que Messieurs les assassins commencent*' is the last word in such matters.

To Neill and his soldiers the horror of the ruthless slaughter and burning by the mob at Allahabad, added to the stories of the Cawnpore massacres, were a justification that none who have not been so moved can fairly comment on. The absolute necessity at the time, of striking terror, was justification at Allahabad. Renaud's executions on the road to Fatehpur cannot so easily be justified, save by the stories of the murders at that place. In any case it was soon realized that reprisals carried out on the innocent and less culpable, defeated their own object by destroying all source of help and sustenance. When the force got to Cawnpore, the story of the Bibighar massacre of some 200 women and children banished all sense of ruth and of proportion. It is to be remembered that all over the land the bodies of English women and children were to be seen lying on the dungheaps, while stories, happily proved to be untrue or mostly untrue, of dishonour, were freely bandied about.

Neill's punishments were reprobated, not because they were undeserved, but because they were unworthy of the righteous indignation of a great people. The execution of rebel soldiers by blowing away from a gun, was but the use of the customary punishment for rebellion, used by ourselves before in India, and is the practice to this day in Kabul for malefactors. It was

also used first by rebels for the European prisoners, and incidentally, while terrible to look on, is invaluable as a warning, and is incredibly swift and painless as compared with the bough and cart method of hanging. Soldiers who, having taken an oath of allegiance, then mutiny *en masse* and shoot their officers can expect no mercy, at any rate till the mutiny is well in hand. The point in the Mutiny that was deplored by wise men, was the delay in issuing an amnesty proclamation to mutineers as soon as the crisis was over.

This brief résumé of those tragic two years cannot pause or find space to do justice to the deeds of individuals, and no period in our history did more to bring out the hero in those who appeared but ordinary mortals, than this great drama of 1857. Death in endeavours to save a regiment's soul, by officers of all ages, the rescue of women and children against astounding odds, the storming of the Delhi breaches, the defence of Lucknow and of Cawnpore, and of many a lesser garrison, the trudge to death in the heat and sand, the daring charge, the faithful Indian orderly, all combine to give material for a thousand epics. Happily they have been sung to some extent in the detailed histories and biographies of the period which still live in the shelves of our libraries. The fame of the Guides, the Gurkhas and the Punjab Irregulars at Delhi, the faithful Bengal sepoy who served in the defence of the Baillie Guard, the irregular horse who hunted down the rebels at the end, are all stories that live happily in regimental annals.

Less sensational but to be remembered wherever men talk of duty done, is the story of those civil magistrates and officials, British and Indians who remained at their posts when danger threatened on all sides, and many of whom paid for their devotion with their lives.

The part of the Anglo-Indian, to use the official term for those of mixed British and Indian blood, is not to be overlooked. More than their fair share of horror fell on them and their families, as a glance at the memorials in the church of St. James at Delhi alone will show. How sharp death came to old and young, wife and maid, grandparent and grandchild even

unto the third and fourth generation, is duly recorded there. The Eurasian lad as he was then called, who served in many volunteer and irregular corps, such as the Lahore Light Horse, which still survives, did notable service. A corps of artillery drivers did especially valuable service, and it is a reflection on our British sense of justice as well as of proportion, that some serious attempt to retain their services in a portion of the permanent forces of the Crown in India has not been made. The new policy also included an increase of the British Garrison to a figure more commensurate with the liabilities and responsibilities of its army, than was admitted in 1857.

The Crown and the Company

As has been related, the long expected charter of amnesty, came with the assumption of direct control of India by the Crown on November 1st 1858, when the cold weather campaign in Oudh was yet to run. That proclamation was promulgated wherever possible at parades and Durbars, with all the solemnity and dignity suitable to the occasion. The wording of the proclamation stands to this day as the definite pronouncement by the British of their aims towards India, and while producing little that was new in the general plan of ethics and treatment, it definitely set forth an object and a prospect and a guarantee. To this day it is well worthy of study, and looking on the India as we now know it, with its trade increased by four hundred million sterling, with its 40,000 miles of railway, its millions of acres of irrigated deserts and its thousands of miles of canals that set the famine spectre at naught, with its prosperous universities and all that over half a century has brought, there is little that the Anglo-Saxon conscience need accuse itself of.

It is curious and perhaps but illustrates that topsy turveydom to which the east is prone, typified as some say by the Indian robin, that just as Sir John Simon's benevolent all-party commission should reach India to see how the experiment of Parliaments could be extended, the intelligentsia from those

numerous universities should turn in an extravagant fury. That, no doubt, will pass as a better sense of proportion and understanding arrives, provided that Britain does not abjure her rights and her Imperial rôle.

In 1858 no such troubles disturbed the new horizon on which the glamour of the Crown was so clearly reflected, and the Queen's charter set no barrier to the generous development of the Continent. It did however, by the very nature of things, imply that the British in India had rights of their own, as well founded as those of any other of the community, and intended to see them respected.

When the thunder of the guns and the scurrying of rebel and pursuing horse left the countryside, all traces of the mutiny disappeared as quickly as the signs of a river flood that has subsided. Willing hands hurried to restore administration and authority. The change over to the Crown made no visible alteration in the admirable system of the country. It is to be remembered that it was steam and electricity that has changed the world and India with it, and it was a coming that took place but a few years before the Mutiny. The coming of the Crown but coincided with the march of science, the opening of the Suez Canal, and the like, and it may yet be argued that the country would have done as well with the Company, save that Empires and Continents cannot be run for ever under such a banner. In fact, the change was a mere change of name, and a road to a slightly easier Parliamentary overseeing, than anything else.


Rewards were freely given to those Indian servants and subjects, civil and military, who had so stoutly stood by the British and the peace of their own countryside.

The New Army

The reconstitution of the Army which was the direct result of 1857 is the subject which concerns most of those whom this story of catastrophe may interest. The great Bengal Line had blown up. Of 10 regiments of Regular Cavalry all



LORD CANNING
the Governor-General in the great crisis



JOHN LAWRENCE
afterwards Lord Lawrence, Governor-General
of India, the man of the Punjab

*From a picture in the possession of the East India United Service
Club, who have kindly given permission for its publication*

mutinied, of 74 battalions but 13 remained staunch. Part of the Irregular Cavalry remained and they had eventually to be disarmed lest they should turn, and were dismounted for the new corps. Most of the Irregular Infantry and all contingents enlisting in Oudh and Bihar went too. Therefore the work of reconstruction had to be sweeping. One fact emerged before all others; the Punjab Irregulars stood staunch, though the corps had both squadrons and companies of Hindustanis. Only in one corps was there serious trouble. The Sikh corps stood staunch, except the Ludhiana Regiment at Benares which was perhaps mishandled, and had joined the Lucknow mutineers.

The new army was therefore to change its enlistment ground for that of the new Punjab province, but it was also going to change its whole system. No longer was it to stand as a copy in organization and clothing, in shako and in cross-belt, of the British Line. The Irregulars had suffered from the disease far less than the Regulars. The 'Irregular' system would be introduced. It consisted largely in having a small cadre of British officers, and giving Indians of status and family far higher military position in the service. It also postulated a system which was extremely cheap and was well suited for small wars. The Commandants would receive lump pro rata sums and would clothe, mount and feed their corps. The Indian officers who led the troops and companies of Irregulars in the suppression of the Mutiny had shown splendid courage and initiative, and the experience thus gained was to form the whole basis of the new system. The Purbiah soldier had lost his place in the sun. No longer would the generations of a Purbiah village, the Brahmin and the Rajput of Oudh, serve the Crown as he had served the Company. He had been losing his fighting reputation for some time. In the Punjab campaigns he had lost it badly, and in the Mutiny his behaviour as a soldier was by no means equal to the assurance with which he had hurried to defy his masters. The Sikh, the Pathan, the Dogra, the Punjabi Moslem, and the Gurkha had proved themselves the far better men, and therefore in

the reconstruction the number of Purbiahs was to be much reduced.

The cadre of British officers was to be reduced from 24 to 5 or 6. Such officers as riding masters, and quartermasters from the British ranks, were to disappear. This system was to be gradually introduced into the Armies of Madras and Bombay also, with the exception that Madras Light Cavalry should remain mounted by Government. All others would mount themselves from their inclusive rates of pay.

The Indian Army has been so often re-numbered that it is an intricate matter to follow the changes, but it may be said that the new Bengal Army was reduced from 74 battalions to something between 40 and 50 battalions, but that several more Gurkha corps were added. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Bengal Cavalry¹ were formed from eight of the Irregular Corps who did not mutiny or of whom a portion rallied to their officers. The remainder were formed from the new corps that had made such a name for themselves, such as Probyn's, Murray's and Hodson's Horse. Thirteen of the Regular Bengal Infantry² were taken into the new line, forming the first eleven regiments, also the 17th and the 1st Gurkhas, two corps were formed from the loyal survivors of Lucknow and other regiments and two irregular corps were brought into the line.¹ Fifty-one battalions that had carried the Union Jack from China to Egypt, that had crossed bayonets with the French and had climbed the Hindu Kush, disappeared.

Allusion has been made to the hard fate of many of the officers of corps that had revolted, and how those less phenomenally active found themselves without work and often without pay, with nothing to turn their hands to for some time. They felt themselves involved in the general opprobrium and blame, which perhaps in a general sense was theirs, for does not William Russell record that if any one in the Queen's Service had hinted at want of discipline in the Bengal Army, he would have had to fight a duel over it. It was only John

¹ *Vide* Appendix II.

² Includes one Gwalior Regt.

Jacob of the Bombay Army apparently who could say what he thought on the subject and 'get away with it.'

The younger men went off to the Irregular Corps and the new levies, and later some of the elders were wanted as road commandants and baggage masters, but a good number were left to eat their hearts out in the hill resorts and Presidency towns, and it is not to be wondered at that they glowed with some reflected glory, when their rebellious 'Jacks' gave some body of the avengers a towelling, which happily did not often occur.

But when the new settlement came, these officers had to be dealt with. It was considered that the new Irregular Corps should have a cadre of officers, commandant, adjutant, and the like and that these and all extra regimental appointments to which officers should be eligible should be considered 'staff' appointments, a truly Chinese rendering of the term. The whole of the new cadre of officers were in future to belong to three general lists the Bengal, Madras or Bombay 'Staff' Corps. There had grown up during the two years of transition a new category of officers, those posted provisionally from the colleges at Home and who were borne on what was called the 'general' list of each Presidency. They had certain rights as had the older pre-Mutiny officer. New appointments were made to the Staff Corps, and officers of the old and the 'General' Lists were invited to join the Staff Corps or remain on the 'General' List or on the 'cadre of their corps.' This was a complicated arrangement and though the majority joined the Staff Corps, a number remained where they were. Those who remained on the 'Cadres' by some unexpected working of the rules got rapid promotion, and India was for many years full of such men for whom no post could be made available, either in the new corps or in civil employment. They were to be found all over India 'on general duty' in cantonments, serving on boards and courts-martial and similar garrison duties. Many of them commanded old forts such as Asirgarh or Michni on the frontier for years and brought up large families in the casemates.

Before many years of the new dispensation had passed, it

was discovered as might have been expected, that the native officers with their enhanced status and duties were not equal to the war work. The enemy to be met with was more war-like than before and the Indian soldiers would not face the foe save with more British leading. This was first apparent in the fierce campaign on the North-West Frontier in Ambela in 1863. A similar state of affairs had occurred before. In the early days of the Company's armies Indians had held high positions. Then came the time when the foes changed from petty chiefs to large armies of the big states trained and armed on the European model, by European officers. It was then found that more British leading was essential, and hence rose the 'regular' model which had just broken down. Ambela first caused the increase of British officers from the post-mutiny establishment, then the Afghan Wars. The Russian threats and the new armaments produced the same results in a more intensive degree, till we see the Indian Army of 1914 with 13 or 14 British officers per regiment or battalion. The Indians who had the character to fight had not the education to master the modern ways, while those who had the brains, had not the 'guts' and instincts. But for some years nevertheless the education of the martial classes was improving and a start at what is now called 'Indianization' could have been made earlier than the World War. In the future the best results will be obtained from educating in the proper schools the sons of the present type of Indian officers.

As far as the rank and file went, the system inaugurated in 1859 steadily prospered. But a most careful plan of grouping the various clans and races in separate companies enhanced their martial value, and a careful selection of recruits which the anxiety of many to serve made possible, gradually produced a finer Indian Army than had ever been seen before. Gradually the march of the Pax Britannica had undermined the fighting spirit of the southern races, who, not from *malice prepense* as the modern intelligentsia love to say, but with very great regret, have been slowly eliminated from the forces. Long had efforts been made to retain them, but their courage

and endurance failed again and again. More and more reliance has had to be placed on the northern races and more and more careful selection and search among suitable races has been necessary; in all the 350,000,000 of India, it is doubtful if 5,000,000 have the proclivities to bear arms.

The sending of young Indians to Sandhurst, in the hope of giving some of them a career in the Indian Army equivalent to that of British officers is being sympathetically pursued. So long as this is left in the hands of the army authorities, it bears every promise of reasonable success. A Sandhurst in India is a reasonable proposal, but Indian parents apparently prefer to see their sons go to Britain.

Four great military lessons stand out from the Mutiny which have not been forgotten. *First*, the necessity for enhancing and preserving the authority and prestige of the regimental commanding officer. *Secondly*, the necessity for keeping officers with their corps and not allowing them to seek better careers in civil services; in other words to make the regimental careers worth having. *Thirdly*, to see that the men's class peculiarities, which make them often peculiarly suitable soldiers, are not rubbed off by the old promiscuous mingling in the ranks; and *fourthly*, last but not least, that arsenals are kept in European hands.

The camaraderie, affection and respect between officers and men since the Mutiny has been great. It was at its zenith in 1914, it is as high now, and it has resisted the most desperate attempt of the implacables and their Soviet friends in the last ten years, to bring about another Mutiny.

But glorious and charming though this is, it is no new thing and was equally the case in the majority of corps that mutinied. Indeed it was a great feature in many a Russian corps whose men in 1917 drove ten-inch nails through their officers' epaulettes. Still it is a great and admirable phase of Indian Army life, and is perhaps still the principal attraction among the inducements to serve in the Indian Army.

The strain of the World War on this New Army was immense, almost more than we had a right to demand of it

however willing. That it served in the way it did is the most astounding tribute to the system, and the British officers who worked, and to the martial races of India who served so bravely, and also to the masses of non-martial folk, largely India's untouchables, who hurried to serve as labourers. It is an astounding story this epic of Indian Army and Indian followers who helped maintain the Union Jack from the Great Wall to the Flanders Flats, the British and Indian officers proud to lead, the men eager to follow. The men are the sons of those who 'Baillie Guard gya' and who still think that the British Government of India is good enough to serve, and it is equally astounding to think that this faithful army has risen on the ruins of one even more famous and equally Empire-wide in its campaigning, that vanished so disastrously.

The great ship of the Indian Empire rescued and so carefully and faithfully built up, from the thousand pieces of the Mogul crash, is, if well steered, but entering on another phase of her voyage on the world's waters. Rudyard Kipling has taken the allegory of the galley and the galley-slave to express the story and the glory of these days of re-building and the feelings of those who have spent their lives in the work, and it is on that note that this narrative may well close. First the great machine.

Oh gallant was our galley from her carven steering-wheel
To her figurehead of silver and her beak of hammered steel.

and then 1857

Was it storm? Our fathers faced it and a wilder never blew;
Earth that waited for the wreckage watched the galley struggle through.

and then the danger that has always threatened India from the
Oxus.

Yet they talk of times and seasons and of woe the years bring forth,
Of our galley swamped and shattered in the rollers of the North.

and there is just the note of fear lest,

A craven-hearted pilot crams her crashing on the shore.

It is the allegory of the builders who in building have acquired some rights in the edifice.

If a softer note be needed in the hope that never more may India be convulsed, but may come to greater fruition in a condominium, let us quote from Lyall's *Ex occidente Vox*. — First a stanza from 'West to East.'

Let the hard earth soften, and toil bring ease,
Let the king be just and the laws be strong;
Ye shall flourish and spread like the sheltered trees,
And the storms shall end, and the ancient wrong.

Then the reply of 'East to West.'

O men of the wandering sea-borne race,
Your venture was high, but your wars are done,
Ye have rent my veil, ye behold my face;
What is the land that your arms have won ?

APPENDIX I

Note on the Numbering of the Batteries and Troops of the Bengal Artillery

THOSE who wish to follow the action of batteries of artillery both European and Indian in the Mutiny are often puzzled by the varied numbering or the fact that troops and batteries appear under the commander's name and that the same battery may be commanded by more than one man during the period. The full detail is only to be found in the volume of the *History of the Royal Artillery* dealing with the Mutiny written with great charm by the late Colonel Jocelyn, R.A.

It is not of sufficient general interest to give the full detail in this book, but the following will explain puzzling references. In those days the Royal Horse Artillery was organized by lettered 'Troops' and the Bengal Horse Artillery by Brigades of numbered troops, each troop being known by its number and brigade, e.g. 2/3 or 2nd Troop 3rd Brigade. The rest of the Artillery both Royal and Bengal was organized in battalions¹ of several companies, as was also the Artillery of Madras and Bombay. But in both armies there also existed a certain number of batteries of guns and horses with a separate number, which was taken over by a company of artillery, consisting of officers and gunners, from time to time. 'These companies that were not 'in battery' were simply 'garrison companies with Station guns to man and drill, with no drivers, horses, or mobile equipment.' Thus at the time of the Mutiny the 5th Light Field Battery (horses) was in charge of Captain De Tessier's Company of Native Artillery, viz. the 3rd Co., 7th Battn., expressed as 3/7, B.A. The 2nd Field Battery (bullocks) at Lucknow was in the hands of Captain Simonds, 2nd Co., 8th Battn., while the battery at Delhi generally known as Scott's Field Battery was the 14th Horse Field Battery, manned by 3/3 Company. The first six battalions were European and the 7th, 8th, and 9th Native. In the suppression of the Mutiny the Indian and Royal Artillery amalgamated themselves, in anticipating the formal blending of a couple of years later.

¹ Brigades in the Royal Artillery since the Crimea.

APPENDIX II

Order of Battle of Sir Colin Campbell's Force at the Capture of Lucknow

(NOTE. — During the operations units were attached to various formations for short periods, which makes the accounts at times puzzling.)

Cavalry Divn. (Hope Grant)	1st Brigade (Little)	2nd Dragoon Gds. (Bays) 9th Lancers 2nd Punjab Cavalry Det. 1st and 5th P. Cavalry
	2nd Brigade (Campbell)	7th Hussars Mily. Train Cavalry Hodson's Horse Various small corps
1st Divn. (Outram) (But not working as a divn.)	1st Brigade (Russel)	84th Foot 1st Madras Fusiliers Ferozepore Regt.
	2nd Brigade (Franklyn)	5th Fusiliers 78th Highlanders 90th Foot
2nd Divn. (Lugard)	3rd Brigade (Guy)	34th Foot 38th „ 53rd „
	4th Brigade (Adrian Hope)	42nd Highlanders 93rd „ 4th Punjab Infantry
3rd Divn. (Walpole)	5th Brigade (Douglas)	23rd Fusiliers 79th Highlanders 1st Bengal Fusiliers
	6th Brigade (Horsford)	2nd R. Bde. 3rd R. Bde. 2nd Punjab Infantry
4th Divn. (Franks)	7th Brigade (Evelyn)	10th Foot 20th „ 97th „
	Gurkha Brigade	Six Gurkha Battns. from the Nepal force (in addition to Jang Bahadur's own force)

Artillery (Archdale Wilson)

6 Horse batterie	E. and F. Troops, R.H.A. 1 / 1, 2 / 1, 2 / 3, 3 / 3 Bengal H.A.
5 Field batteries	5 / 12, 3 / 14, 6 / 13 R.A. 2 / 3 Bengal Arty. A / 3 Madras Arty.
Siege Train 8 companies	8 / 2, 3 / 8, 6 / 11, 5 / 13 R.A. 4 / 1, 1 / 5, 3 / 5, 4 / 5 Bengal Arty.

APPENDIX III

The Corps of the Bengal Army which Survived the Mutiny

Those corps with an asterisk mutinied but left a sufficiently loyal residue to justify the corps' retention on the Army List.

A. CAVALRY

<i>In 1857.</i>		<i>At the reconstruction.</i>	<i>In 1930.</i>
1st Irregular Cavalry (Multan)		1st Bengal Cavalry	1st Skinner's Horse
2nd " " (Gurdaspur)		2nd " "	2nd Lancers
4th* " " (Hansi)		3rd " "	(Amalgamated with 1st)
6th " " (Jacobabad and Multan)		4th " "	(Amalgamated with 2nd)
7th ¹ " " (Peshawar)		5th " "	3rd Cavalry (Amalgamated as 18th) (Amalgamated with 5th to become 3rd)
8th* " " (Bareilly)		6th " "	
17th ¹ " " (Shamsabad)		7th " "	
18th ¹ " " (Peshawar)		8th " "	

B. INFANTRY

<i>In 1857.</i>		<i>At the reconstruction.</i>	<i>In 1930.</i>
21st Bengal Native Infantry (Peshawar)		1st Bengal Infantry	4/1 Punjab
31st " " (Saugor)		2nd " "	1/7 Rajput
32nd* " " (Barrackpore with detachments out)		3rd " "	" "
33rd ¹ " " (Hoshiarpur)		4th " "	2/7 Rajput
42nd* " " (Saugor)		5th " "	" "
43rd ¹ " " (Barrackpore)		6th " "	1/9 Jats
47th " " (Mirzapur)		7th " "	3/7 Rajput
59th ¹ " " (Amritsar)		8th " "	4/7 Rajput
63rd ¹ " " (Berhampur)		9th " "	4/6 Punjab
65th ¹ " " (Ghazipur)		10th " "	3/9 Jats
70th ¹ " " (Barrackpore)		11th " "	5/7 Rajput
The Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regt. (Shabkadr)		12th " "	2/2 Pioneers
The Shekawati Regt.		13th " "	10/6 Rajput
The Ferozepore Regt. (Allahabad)		14th " "	1/11 Sikh
The Ludhiana Regt.* (Benares)		15th " "	2/11 Sikh
Remnant of 13th, 48th, 71st (Lucknow)		16th (Lucknow)	10/7 Rajput
Remnant of various corps		17th (Loyal)	" "
Alipur Militia (Calcutta)		18th " "	10/9 Jats
66th		1st Gurkha Rifles	1st Gurkha Rifles
Sirmoor Battalion (Dera Dun)		2nd " "	2nd " "
Kumaon Battalion		3rd " "	3rd " "
Naseree Battalion (Jutogh)		4th " "	4th " "
1st Gwalior Infantry (Morar)		41st Bengal Infantry	" "
1st Assam Light Infantry		42nd " "	1/6th " "
2nd Assam Light Infantry		43rd " "	2/8th " "
Sylhet Light Infantry		44th " "	1/8th " "
Rattray's Sikhs (Milty. Police) (Patna and neighbourhood)		45th " "	3/11 Sikh

All the Punjab Irregular Force, became the Punjab Frontier Force, and with the exception of certain corps reduced after the second Afghan War, form the various F. F. Regiments of the new grouping and the 5th Gurkhas.

The Bhopal Battalion, and other Central Indian corps afterwards brought into the line of the Indian army are not included in this table.

¹ Disarmed as a precautionary measure.

* Volunteered for China.

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
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